A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Entry regulation and intersectoral reallocation

We study how restrictions on firm entry affect intersectoral factor reallocation when openeconomies experience global economic shocks. In our theoretical framework, countries trade freelyin a range of differentiated sectors that are subject to country-specific and global shocks. Entryrestrictions are modeled as an upper bound on the introduction of new differentiated goods followingshocks. Prices and quantities adjust to clear international goods markets, and wages adjustto clear national labor markets. We show that in general equilibrium, countries with tighter entryrestrictions see less factor reallocation compared to the frictionless benchmark. In our empiricalwork, we compare sectoral employment reallocation across countries in the 1980s and 1990s withproxies for frictionless benchmark reallocation. Our results indicate that the gap between actualand frictionless reallocation is greater in countries where it takes longer to start a firm.

Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not robust to the inclusion of private information. In particular, this paper analyzes a generalization of the Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model, which relaxes the assumption that all consumers are perfectly informed about the level of fundamentals. In this environment, the KFG equilibrium of zero devaluation is only one of many possible equilibria. In all the other equilibria, the lack of perfect information delays the attack on the currency past the point at which the shadow exchange rate equals the peg, giving rise to unpredictable and discrete devaluations.

Endogenous credit cycles

I develop an overlapping-generations framework in which changes in lending standards generateendogenous cycles. In my economy, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about thequality of their projects need to borrow funds. Intermediaries screen entrepreneurs both throughthe amount of investment undertaken and through the level of entrepreneurial net worth.I show that endogenous regime switches in financial contracts from pooling to separatingand vice-versa may generate fluctuations even in the absence of exogenous shocks. Whenthe economy is in the pooling (separating) regime, lending standards seem lax ( tight ) andinvestment is high (low). Differently from the existing literature, my model does not requireentrepreneurial net worth to be counter cyclycal or inconsequential for determining aggregateinvestment.

The economics of anti-parasite defences in animal societies

RESUME : De nombreuses espèces animales vivent en groupe. Du simple grégarisme aux colonies hautement intégrées de fourmis, la vie sociale a atteint des degrés divers de complexité. Les nombreuses interactions entre membres d'une société favorisent la transmission de parasites. Cela représente un coût potentiel de la vie sociale. Cette thèse s'intéresse aux défenses permettant de réduire le coût du parasitisme dans les colonies de fourmis ainsi qu'à la manière dont le parasitisme a pu façonner certains aspects de ces sociétés. Les colonies de fourmis des bois (Forimica paralugubris) contiennent de grandes quantités de résine de conifères. Cette résine réduit la densité microbienne dans le nid et augmente la survie des ouvrières lors d'infections parasitaires. Dans cette thèse, nous montrons, d'une part, que les ouvrières collectent activement la résine et que ce comportement est plutôt préventif que curatif et, d'autre part, que la résine permet aux ouvrières une utilisation moindre de leurs défenses immunitaires. Ces résultats permettent de conclure que ce comportement réduit l'exposition au parasitisme et qu'il a une fonction adaptative. L'émergence d'un tel comportement de médication chez une espèce d'insectes sociaux illustre le fait que la socialité, bien yue provoquant une exposition accrue au parasitisme, permet également l'émergence de mécanismes sociaux de défense. II a été suggéré que la présence de plusieurs reines au sein d'un même nid (polygynie) améliore la résistance aux parasites en augmentant la diversité génétique au sein de la colonie. En accord avec cette hypothèse, nous montrons qu'une augmentation de la diversité génétique au sein de groupes expérimentaux de Formica selysi améliore leur survie lors d'une infection parasitaire. Cependant, nous suggérons également que sur le terrain, d'autres facteurs corrélés à la polygynie ont des effets antagoniques sur la résistance. Nous montrons par exemple que les ouvrières polygynes semblent avoir une capacité moindre à monter une réponse immunitaire. Certains aspects de la reproduction des fourmis ont pu également être façonnés par le parasitisme. L'accouplement n'a lieu que lors d'une courte période au début de la vie adulte, généralement à l'extérieur de la colonie. Les reines stockent ensuite le sperme et l'utilisent parcimonieusement au cours de leur vie alors que les males meurent rapidement. Nous montrons que les défenses immunitaires des reines de fourmis des bois (F. paralugubris) sont fortement affectées par l'accouplement. Ces modulations immunitaires sont probablement liées à une augmentation de l'exposition au parasitisme lors de l'accouplement ainsi qu'à des blessures copulatoires. I1 semble donc que l'accouplement soit accompagné de coûts immunitaires pour les reines. Dans son ensemble, cette thèse illustre la diversité des mécanismes de défenses contre les parasites dans les sociétés de fourmis. La vie sociale, en offrant un nouveau niveau d'interaction, permet en effet l'émergence d'adaptations originales. Cela explique probablement le grand succès écologique des espèces sociales. SUMMARY : Sociality is widespread among animals and has reached variable degrees of complexity, from loose social Groups to highly integrated ant colonies. The many interactions between members of a social group promote the spread of parasites, but social life also permits the evolution of original defence mechanisms. This thesis sheds light on how ant colonies defend themselves against parasites, and on how parasitism shapes certain aspects of these societies. Wood ants nests (Formica paralugubris) contain large amounts of conifer resin which reduces the microbial density in ant nests and enhances the survival of ants challenged by some pathogens. We show that resin is actively collected by workers and that resin collection is rather a prophylactic than a curative behaviour. Moreover, we suggest that resin reduces the use of the immune defences of workers. Altogether, these results indicate that the use of resin is a collective adaptation to prevent the spread of parasites. The emergence of medication in a social insect species illustrates that sociality does not only increase the exposure to parasites but also allows the emergence of social mechanisms to counter this threat. The number of reproducing queens per colony is a variable trait in ants. It has been suggested that polygyny (the occurrence of multiple queens within a colony), by increasing the colonial genetic diversity, improves disease resistance. In line with this hypothesis, we show that in a socially polymorphic ant (Formica selysi), an experimental increase of colony genetic diversity enhances disease resistance. However, we also suggest that factors covarying with queen number variation in the field have antagonistic effects on parasite resistance. We show for instance that polygyne workers seem to have lower immune defences. Parasites may also shape some aspects of ant queen reproductive biology. Ant queens mate at the beginning of their adult life, usually outside of the colony, and store sperm for several years to fertilize eggs. Males die shortly after mating and queens never remate later in life, which drastically reduces sexual conflicts. Moreover, mating and nest founding occur away from the collective defence mechanisms of the natal colony and might be associated with an increased risk of parasitism. We show that mating affects the immune defences of wood ant queens (F. paralugubris) in multiple ways that are consistent with mating wounds and increased risk of parasitism. We suggest that mating is associated with immunity costs in ants, despite the reduced level of sexual conflicts. Altogether, my thesis illustrates the diversity of anti-parasite mechanisms in ant societies. This sheds light on how sociality, by offering a new level of interactions, allows the evolution of original adaptations, which may explain the wide ecological success of social species.

Altruism, uncertain lifetime and the distribution of wealth

This paper studies the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in ageneral equilibrium framework. It considers an overlapping generationsmodel with production and altruistic preferences in which individualsface an uncertain lifetime and annuity markets do not exist. Thispaper focuses on the role that accidental bequests, voluntary bequests,and non--negativity constraints on bequests play in the dynamics of thedistribution of wealth. It is proved that the equilibrium interestrate is lower than the one that satisfies the modified goldenrule. In this economy, a social security system not only plays aninsurance role, but also prevents capital overaccumulation. In fact,this paper shows that a pay--as--you--go social security systemdecentralizes the social planner solution as a competitive equilibrium.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presenceof private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from suchagreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is anecessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to internationaltransfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the currentworld trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidiesare prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might beoptimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the lastdecades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.

Solving non-linear stochastic models by parameterizing expectations: An application to asset pricing with production

A new algorithm called the parameterized expectations approach(PEA) for solving dynamic stochastic models under rational expectationsis developed and its advantages and disadvantages are discussed. Thisalgorithm can, in principle, approximate the true equilibrium arbitrarilywell. Also, this algorithm works from the Euler equations, so that theequilibrium does not have to be cast in the form of a planner's problem.Monte--Carlo integration and the absence of grids on the state variables,cause the computation costs not to go up exponentially when the numberof state variables or the exogenous shocks in the economy increase. \\As an application we analyze an asset pricing model with endogenousproduction. We analyze its implications for time dependence of volatilityof stock returns and the term structure of interest rates. We argue thatthis model can generate hump--shaped term structures.

On money as a medium of exchange when goods vary by supply and demand

Models of the exchange process based on search theory can be usedto analyze the features of objects that make them more or less likely toemerge as ``money'' in equilibrium. These models illustrate the trade--offbetween endogenous acceptability (an equilibrium property) and intrinsiccharacteristics of goods, such as storability, recognizability, etc. Inthis paper, we look at how the relative supply and demand for various goodsaffect their likelihood of becoming money. Intuitively, goods in highdemand and/or low supply are more likely to appear as commodity money,subject to the qualification that which object ends up circulating as amedium of exchange depends at least partly on convention. Welfare propertiesare discussed.

Offshoring and directed technical change

To study the short-run and long-run implications on wage inequality, we introducedirected technical change into a Ricardian model of offshoring. A unique final good isproduced by combining a skilled and an unskilled product, each produced from a continuumof intermediates (tasks). Some of these tasks can be transferred from a skill-abundant Westto a skill-scarce East. Profit maximization determines both the extent of offshoring andtechnological progress. Offshoring induces skill-biased technical change because it increasesthe relative price of skill-intensive products and induces technical change favoring unskilledworkers because it expands the market size for technologies complementing unskilled labor.In the empirically more relevant case, starting from low levels, an increase in offshoringopportunities triggers a transition with falling real wages for unskilled workers in the West,skill-biased technical change and rising skill premia worldwide. However, when the extentof offshoring becomes sufficiently large, further increases in offshoring induce technicalchange now biased in favor of unskilled labor because offshoring closes the gap betweenunskilled wages in the West and the East, thus limiting the power of the price effectfueling skill-biased technical change. The unequalizing impact of offshoring is thus greatestat the beginning. Transitional dynamics reveal that offshoring and technical change aresubstitutes in the short run but complements in the long run. Finally, though offshoringimproves the welfare of workers in the East, it may benefit or harm unskilled workers inthe West depending on elasticities and the equilibrium growth rate.

The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.