Dinero y política en Argentina: financiamiento de campañas, resultados electorales y elección de políticas en el período 2003-2011.

En el contexto de profundización democrática de los últimos 30 años en América Latina, adquieren cada vez mayor relevancia las instituciones políticas de la democracia. Entre estas, las elecciones periódicas y libres tienen una importancia crucial como mecanismo agregador de las preferencias individuales y como mecanismo disciplinador de los representantes electos (mecanismo de accountability). El financiamiento de campañas electorales puede, sin embargo, introducir distorsiones significativas que tengan efectos sobre quienes efectivamente resultan electos y sobre el grado de competencia electoral efectivo. Intereses especiales y sectoriales juegan un rol clave en este proceso por cuanto sus motivaciones para contribuir a las campañas partidarias frecuentemente son lobbísticas y no ideológicas. De este modo, la elección de políticas por parte de los representantes electos puede estar condicionada a los intereses sectoriales y no reflejar los intereses generales, generando y/o profundizando asimetrías socio-económicas. El objetivo general de esta investigación es contribuir al estudio teórico y empírico de la relación entre dinero y política en el caso de Argentina. Más concretamente, se investiga la relación entre el financiamiento de campañas, los resultados electorales y la elección de políticas para el período 2003-2011. Estudiar estas relaciones involucra examinar los efectos políticos --resultados electorales- y económicos --elección de políticas- asociados. Utilizando una novedosa base de micro-datos, podemos analizar estas relaciones y adicionalmente las implicancias que los cambios en el diseño institucional poseen sobre aquellas variables. Finalmente, se avanzará en la construcción de modelos que tengan en cuenta la interdependencia entre las variables. Este proyecto constituye el primer intento de abordar la relación entre el dinero y la política a través del estudio del financiamiento de campañas electorales desde un enfoque teórico-empírico exhaustivo. Las contribuciones originales previstas son: la formulación de un modelo teórico de economía-política que intenta explicar las relaciones y los canales entre el financiamiento de campañas políticas, los resultados electorales y la elección de políticas; el estudio de la relación empírica entre estas tres variables nterdependientes usando una base de datos única en su tipo; un avance en relación al impacto de las reformas institucionales sobre los resultados políticos y económicos.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

The 2004 election in Spain: terrorism, accountability, and voting

In this paper the electoral consequences of the Islamist terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004 are analysed. According to a quantitative analysis based on a post-electoral survey, we show the causal mechanisms that transform voters’ reactions to the bombings into a particular electoral behaviour and estimate their relevance in the electoral results on March 14, 2004

Las Elecciones municipales de 2007 en Cataluña

A partir d’una breu explicació de l’evolució electoral produïda a Catalunya des dels comicis municipals de 1999, es realitza una aproximació als resultats de les darreres eleccions municipals de maig de 2007 des d’una òptica doble. D’una banda s’analitzen els resultats electorals en les seves diverses vessants, es a dir, es tracta el comportament electorals dels ciutadans de Catalunya reflectit en la participació i en el vot als principals partits, sempre tenint present la particularitat de l’existència d’un sistema propi de partits polítics, diferent de que s’ha configurat al conjunt d’Espanya. En segon lloc s’analitza l’evolució de la representació política que aquests resultats electorals ha produït i, per tant, la configuració dels Ajuntaments catalans com a resultat del seu procés constitutiu.

Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

The disadvantage of winning an election

This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.