899 resultados para Explaining intention to play
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The human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) Rev protein is required for nuclear export of late HIV-1 mRNAs. This function is dependent on the mutationally defined Rev activation domain, which also forms a potent nuclear export signal. Transcription factor IIIA (TFIIIA) binds to 5S rRNA transcripts and this interaction has been proposed to play a role in the efficient nuclear export of 5S rRNA in amphibian oocytes. Here it is reported that amphibian TFIIIA proteins contain a sequence element with homology to the Rev activation domain that effectively substitutes for this domain in inducing the nuclear export of late HIV-1 mRNAs. It is further demonstrated that this TFIIIA sequence element functions as a protein nuclear export signal in both human cells and frog oocytes. Thus, this shared protein motif may play an analogous role in mediating the nuclear export of both late HIV-1 RNAs and 5S rRNA transcripts.
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A family of interferon (IFN) regulatory factors (IRFs) have been shown to play a role in transcription of IFN genes as well as IFN-stimulated genes. We report the identification of a member of the IRF family which we have named IRF-3. The IRF-3 gene is present in a single copy in human genomic DNA. It is expressed constitutively in a variety of tissues and no increase in the relative steady-state levels of IRF-3 mRNA was observed in virus-infected or IFN-treated cells. The IRF-3 gene encodes a 50-kDa protein that binds specifically to the IFN-stimulated response element (ISRE) but not to the IRF-1 binding site PRD-I. Overexpression of IRF-3 stimulates expression of the IFN-stimulated gene 15 (ISG15) promoter, an ISRE-containing promoter. The murine IFNA4 promoter, which can be induced by IRF-1 or viral infection, is not induced by IRF-3. Expression of IRF-3 as a Gal4 fusion protein does not activate expression of a chloramphenicol acetyltransferase reporter gene containing repeats of the Gal4 binding sites, indicating that this protein does not contain the transcription transactivation domain. The high amino acid homology between IRF-3 and ISG factor 3 gamma polypeptide (ISGF3 gamma) and their similar binding properties indicate that, like ISGF3 gamma, IRF-3 may activate transcription by complex formation with other transcriptional factors, possibly members of the Stat family. Identification of this ISRE-binding protein may help us to understand the specificity in the various Stat pathways.
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We recently isolated human cDNA fragments that render MCF-7 breast cancer cells resistant to cell death caused by Pseudomonas exotoxin, Pseudomonas exotoxin-derived immunotoxins, diphtheria toxin, and tumor necrosis factor. We report here that one of these fragments is an antisense fragment of a gene homologous to the essential yeast chromosome segregation gene CSE1. Cloning and analysis of the full-length cDNA of the human CSE1 homologue, which we name CAS for cellular apoptosis susceptibility gene, reveals a protein coding region with similar length (971 amino acids for CAS, 960 amino acids for CSE1) and 59% overall protein homology to the yeast CSE1 protein. The conservation of this gene indicates it has an important function in human cells consistent with the essential role of CSE1 in yeast. CAS is highly expressed in human tumor cell lines and in human testis and fetal liver, tissues that contain actively dividing cells. Furthermore, CAS expression increases when resting human fibroblasts are induced to proliferate and decreases when they are growth-arrested. Thus, CAS appears to play an important role in both toxin and tumor necrosis factor-mediated cell death, as well as in cell proliferation.
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Programmed cell death (apoptosis) is a normal physiological process, which could in principle be manipulated to play an important role in cancer therapy. The key importance of p53 expression in the apoptotic response to DNA-damaging agents has been stressed because mutant or deleted p53 is so common in most kinds of cancer. An important strategy, therefore, is to find ways to induce apoptosis in the absence of wild-type p53. In this paper, we compare apoptosis in normal human mammary epithelial cells, in cells immortalized with human papilloma virus (HPV), and in mammary carcinoma cell lines expressing wild-type p53, mutant p53, or no p53 protein. Apoptosis was induced with mitomycin C (MMC), a DNA cross-linking and damaging agent, or with staurosporine (SSP), a protein kinase inhibitor. The normal and HPV-transfected cells responded more strongly to SSP than did the tumor cells. After exposure to MMC, cells expressing wild-type p53 underwent extensive apoptosis, whereas cells carrying mutated p53 responded weakly. Primary breast cancer cell lines null for p53 protein were resistant to MMC. In contrast, two HPV immortalized cell lines in which p53 protein was destroyed by E6-modulated ubiquitinylation were highly sensitive to apoptosis induced by MMC. Neither p53 mRNA nor protein was induced in the HPV immortalized cells after MMC treatment, although p53 protein was elevated by MMC in cells with wild-type p53. Importantly, MMC induced p21 mRNA but not p21 protein expression in the HPV immortalized cells. Thus, HPV 16E6 can sensitize mammary epithelial cells to MMC-induced apoptosis via a p53- and p21-independent pathway. We propose that the HPV 16E6 protein modulates ubiquitin-mediated degradation not only of p53 but also of p21 and perhaps other proteins involved in apoptosis.
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Previous studies have implicated the bcl-2 protooncogene as a potential regulator of neuronal survival. However, mice lacking functional bcl-2 exhibited normal development and maintenance of the central nervous system (CNS). Since bcl-2 appears dispensable for neuronal survival, we have examined the expression and function of bcl-x, another member of the bcl-2 family of death regulatory genes. Bcl-2 is expressed in neuronal tissues during embryonic development but is down-regulated in the adult CNS. In contrast, Bcl-xL expression is retained in neurons of the adult CNS. Two different forms of bcl-x mRNA and their corresponding products, Bcl-xL and Bcl-x beta, were expressed in embryonic and adult neurons of the CNS. Microinjection of bcl-xL and bcl-x beta cDNAs into primary sympathetic neurons inhibited their death induced by nerve growth factor withdrawal. Thus, Bcl-x proteins appear to play an important role in the regulation of neuronal survival in the adult CNS.
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Since the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of Latin American states have attempted to incorporate in some way or another human rights concern into their respective foreign policies, highlighting a history of human rights abuses and the return of democratic political rule as a trigger for galvanizing a commitment to assist in preventing such violations in other countries. Yet, while human rights have come to play a non-trivial role in the contemporary foreign policy of many Latin American states, there is great diversity in the ways and the extent to which they go about incorporating human rights concerns into their foreign policies. Explaining the diversity of human rights foreign policies of new Latin American democracies is at the heat of this project. The main research questions are the following: Why do new democracies incorporate human rights into their foreign policies? And what explains the different international human rights policies of new democracies? To answer these questions, this research compares the human rights foreign policies of Chile and Brazil for over two decades starting from their respective transitions to democracy. The study argues that states commitment to international human rights is the result of the intersection of domestic and international influences. At the international level, the search for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition and credibility affected the adoption of international human rights in both cases but with different degrees of impact. International values and pressures by themselves, while necessary, are an insufficient condition for human rights initiatives perceived to have not insubstantial political, economic or strategic costs. New democracies will be more or less likely to actively include human rights in their international policies depending on the following four domestic conditions: political leadership legitimizing the inclusion of human rights into a state's policies, civil society groups connected to international human rights advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign policy decisions of their government, and the Foreign Ministry's attitudes towards international human rights and the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of the foreign policy process.
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Electron donor-acceptor (EDA) interactions are widely involved in chemistry and their understanding is essential to design new technological applications in a variety of fields ranging from material sciences and chemical engineering to medicine. In this work, we study EDA complexes of carbon dioxide with ketones using several ab initio and Density Functional Theory methods. Energy contributions to the interaction energy have been analyzed in detail using both variational and perturbational treatments. Dispersion energy has been shown to play a key role in explaining the high stability of a non-conventional structure, which can roughly be described by a cooperative EDA interaction.
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Two drafts of a letter regarding Croswell's intention to break his lease due to loud noises.
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Recent economic data points to the seeds of an economic recovery in the European Union. However, significant risks remain and bold policies are still needed. There are three central risks. Competitiveness adjustment is incomplete, casting doubt on the sustainability of public debt. Banking remains unstable and fragmented along national lines, resulting in unfavorable financial conditions, which further erode growth, job creation and competitiveness. Rising unemployment, especially among the young, is inequitable, unjust and politically risky. Germany has a central role to play in addressing these risks. The new German government should work on three priorities: Domestic economic policy should be more supportive of growth and adjustment, with higher public investment, a greater role for high-value added services, and more supportive immigration policy. Germany should support a meaningful banking union with a centralised resolution mechanism requiring a transfer of sovereignty to Europe for all countries including Germany. The establishment of a private investment initiative combined with a European Youth Education Fund and labour market reforms should be promoted. Building on these priorities, a significant deepening of the euro area is needed, with a genuine transfer of sovereignty, stronger institutions and democratically legitimate decision-making structures in areas of common policy.
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The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.
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Cities, more particularly ‘smart’ cities, could become a catalyst for economic and social development. For this to happen, Europe will need a new type of integrated infrastructure, a new urban governance and policy structure, as well as new finance and business models. Successful smart projects will eventually develop into new business models and companies. While the European Commission cannot mandate or regulate this top down, it has a role to play in nurturing new initiatives to allow Europe the possibility of developing its own Google and Apple.
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Introduction. Iceland’s domestic politics and foreign affairs are undergoing drastic changes. After an economic crash, violent protests on the streets of Reykjavik for the first time in Iceland’s history contributed to the defeat of the government. The party system has been altered. A turn has been taken towards Europe after the United States left the island, first by closing its military base in 2006 and then by its clear stance not to assist the country in its economic difficulties. The former close relations with the superpower are unlikely ever to be restored. The EU membership application is placing severe constraints on political parties which are split on the issue and has put in jeopardy the unity of the first left majority in the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi. Society is in a state of flux after an unprecedented economic downscaling and the collapse of almost its entire financial sector – which had boomed rapidly beginning in the mid-1990s. The credibility of politicians, the parliament and the media is in ruins. Iceland’s smallness and its location on the geographical map – one could also say the geopolitical map – has had a profound influence on its domestic and foreign affairs. Iceland is closely associated with the other Nordic states and has adopted many of their domestic characteristics, with important exceptions. On the other hand, the country has come under American influence – geographically, it straddles the Mid-Atlantic rift – and has limited its participation in the European project. Its geographical location in the middle of the North Atlantic has led to a notion that the country’s culture is unique and should be protected by all available means. Politicians continue to play the ‘nationalistic uniqueness’ card with considerable success even though the country has been swept by globalization. Rapid modernization (which only really began in the Second World War with British and American occupations) and sudden engagement with the outside world (which only extended to the general public in the last quarter of the twentieth century) are still slowly but steadily making their mark on the country’s foreign policy. The country’s political discourse and foreign policy still bear the hallmark of the past, i.e. of a small and insular society This paper will address the political developments in Iceland since the 2008 economic crash and place it in a historical context. The aim is to understand Iceland’s present foreign policy and, in particular, the highly contested decision by its government in 2009 to apply for membership of the European Union. The paper is divided into five sections in addition to this introduction and the concluding remarks. First, it starts by explaining the importance in Iceland of a political discourse based on the concept of independence which dates back to the historical narrative of the settlement period. This section will also examine Iceland’s close relations with the other Nordic states – despite important differences between it and the others. Second, the paper will analyse the importance of the party system, i.e. the dominance of the centre-right in Icelandic politics, and the changed nature of the system. Third, it examines how Iceland further distinguishes itself from the other Nordic states in many important features. Fourthly, the paper analyses the country’s three main foreign policy priorities in the post-war period, i.e. extensions of the Exclusive Economic Zone, firm defence arrangements with the US and membership of NATO, and the drive for better market access for marine products – including a partial engagement in the European project. Fifthly, the paper examines how the country’s smallness, in terms of its central administrative capacity, has affected its domestic and foreign policy-making. The concluding section summarizes the main findings concerning the political and historical obstacles that the Social Democratic Alliance faces in its hard-fought battle to change the country’s European Policy.
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1. The priority of Ankara's energy policy is to make Turkey an important transit corridor for energy resources transported to the EU. Turkey wishes to play an active role in the distribution and sale of gas and oil flowing across its territory. 2. Transit and sale of energy resources, and gas in particular, are expected to provide a major source of income for Turkey and a tool by which Ankara will be able to build its position in the region and in Europe. 3. Since Turkey is an EU candidate country, Brussels will probably welcome Turkey's role as a transit corridor as much as Ankara will. 4. The success of Ankara's energy strategy hinges on developments in Turkey's internal energy market. 5. It also depends on a number of external factors including: - Export policies and internal situation in producer countries. Most importantly, it depends on: a. Russia and its energy policy priorities b. Stability in the Middle East. - Policies of consumer countries, including the EU in particular. - Policies of world powers present in the region (USA).
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In this paper I argue that there is a preface paradox for intention. The preface paradox for intention shows that intentions do not obey an agglomeration norm, requiring one to intend conjunctions of whatever else one intends. But what norms do intentions obey? I will argue that intentions come in degrees. These partial intentions are governed by the norms of the probability calculus. First, I will give a dispositional theory of partial intention, on which degrees of intention are the degrees to which one possesses the dispositions characteristic of full intention. I will use this dispositional theory to defend probabilism about intention. Next, I will offer a more general argument for probabilism about intention. To do so, I will generalize recent decision theoretic arguments for probabilism from the case of belief to the case of intention.
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Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06