Countries under Adjustment Programmes: What role for the ECB? CEPS Special Report No. 124, December 2015

Providing ‘technical assistance/advice’ on programmes for countries under financial stress is well within the mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Being fully part of the Troika, however, is a different role. Formally the ECB does not participate in the ‘decision-making’ on programmes (decisions are taken by the Finance Ministers – and the IMF). However, the ECB is part of the ‘decision-shaping’ process. These two roles have often been confused. The ECB should interpret its formal role in future ESM (European Stability Mechanism) programmes as narrowly as possible. Providing advice but avoid taking part in the operational work of programme surveillance. The ECB should de facto leave the Troika. At any rate, future incidents like the Italian or Spanish letters will be superseded by the OMTs (outright monetary transactions) and an Irish-type situation would be shaped by the legal framework of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the potential funding from the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). An additional issue for the ECB is internal coherence: Its six-member Executive Board manages the participation in the Troika, monetary policy is decided by the Governing Council and banking supervision is under the Supervisory Board, separated in principle by Chinese walls from the (rest of the) ECB.

Banking crisis yet again and how to fix it. CEPS Commentary, 15 February 2016

Almost out of the blue, a combination of diverse factors has elicited a run on bank stocks and junior and senior debt, raising the spectre of a renewed systemic bank crisis within the European Union. The policy response cannot come from the European Central Bank but, instead, must consist of regulatory responses capable of dispelling the uncertainty over future prudential capital requirements while also temporarily suspending the rules on state aid cum bail-in that had ignited the crisis.

The negative rates club. CEPS Commentary, 19 February 2016

For the better part of a decade, central banks have been making only limited headway in curbing powerful global deflationary forces. Since 2008, the US Federal Reserve has maintained zero interest rates, while pursuing multiple waves of unprecedented balance-sheet expansion through large-scale bond purchases. The Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank have followed suit, each with its own version of so-called quantitative easing (QE). Yet inflation has not picked up appreciably anywhere.

The United States dominates global investment banking: does it matter for Europe? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2016/06, March 2016

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the market share of US investment banks is increasing, while that of their European counterparts is declining. We present evidence that US investment banks are on the verge of taking over pole position in European investment banking. Meanwhile, since 2015, Chinese investment banks have overtaken American and European investment banks in the Asia-Pacific market. Credit rating agencies and investment banks are the gatekeepers of the capital markets. The European supervisory institutions can effectively supervise the European operations of these US-managed players. On the political side, we suggest that the European Commission should continue to view its, albeit declining, banking industry as a strategic sector. The Commission, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England should jointly develop a strategic agenda for the EU-US Regulatory Dialogue. Finally, corporates rely on investment banks to issue new securities. We recommend that the big European corporates should cherish the (few) remaining European investment banks, by giving them at least one place in otherwise US- dominated banking syndicates. That could help to avoid complete dependence on US investment banks.

The ECB’s Latest Gimmick. Cash for loans, CEPS Policy Brief No. 341, March 2016

Among several important monetary policy initiatives decided by the European Central Bank on 10 March 2016 was the launch of a new set of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II), expanding on the previous TLTRO. In assessing this scheme, which might cost up to €24 billion, this Policy Brief finds that while it could become important, it is questionable whether it will achieve its goal of encouraging the extension of credit for new investment, as banks can easily window dress their loan book.

Three score and ten years of co-operative banking in Massachusetts /

Map on lining papers.

Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. While households with large holdings of securities from stressed Euro area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) de-crease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Euro area crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Euro area countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. Only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration. Our results are robust to falsification tests, and instrumental variables estimation.

Translation practices in political institutions:a comparison of national, supranational, and non-governmental organisations

This article explores the settings and practices of translation at three types of political institutions, i.e. national, supranational, and non-governmental organisations. The three institutions are the translation service of the German Foreign Office, the translation department of the European Central Bank, and translation provision by the non-governmental organisation Amnesty International. The three case studies describe the specific translation practices in place at these institutions and illustrate some characteristic translation strategies. In this way, we reflect on how different translation practices can impact on translation agency and how these practices in turn are influenced by the type of institution and its organisational structure. The article also aims to explore to which extent the characteristics of collectivity, anonymity and standardisation, and of institutional translation as self-translation are applicable to the institutions under discussion.

Monetary policy preferences of the EMU and the UK

We estimate the central bank policy preferences for the European Monetary Union and for the UK. In doing so, we extend the theoretical framework suggested by Cecchetti etal. (TheManchesterSchool, Vol. 70 (2002), pp. 596-618), by assuming that policy preferences change across different regimes. Our empirical results suggest that the weight that policy makers put on inflation is typically profound. Furthermore, it appears that volatility shifts of the economic disturbances are the main factor, which generates variation in policy preferences.

Kiigazítás recesszió nélkül. Esettanulmány a magyar stabilizációról = Adjustment without recession: A Case Study of Hungarian Stabilization

1995. március 12-én a magyar kormány és a központi bank szigorú kiigazítási és stabilizációs programot hirdetett meg. A cikk az első eredmények számbavételére tesz kísérletet. A program meghirdetése előtt Magyarország két egymást követő év- ben hatalmas fizetésimérleg-hiányt mutatott fel, és nemzetközi megítélése romlani kezdett. A program radikális intézkedései nyomán elkerülhetővé vált a mexikói vál- sághoz hasonló pénzügyi katasztrófa. Sok makrogazdasági mutató jól érzékelhető javulást jelez: lényegesen csökkent a kereskedelmi mérleg és a folyó fizetési mérleg hiánya, a költségvetés elsődleges egyenlege pozitív lett. Az ilyesféle stabilizációs programokat rendszerint súlyos visszaesés és a munkanélküliség nagy növekedése kíséri. Magyarország elkerülte ezeket a mellékhatásokat: a GDP drasztikus vissza- esés helyett valamelyest tovább növekedett, és a munkanélküliség változatlan ma- radt. A javulásnak nagy ára volt: az életszínvonal erőteljes csökkenése, az infláció felgyorsulása, bár a magyarországi infláció még mindig a kézben tartott, mérsékelt infláció sávjában maradt. A cikk ismerteti a program heterodox módszereit: 1. nagy leértékelés, az előre meghirdetett csúszó árfolyam rezsimjének bevezetése, valamint ideiglenes import- vámpótlék kivetése; 2. határozott jövedelempolitika, amely 12 százalékos reálbércsök- kenést kényszerített ki; 3. fiskális intézkedések, köztük jóléti jogosultságok csök- kentése (a program meghirdetése előtt ezek a jogosultságok tabuk voltak); 4. a hitel- kínálat átcsoportosítása a vállalati szektor javára, a jövedelmezőség növekedése; 5. feszített (bár nem mértéktelenül feszített) monetáris politika, amely lehetővé tette a sikeres vállalatok expanzióját; 6. a privatizáció felgyorsítása, nagy és sikeres lépé- sek egyes kulcsszektorok (energia, telekommunikáció) privatizációjában. Végezetül a tanulmány óva int a túlzott magabiztosságtól és felhívja a figyelmet a potenciális veszélyekre. A makrogazdasági javulás még törékeny. A magyar fejlődés legbiztatóbb sajátossága a termelékenység erőteljes és folyamatos növekedése. / === / On March 12, 1995 Hungary s government and central bank announced a tough program of adjustment and stabilization. This study is an attempt to asses the first results. Before the announcement of the program Hungary had a huge current account deficit for two consecutive years, and her international reputation started to decline. The program s radical measures made it possible to avoid a Mexico-style financial catastrophe. Many macroeconomic indicators show tangible improvement: the trade deficit and the deficit on the current account have been reduced significantly, the primary budget shifted to surplus. These kinds of adjustment programs are usually associated with deep recession and a large increase of unemployment. Hungary avoided these adverse side-effects: GDP instead of a drastic decline, continued to grow somewhat, and unemployment remained unchanged. There was a high price for the improvement: a sharp decline in the standard of living, and an acceleration of inflation, although Hungary is still in the range of controlled, moderate inflation. The paper describes the heterodox instruments of the program: (1) large devaluation, followed by a new exchange rate regime of pre-announced crawling peg, and a temporary import surcharge, (2) energetic income policy, enforcing a 12% cut in real wages; (3) fiscal measures, including cuts in welfare entitlements. That happened for the first time: before the program entitlements had been regarded as taboo ; (4) reallocation of credit supply in favor of the enterprise sector; increase of profitability; (5) tight (but not excessively tight) monetary policy, allowing the expansion of successful private busi- ness; (6) acceleration of privatisation, including large and successful steps in the privatisation of some key sectors (energy, telecommunication). Finally the paper warns against excessive self- confidence and draws the attention to potential dangers. The macroeconomic improvement is still fragile. The most reassuring feature of Hungary s development is the impressive and persistent improvement of productivity.

Monetary efficacy in the community level

Hypothesis of the paper is that the monetary room for manoeuvre in the European Community is determined by the institutional and strategic characteristics of the ECB, moreover the financial market environment composed by multi-state community. The methodology of the paper is built on the evaluation of the decision making and strategy of ECB as institutional aspect, and the monetary transmission in national financial markets. In policy evaluation, the monetary targeting is surveyed through HICP, monetary base, central bank rates, exchange rates and treatment of price impacts. The transmission is examined through analysis of structure of the member state’s financial markets.

The Reverse Balassa–Samuelson Effect in the Euro Zone

The debt crisis of the eurozone revealed a structural problem of the single market. The single currency created a pegged foreign exchange system among the euro member states. Thus, the less competitive countries can not improve their wage competitiveness through devaluation, but are motivated to extend the current consumption as the single central bank rate and the zone stability created cheap debt financing. The paper overviews the process of Reverse Balassa-Samuelson effect to explain the importance of external imbalance in the debt crisis.

Odüsszeuszi utazás – az előretekintő iránymutatás tapasztalatai = An Odysseian journey - experience with forward guidance

Az alsó kamatkorlát melletti előretekintő iránymutatás a kamatpolitika helyettesítője, a várakozások és a pénzpiaci hozamok befolyásolásának nem konvencionális monetáris politikai eszköze. A jegybank a piaci szereplők számára előre jelezheti az alacsony kamatkörnyezet tartós fennmaradását (delphoi típus), és kötelezettséget is vállalhat erre (odüsszeuszi típus). Ez utóbbi esetben megváltozik a jegybanki reakciófüggvény: a jegybanki kamatdöntésekben nem az inflációs kilátások és az inflációs cél közötti eltérés, illetve a kibocsátási rés jut kitüntetett szerephez, hanem valamilyen állapotváltozó alakulása vagy az időtényező. A reakciófüggvény változásának hitelessége esetén a hozamok csökkenésére lehet számítani. Ha a jegybank a kamatszint fenntartásának feltételéül az állapotváltozók olyan értékeit jelöli meg, amelyek teljesülése esetén az inflációs célkövetés szabályai szerint amúgy sem emelt volna kamatot, akkor az előretekintő iránymutatás „üres beszéd”, és a hozamokra gyakorolt hatás is elmaradhat. Egyelőre nem eldönthető, hogy az előretekintő iránymutatás a kamatpolitika átmeneti helyettesítőjéből annak tartós kiegészítő elemévé válik-e. _____ Forward guidance is a substitute for interest-rate policy where the zero lower boundary applies. It is an unconventional monetary policy instrument intended to influence market yields and expectations. The central bank may give signals (forecasts) to the market on lasting maintenance of a low interest-rate environment (Delphi type) or may commit itself to do so (Odysseus type). In the latter case the reaction function changes: instead of inflation prospects and output gap, the main role in central bank rate decisions becomes the evolution of given macroeconomic state variables or the time factor. If changes of the reaction function are credible, a drop in security yields are expected. Forward guidance is just cheap talk if such values in economic state variables are set as conditions for keeping interest rates unchanged, which based on the rules of inflation targeting would not trigger an interest rate increase, regardless. In that case, no impact on yields may occur. For the time being it cannot be decided whether forward guidance is transitory or a lasting instrument of monetary policy.

Empirical study of exchange rates in Brazil, Canada and the Caribbean

This dissertation examines the monetary models of exchange rate determination for Brazil, Canada, and two countries in the Caribbean, namely, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. With the exception of Canada, the others adopted the floating regime during the past ten years.^ The empirical validity of four seminal models in exchange rate economics were determined. Three of these models were entirely classical (Bilson and Frenkel) or Keynesian (Dornbusch) in nature. The fourth model (Real Interest Differential Model) was a mixture of the two schools of economic theory.^ There is no clear empirical evidence of the validity of the monetary models. However, the signs of the coefficients of the nominal interest differential variable were as predicted by the Keynesian hypothesis in the case of Canada and as predicted by the Chicago theorists in the remaining countries. Moreover, in case of Brazil, due to hyperinflation, the exchange rate is heavily influenced by domestic money supply.^ I also tested the purchasing power parity (PPP) for this same set of countries. For both the monetary as well as the PPP hypothesis, I tested for co-integration and applied ordinary least squares estimation procedure. The error correction model was also used for the PPP model, to determine convergence to equilibrium.^ The validity of PPP is also questionable for my set of countries. Endogeinity among the regressors as well as the lack of proper price indices are the contributing factors. More importantly, Central Bank intervention negate rapid adjustment of price and exchange rates to their equilibrium value. However, its forecasting capability for the period 1993-1994 is superior compared to the monetary models in two of the four cases.^ I conclude that in spite of the questionable validity of these models, the monetary models give better results in the case of the "smaller" economies like the Dominican Republic and Jamaica where monetary influences swamp the other determinants of exchange rate. ^