869 resultados para Bergama (Turkey). Temple of Trojan.
Resumo:
Once the West’s ally, Turkey has been an ever more problematic partner in recent years. The Turkish leadership no longer views the alliance with the European Union and membership in NATO as based on shared values; rather, it is now merely a cherry-picked and shaky community of interests. Turkey is also increasingly alienated politically in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the regional developments which followed, Ankara has lost much of the influence it had built in region in previous years. Turkey’s growing international isolation is a consequence of the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy to the ideology of the ruling AKP. The world vision offered by that ideology does not square with the diagnoses of Turkey’s partners. The objectives it sets for Turkish foreign policy are incompatible with its partners’ expectations. Moreover, a foreign policy rooted in ideology is less flexible and less capable of adjusting to current international dynamics.
Resumo:
Since the AKP took power in 2002, Turkey has seen a replacement of the state’s elites, a real change of the political system and a redefinition of the state identity. All this has been accompanied by economic development and rapid social transformation. The pro-democratic reforms and improved prosperity in the first decade of the AKP’s rule created the opportunity for Turkey to become part of the West in terms of legal and political standards, while maintaining its cultural distinctness. However, from the point of view of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of a new Turkey, the political reforms turned out not to be a goal per se but a means to the end of achieving a monopoly on power. Once this goal was achieved, Erdogan began leading Turkey towards the status of an autocratic state focused on the Middle East and resentful towards the West. This trend is unlikely to be reversed under Erdogan’s rule. However, even if the government were to change, there would be no return to the Turkey from before the AKP era. In turn, the Turkish public will have to answer the questions regarding its civilisational identity and the vision of the political and social order.
Resumo:
Back in the autumn of 2014, the deal between Russia and Turkey on the Turkish Stream pipeline was expected to start a period of close energy cooperation between the two countries, potentially able to change the energy game in the region and consolidate political relations in a long-term perspective. One year later, after announcing the project’s size would be reduced by half, Moscow suspended the negotiations in retaliation to the downing of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish Air Force at the border between Turkey and Syria. This seems to complement growing doubts about Turkish Stream, which already started as a result of Russia’s military involvement in Syria. From an EU perspective, recent developments raise doubts about Turkey’s role in the Union’s energy strategy.
Resumo:
The 7 March EU-Turkey migration crisis summit took place three days after the Turkish authorities seized Feza media group, which includes Turkey’s largest circulation daily Zaman and its English language sister paper Today’s Zaman. The seizure was the latest development in the worst crackdown on fundamental rights and freedoms Turkey has witnessed in decades. Yet because Turkey is vital in dealing with the migration/refugee crisis, the EU’s response was meek to say the least. For the first time since the Cold War – when Turkey was key in shoring up Europe’s security – Ankara has found itself in a particular position of strength. Turkey has skillfully exploited the EU’s and particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s urgent need to find a way out of the crisis.
Resumo:
The March 2016 EU Summit was yet another attempt to make progress on managing the EU’s migration/refugee crisis. In this post-summit analysis, Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that the EU-Turkey deal, which foresees a return of migrants from Greece to Turkey and a direct resettlement of Syrians from Turkey to the EU on the grounds of a ‘1-for-1’ scheme, is a key and necessary element in a very complex puzzle trying to stop ‘irregular routes’ of migration. The ultimate success of this agreement is by no means certain, but it has the chance to reduce the number of people arriving at the shores of Europe. However, this would neither settle the crisis nor will it provide an adequate response to those in need of international protection. The ‘humanitarian imperative’ requires that the EU-Turkey deal is complemented by a much more ambitious direct resettlement scheme and other long-term measures as part of a comprehensive plan aiming to balance ‘solidarity and security’ in an effort to sustainably overcome the crisis.
Resumo:
The 7 March EU-Turkey migration crisis summit took place three days after the Turkish authorities seized Feza media group, which includes Turkey’s largest circulation daily Zaman and its English language sister paper Today’s Zaman. The seizure was the latest development in the worst crackdown on fundamental rights and freedoms Turkey has witnessed in decades. Yet because Turkey is vital in dealing with the migration/refugee crisis, the EU’s response was meek to say the least. For the first time since the Cold War – when Turkey was key in shoring up Europe’s security – Ankara has found itself in a particular position of strength. Turkey has skillfully exploited the EU’s and particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s urgent need to find a way out of the crisis.
Resumo:
Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.
Resumo:
Edition limited to 800 numbered sets.