The Importance of Using Games to Teach English in the 3rd Cycle

The title of this thesis is “The importance of using games to teach English in the 3rd Cycle”. I choose this topic because I think that games are important in the process of learning and because in my opinion not only students but people in general are more motivated to learn when they are having fun or when they are doing something that is interesting. Some authors argue that games stimulate learners to practise, to activate and extend their English vocabulary, and that most students feel more motivated to learn and learn more easily when they are having fun. Games make demands on learners’ intelligence and imagination and calls for active participation. That is exactly what 3rd Cycle students and teachers need in order to have success in their studies and work respectively. The 3rd Cycle students have covered the majority of the grammar and functions contents of the English curriculum in the previous Cycles (the 1st and 2nd Cycle) and in the 3rd Cycle the students need most of their time to put into practice what they have learned before. Games are an effective method to put in practice what they have learned before and also through games they have several contexts and different situations to explore in order to show their knowledge or their vocabulary. The 3rd Cycle students need methods that motivate them to learn and to participate in class and since they already study a specific language function. If the teacher uses an enjoyable method like games students will not get bored and they will be more motivate to participate in class.

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.

The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games

We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjectschoose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and acostly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are themost frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent withoutrole uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with roleuncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four differenttypes of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse andCompetitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of SocialWelfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additionaltreatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in theexperiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctlyunderstand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions weremost frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim tomeasure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Little Spirit Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Project Overview, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Silver Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Center Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-West Okoboji Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Lower Gar Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Lake Minnewashta, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Upper Gar Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-East Okoboji Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Big Spirit Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.