962 resultados para Environmental policy instruments
Resumo:
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between government measures, volunteer participation, climate variables and forest fires. A number of studies have related forest fires to causes of ignition, to fire history in one area, to the type of vegetation and weathercharacteristics or to community institutions, but there is little research on the relation between fire production and government prevention and extinction measures from a policy evaluation perspective.An observational approach is first applied to select forest fires in the north east of Spain. Taking a selection of fires with a certain size, a multiple regression analysis is conducted to find significant relations between policy instruments under the control of the government and the number of hectares burn in each case, controlling at the same time the effect of weather conditions and other context variables. The paper brings evidence on the effects of simultaneity and the relevance of recurring to army soldiers in specific days with extraordinary high simultaneity. The analysis also brings light on the effectiveness of twopreventive policies and of helicopters for extinction tasks.
Resumo:
This manual captures the experience of practitioners in the Iowa Department of Transportation’s (Iowa DOT’s) Office of Location and Environment (OLE). It also documents the need for coordinated project development efforts during the highway project planning, or location study phase and engineering design. The location study phase establishes: * The definition of, and need for, the highway improvement project * The range of alternatives and many key attributes of the project’s design * The recommended alternative, its impacts, and the agreed-to conditions for project approval The location study process involves developing engineering alternatives, collecting engineering and environmental data, and completing design refinements to accomplish functional designs. The items above also embody the basic content required for projects compliant with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 19691, which directs federal agencies to use a systematic, interdisciplinary approach during the planning process whenever proposed actions (or “projects”) have the potential for environmental impacts. In doing so, NEPA requires coordination with stakeholders, review, comment, and public disclosure. Are location studies and environmental studies more about the process or the documents? If properly conducted, they concern both—unbiased and reasonable processes with quality and timely documents. In essence, every project is a story that needs to be told. Engineering and environmental regulations and guidance, as documented in this manual, will help project staff and managers become better storytellers.
Resumo:
In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy
Resumo:
In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy
Resumo:
Research on regulation has crossed paths with the literature on policy instruments, showing that regulatory policy instruments contain cognitive and normative beliefs about policy. Thus, their usage stacks the deck in favor of one type of actor or one type of regulatory solution. In this article, we challenge the assumption that there is a predetermined relationship between ideas, regulatory policy instruments, and outcomes. We argue that different combinations of conditions lead to different outcomes, depending on how actors use the instrument. Empirically, we analyze 31 EU and UK case studies of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) - a regulatory policy instrument that has been pivotal in the so-called better regulation movement. We distinguish four main usages of RIA, that is, political, instrumental, communicative, and perfunctory. We find that in our sample instrumental usage is not so rare and that the contrast between communicative and political usages is less stark than is commonly thought. In terms of policy recommendations, our analysis suggests that there may be different paths to desirable outcomes. Policymakers should therefore explore different combinations of conditions leading to the usages they deem desirable rather than arguing for a fixed menu of variables.
Resumo:
The Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT), Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR), and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) are proposing to improve the interstate system around Council Bluffs with improvements extending across the Missouri River on I-80 to east of the I-480 interchange in Omaha, Nebraska, see Figure 1-1. The study considers long-term, broad-based transportation improvements along I-80, I-29, and I-480, including approximately 18 mainline miles of interstate and 14 interchanges (3 system1, 11 service), that would add capacity and correct functional issues along the mainline and interchanges and upgrade the I-80 Missouri River Crossing. These improvements, once implemented, would bring the segments of I-80 and I-29 up to current engineering standards and modernize the roadway to accommodate future traffic needs. In 2001, Iowa DOT and FHWA initiated the Council Bluffs Interstate System (CBIS) Improvements Project. The agencies concluded that the environmental study process would be conducted in two stages; that is, a tiered approach would be applied. The project is being conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1502.20, and FHWA 23 CFR Part 771.111, that permit tiering for large, complex NEPA studies. Tier 1 is an examination of the overall interstate system improvement needs, including a clear explanation of the area’s transportation needs, a study of alternatives to satisfy them, and broad consideration of potential environmental and social impacts. The Tier 1 evaluation is at a sufficient level of engineering and environmental detail to assist decision makers in selecting a preferred transportation strategy. Tier 1 includes preparation of a draft and final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that would disclose the potential environmental and social effects (evaluated at a planning level that considers a variety of conceptual designs) of the proposed improvements. The final EIS will conclude with a Record of Decision (ROD) that states the preferred plan for improvements to be implemented. Essentially, the Tier 1 document will establish the planning framework for the needed improvements. Because the scope of the overall system improvements is large, the interstate improvements would be implemented as a series of individual projects that fit into the overall planning framework. The Tier 1 Area of Potential Impact, which is discussed in detail in Section 4 is an alternative that considers a combination of the most reasonable concepts that have been developed, buffered by approximately 100 or more feet to ensure that any Tier 2 design modifications would remain inside the outer boundary.
Resumo:
En los últimos años, ha habido un creciente interés por la integración de la ciencia y la toma de decisiones políticas en cuestiones medioambientales. Se considera que los científicos pueden facilitar la resolución de problemas medioambientales complejos a través de una mayor implicación en el proceso político. Sin embargo, las diferencias de valores e intereses entre los científicos y los políticos y otros grupos de interés pueden dificultar esta integración. Este estudio analiza, a partir de entrevistas semiestructuradas a científicos medioambientales, las creencias y las actitudes de los científicos hacia el papel de la ciencia y los científicos en el proceso político medioambiental.
Resumo:
Optimal tax formulas expressed in "sufficient statistics" are usually calibrated under the assumptionthat the relevant tax elasticities are unaffected by other available policy instruments.In practice though, tax authorities have many more instruments than the mere tax rates andtax elasticities are functions of all these policy instruments. In this paper we provide evidencethat tax elasticities are extremely sensitive to a particular policy instrument: the level of taxenforcement. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in France in 1983, when the taxadministration tightened the requirements to claim charitable deductions. The reform led to asubstantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration, which can becredibly attributed to overreporting of charitable contributions before the reform, rather thanto a real change in giving behaviours. We show that the reform was also associated with asubstantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions. This findingallows us to partially identify the elasticity of overreporting contributions, which is shown tobe large and inferior to -2 in the lax enforcement regime. We further show using bunching oftaxpayers at kink-points of the tax schedule that the elasticity of taxable income also experienceda significant decline after the reform. Our results suggest that optimizing the tax rate fora given tax elasticity when other policy instruments are not optimized can lead to misleadingconclusions when tax authorities have another instrument that could set the tax elasticity itselfat its optimal level as in Kopczuk and Slemrod [2002].
Resumo:
This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.