Democratizing Indonesia: Reformasi Period in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Triggered by the Asian currency crisis, Indonesia plunged into the times of violent change. With the downfall of the long-standing Soeharto rule in May 1998, changes of　the state order started with great magnitude and rapidity under a new banner of　“reformasi” (reform). What changes have occurred in this reformasi period? What do　these changes signify? To answer these questions, it would be better to have a certain　yardstick to allow us comparison. One possibility is to use a yardstick of history. What　picture will emerge if we see the current array of changes in long-term historical　perspectives is a main question of this paper. This paper intends to provide a bird’s-eye picture illustrating where in the Indonesian history the current restructuring of the state order is located. Rather than focusing on a specific area, I here attempt to broaden our outlook on Indonesia’s political, economic and social arenas in order to identify what are happening in these arenas, how they are mutually related, and what those events signify in the Indonesia’s historical context.

Decentralization in Nation State Building of Indonesia

Introduction：Today, many countries, regardless of developed or developing, are trying to promote decentralization. According to Manor, as his quoting of Nickson’s argument, decentralization stems from the necessity to strengthen local governments as proxy of civil society to fill the yawning gap between the state and civil society (Manor [1999]: 30). With the end to the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union rendering the cause of the “leadership of the central government to counter communism” meaningless, Manor points out, it has become increasingly difficult to respond flexibly to changes in society under the centralized system. Then, what benefits can be expected from the effectuation of decentralization? Litvack-Ahmad-Bird cited the four points: attainment of allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for local public goods; improvement to government competitiveness; realization of good governance; and enhancement of the legitimacy and sustainability of heterogeneous national states (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird [1998]: 5). They all contribute to reducing the economic and social costs of a central government unable to respond to changes in society and enhancing the efficiency of state administration through the delegation of authority to local governments. Why did Indonesia have a go at decentralization? As Maryanov recognizes, reasons for the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia have never been explicitly presented (Maryanov [1958]: 17). But there was strong momentum toward building a democratic state in Indonesia at the time of independence, and as indicated by provisions of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, there was the tendency in Indonesia from the beginning to debate decentralization in association with democratization. That said debate about democratization was fairly abstract and the main points are to ease the tensions, quiet the complaints, satisfy the political forces and thus stabilize the process of government (Maryanov [1958]: 26-27). 　　　What triggered decentralization in Indonesia in earnest, of course, was the collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The Soeharto regime, regarded as the epitome of the centralization of power, became incapable of effectively dealing with problems in administration of the state and development administration. Besides, the post-Soeharto era of “reform (reformasi)” demanded the complete wipeout of the Soeharto image. In contraposition to the centralization of power was decentralization. The Soeharto regime that ruled Indonesia for 32 years was established in 1966 under the banner of “anti-communism.” The end of the Cold War structure in the late 1980s undermined the legitimate reason the centralization of power to counter communism claimed by the Soeharto regime. The factor for decentralization cited by Manor is applicable here. 　　　Decentralization can be interpreted to mean not only the reversal of the centralized system of government due to its inability to respond to changes in society, as Manor points out, but also the participation of local governments in the process of the nation state building through the more positive transfer of power (democratic decentralization) and in the coordinated pursuit with the central government for a new shape of the state. However, it is also true that a variety of problems are gushing out in the process of implementing decentralization in Indonesia. 　　　This paper discusses the relationship between decentralization and the formation of the nation state with the awareness of the problems and issues described above. Section 1 retraces the history of decentralization by examining laws and regulations for local administration and how they were actually implemented or not. Section 2 focuses on the relationships among the central government, local governments, foreign companies and other actors in the play over the distribution of profits from exploitation of natural resources, and examines the process of the ulterior motives of these actors and the amplification of mistrust spawning intense conflicts that, in extreme cases, grew into separation and independence movements. Section 3 considers the merits and demerits at this stage of decentralization implemented since 2001 and shed light on the significance of decentralization in terms of the nation state building. Finally, Section 4 attempts to review decentralization as the “opportunity to learn by doing” for the central and local governments in the process of the nation state building. 　　　In the context of decentralization in Indonesia, deconcentration (dekonsentrasi), decentralization (desentralisasi) and support assignments (tugas pembantuan; medebewind, a Dutch word, was used previously) are defined as follows. Dekonsentrasi means that when the central government puts a local office of its own, or an outpost agency, in charge of implementing its service without delegating the administrative authority over this particular service. The outpost agency carries out the services as instructed by the central government. A head of a local government, when acting for the central government, gets involved in the process of dekonsentrasi. Desentralisasi, meanwhile, occurs when the central government cedes the administrative authority over a particular service to local governments. Under desentralisasi, local governments can undertake the particular service at their own discretion, and the central government, after the delegation of authority, cannot interfere with how local governments handle that service. Tugas pembantuan occur when the central government makes local governments or villages, or local governments make villages, undertake a particular service. In this case, the central government, or local governments, provides funding, equipment and materials necessary, and officials of local governments and villages undertake the service under the supervision and guidance of the central or local governments. Tugas pembantuan are maintained until local governments and villages become capable of undertaking that particular service on their own.

Politics of the 1945 Constitution:Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institutions in Indonesia

Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? 　　　The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. 　　　Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.

The misconception of political lessons : how UMNO perceives the fall of LDP in Japan

2012 marks the thirtieth anniversary of Malaysia’s Look East Policy (LEP). This article argues that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is stimulated by symbiotic ties binding together both countries’ respective major political parties, viz. the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). UMNO, especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), derived political lessons from developments affecting LDP in Japan. Two forms of lessons may be discerned. First, emulation of Japan’s success in economic development, which become the basis of LEP launched in 1981. Second, on which our article focuses, lessons from the failure of LDP to retain power twice in 1993 and 2009. Since 1993, DP’s defeat has been a poignant reminder for UMNO to be in alert mode in facing any electoral possibility. When LDP was again ousted from power in 2009, UMNO was a most psychologically affected party owing to the unprecedented setback it suffered at Malaysia’s Twelfth General Elections (GE) of 2008. Yet, although LDP’s reversal of fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to its trajectory since 1999, the analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO leaders were, to a large extent, flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in analogising between different situations which at a glance seem to be comparable.

Influencia de un nuevo marco jurídico en la competitividad del sistema portuario español

El sistema portuario español movió en el año 2013 aproximadamente 458,54 millones de toneladas, 13,8 millones de TEUs, con un total de 131.128 buques que accedieron a puerto para el conjunto de las 28 Autoridades Portuarias. Con el 62% de las exportaciones y el 86% de las importaciones realizadas por vía marítima, una rentabilidad del 2,34 %, muy cerca del objetivo del 2,5 % de rentabilidad media annual establecida legalmente, y una cifra de negocios aproximada de 1.028 millones de euros equivalentes al 1,1 % del PIB que genera un empleo directo e indirecto vinculado de 145.000 personas, concluimos que estamos hablando de un sector estratégico para la economía del país. Desde hace décadas, en muchos puertos del mundo se han venido desarrollando terminales “hub” o de concentración y distribución de cargas. Las navieras concentran entre este tipo de terminales sus líneas transoceánicas con buques de enormes dimensiones y capacidad de carga para producir los tránsitos de contenedores desde estas líneas a otras líneas llamadas “feeder”, con buques de menor tamaño que enlazan el “hub” con los puertos de su área marítima de influencia. La excepcional ubicación geoestratégica de España, con aproximadamente ocho mil kilómetros de costa, ha originado que los puertos españoles de mayor dimensión aspiren a incorporarse a esta red marítima internacional de contenedores y determina que en nuestro sistema portuario los movimientos de contenedores de tránsito tengan gran importancia. Sin embargo, la crisis económica ha tenido un efecto decisivo en el sector marítimo, determinando una lucha feroz entre todos los puertos, nacionales e internacionales, por captar este tipo de tráficos, lo que origina una búsqueda de las compañías navieras de puertos cada vez más eficientes en términos calidad/coste del servicio. La entrada en vigor del Texto Refundido de la Ley de Puertos y la piedra angular de su reforma, la Ley 33/2010, plantea como objetivo principal la mejora de la competitividad del sistema portuario español y liderar su recuperación, ofreciendo unas condiciones de entorno favorables a los puertos españoles que acaben por incentivar la captación de tráficos e inversión privada a través de una oferta de servicios e infraestructura de calidad y a precios competitivos que consoliden su posición dentro del tráfico marítimo mundial. Surge, por tanto, la conveniencia de investigar la influencia de las medidas propuestas por dicha norma legal y las soluciones ofrecidas a las demandas de un sector considerado estratégico para la economía del país, y cuya resolución se considera imprescindible para consolidar su recuperación. Por eso, se han analizado los aspectos más importantes de la reforma mediante la realización de un resumen ejecutivo y se ha estudiado la influencia de las medidas que incorpora desde el punto de vista de tres factores, que previamente se han considerado como fundamentales para la recuperación del sistema portuario español, y que históricamente habían sido demandados por el mismo, como son, en primer lugar, un progresivo sistema de flexibilización tributaria que permitiera a los puertos españoles ganar en términos de competitividad respecto a otros modelos portuarios mucho más flexibles en materia tarifaria, en segundo lugar, una necesaria liberalización del régimen de prestación de los servicios portuarios que posibilite el libre acceso a cualquier interesado en su prestación y, en último lugar, el progresivo abaratamiento de los costes inherentes a dichos servicios, fundamentalmente la manipulación de mercancías. Con posterioridad se ha investigado el trámite parlamentario al que se ha sometido la ley, fruto del enorme consenso alcanzado entre las dos principales fuerzas políticas del país, que determinó que se presentaran más de 700 enmiendas al proyecto original, y en algunos casos, se ha prestado especial atención a determinadas enmiendas que se consideran, en opinión de este investigador, novedosas y aventuradas, razón por la cual quizás no fueron incorporadas definitivamente al texto legal. Y se han analizado las principales demandas y aportaciones extraídas de la Sesión Informativa sobre la tramitación del entonces proyecto de ley ofrecida por la Comisión de Fomento del Congreso de los Diputados a los principales representantes del sector, comunidad portuaria, universidad y sindicatos. Siendo conscientes de la incidencia que tiene el servicio portuario de manipulación de mercancías en el paso de la mercancía por el puerto, se ha hecho una referencia concreta al peculiar régimen jurídico y laboral del personal vinculado al servicio. Avanzamos que las características de la relación laboral especial, y su peculiar régimen jurídico, con una dualidad de relaciones laborales, tiene una influencia decisiva en la nómina del trabajador que se repercute en los usuarios del servicio, fundamentalmente el naviero y el operador de la terminal, que en definitiva, incide en la competitividad del puerto. Y se ha constatado el auge aperturista de numerosas legislaciones portuarias europeas, prestando especial atención al proyecto frustrado de liberalización de los servicios portuarios en la Unión Europea de la conocida como Directiva Loyola de Palacio del año 2003 y al Libro Blanco de Transportes del año 2011. Así como a las deficiencias advertidas por el Dictamen de la Comisión Europea de fecha 27/09/2012 en relación al régimen jurídico del servicio portuario de manipulación de mercancías, que lo considera disconforme y contrario con las normas de libertad de establecimiento en Europa y que amenaza con una previsible reforma unilateral de la legislación portuaria española, a instancias europeas. Bajo este planteamiento, se ha procedido a analizar el marco de prestación de dichos servicios desde el punto de vista de la propia comunidad portuaria. Inicialmente, a través de un estudio de fuerzas de la competitividad del sector de los servicios portuarios en el sistema portuario español que nos permitirá trazar un mapa estratégico del mismo a través del “Modelo de las Cinco Fuerzas de Porter” concluyendo, que el poder de los prestadores de servicios portuarios como proveedores de los mismos, fundamentalmente en la manipulación de mercancías, es máximo, con un único colectivo, los estibadores portuarios, que al amparo de la normativa legal vigente tienen la exclusividad de su prestación. Dichas circunstancias restan competitividad al sistema frente a alternativas portuarias más flexibles y desincentivan la inversión privada. Y, en segundo lugar, mediante un proceso participativo en distintas encuestas sobre el modelo legislativo y sobre el marco formativo del sector con los propios agentes afectados dentro de la comunidad portuaria, desde la triple perspectiva de la vertiente pública que representan las Autoridades Portuarias, como gestores de las infraestructuras, la vertiente privada que representan los usuarios y prestadores de servicios, como principal cliente del puerto y desde el punto de vista de la propia mano de obra portuaria materializada en la representación sindical de dichos trabajadores. Los resultados nos permitirán concluir, respectivamente, la incidencia del servicio portuario mercancía por el puerto, por representar más de la mitad de los costes. Así como la aspiración de los trabajadores adscritos a dicho servicio de consolidar un título formativo que unifique y potencie su capacitación profesional, circunstancia esta última, también demandada por toda comunidad portuaria. Analizadas las conclusiones extraídas en cada una de las líneas de investigación se han detectado una serie de ineficiencias dentro del mismo que dicho marco regulador no ha sabido resolver, por lo que se ha considerado la conveniencia de formular, como herramienta de ayuda a gestores del sistema portuario español, una relación de medidas que, en opinión de este investigador, se consideran necesarias para mejorar el régimen de prestación de los servicios portuarios y se ha propuesto un borrador de modificación del actual Texto Refundido que pueda servir de base para materializar una futura reforma legal. Las conclusiones obtenidas en la investigación deben sentar las bases de una profunda reflexión sobre la necesidad de encaminar, como alternativa a una previsible modificación a instancias europeas, una reforma legal que decididamente apueste por la competitividad del sistema portuario español desde el punto de vista de la liberalización de servicios, el abaratamiento de los costes de la estiba y la necesaria profesionalización de los trabajadores adscritos al servicio portuario de manipulación de mercancías. During 2013 the Spanish Port System moved nearly 458,54 million tons of freight, 13,8 million TEUs, involving a total of 131.128 ships for the 28 existing Port Authorities. With 62% of exports and 86% of imports made through sea transportation, a 2,34% profit, close to the 2,5% average annual profit goal legally established, revenues of 1.028 million € equivalent to a 1.1% of Spain’s GDP and a figure of 145.000 people a directly or indirectly employed we can conclude that maritime industry is undoubtedly one of the strategic and key sectors for the country’s economy. Since several decades many ports in the world have been increasingly developing “Hub” terminals, those which concentrate and distribute freight. Shipping companies place among these type of terminals their transoceanic sea liners along with huge dimension & capacity ships to make the container transit from these liners to other called “feeder” which are smaller freight ships that connect the “hub” with the ports within its maritime area of influence. Spain’s exceptional geostrategic location with over 8.000 km of coastline has originated that those big dimension Spanish ports aspire to become a part of a container international maritime network which also determines that transit container move is key within our port system. Nevertheless the economic crisis has had a decisive impact on the maritime sector originating a fierce battle between all ports, national and international ones, all of them fight against each other to catch this type of maritime traffic which triggers an ongoing shipping companies search in cost/service quality efficient ports. The cornerstone of the Restated Text of Port Law is Law 33/2010, which lays out as main goal the Spanish Port System competitiveness improvement and lead its recovery offering favorable environment conditions to Spanish ports which help encourage maritime traffic attraction and private investment through a wide offer of services, quality of infrastructure and competitive prices which can consolidate its positioning within the world’s maritime traffic. It is therefore key to investigate the influence of the measures proposed by the above mentioned law and also the solutions offered to the demands of a sector which is considered strategic for the country’s economy and which solution is essential to consolidate the recovery. It is because of this that the most important aspects of the reform have been analyzed through the making of an executive summary and it has also been studied the influence of the measures it includes from the point of view of three factors which have previously been considered as key for the Spanish port system recovery. The system has historically demanded a progressive tax flexibility, which would permit Spanish ports be more competitive compared to other port models much more flexible in rates, a necessary liberalization of the port service provision regime and last but not least, to cut the price of costs related to those services, mainly freight handling. Following this, the parliamentary process of the law has also been studied as a consequence of the vast consensus reached by the main political forces in the country which clearly determined that more than 700 amendments to the original project were presented. In some cases the focus has been on amendments which are adventurous and new, reason why they were finally not included to the final legal text. Being well aware of the importance that freight handling procedure has, I have made a specific reference to the legal and working framework of those employees related to this service. We conclude that the special working relationship, its different legal regime, along with the working relationship dualism has a big impact and decisive influence over the worker’s salary which also affects service users, mainly shipowners and terminal operators, having a bad effect on the port’s competitiveness. The above confirms the new opening trend of main European port laws with special attention to the frustrated European Union port services liberalization project, also known as Directive Loyola de Palacio (2003) and the White Paper on Transports (2011). It is important to highlight that the European Commission has also observed several deficiencies with regard to the freight handling port service Law Regime being in disagreement with it, considering it is against the free establishment rules in Europe. The Commission is likely to present a unilateral reform to the Spanish Port Law. Under this approach the service provision framework is being analyzed from the Port Community point of view. Initially the analysis will focus on the study of the competition forces within the port services industry in Spain, this will allow us to draw up an strategic map through “Porter’s Five Forces Model” concluding that the power of port services providers as freight handlers is maximum, with an only collective, stevedores, which has the exclusivity for their services. All these circumstances not only decrease the system’s competitiveness versus other more flexible but also restrain private investments. Secondly, through a participating procedure in different surveys about the legislative model and about the training framework with the affected agents within the port community, there is a triple perspective: Public point of view represented by Port Authorities as infrastructure managers, Private point of view represented by users and service suppliers as main Port’s customer and finally, port workforce, represented by union leaders. Results will let us conclude that freight handling service is the most critical port service and represents more than half of the costs. This service related workers aspire to obtain a training certificate that unifies and boosts their professional role which is also chased by the entire port community. Once conclusions have been analyzed for all research lines, several deficiencies have been found and the regulatory framework hasn’t yet been able to solve them, it has therefore been a series of necessary measures that help improve the port services provision regime. A new proposal to the Restated Law Text has been drafted as the first step to embrace a future legal reform. Conclusions obtained on the research should set the new basis of a deep reflection about the need to bent on a new legal reform which firmly bets on Spanish port system competitiveness from three key points of view, service liberalization, ship load cost reduction and professionalization of freight handling related workers.

Conventions in comparative constitutional law. Research Paper in Law 4/2003

Introduction. “Convention” is an ambiguous term, not only for lawyers, containing a wide variety of different meanings. Even when restricted to denote an assembly it may be used for all sorts of gatherings. In the context of constitutional law a convention is a very specific instrument, and the question is to what extent it is actually known in European constitutional law and whether the “Convention on the Future of Europe” as called forth by the Declaration of Laeken conforms to what is understood in constitutional law by “convention”.1 Or did the Laeken Council pick up a term without any foundation in European constitutional law, rarely practiced and even less understood, the only precedents of which are supposed to be the American Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and the convention that drafted the European Charter on Fundamental Rights, as can be read time and again? 2 As it is the privilege of the constitutional historian to make aware the evolution of legal institutions and to analyze their conferred meaning so that they will be available in political discourse, I shall examine the meaning of “convention” in constitutional history and comparative constitutional law in a first part, while a second part will place the Convention on the Future of the European Union according to its composition and commission into the context of constitutional conventions as understood in law.

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.

The Discursive double game of EMU reform: the clash of titans between French White Knight and German Iron Lady. Paper presented at the 9th Biennial Conference European Community Studies Association–Canada (ECSA-C), Ottawa, Ontario, April 27-28, 2012

From the Introduction. In the aftermath of the EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, many scholars and observers of European integration were proclaiming that the French-German “engine” of Europe had come to an end. The political legitimacy of French-German initiatives was contested by coalitions of smaller member states and the ‘new Europe’ was calling for new leadership dynamics. However, the experience of the Eurozone debt crisis provided dramatic evidence that no alternative to the Franco-German partnership has yet to emerge in the enlarged EU. In a time of existential crisis, Franco-German initiatives appear to have remained the basic dynamic of integration. However, unlike in the past, agreements on steps forward have proven to be particularly difficult. This is largely due to these countries’ contrasting political economic policy ideas, cultures, and practices....the paper analyses the ideational ‘frames’ of the two leaders while tracing their discursive interactions against changing background conditions since the European debt crisis was triggered by Greece in October 2009 until the last measures taken in 2012 before the French Presidential elections. The empirical analysis is based on a systematic corpus of press conferences and media interviews by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel after European summits. It is complemented by a number of press interviews including some given by their respective Finance Ministers) and important speeches in that same period of time.

The Theory of Interhybridity: Socio-political Dimensions and Migration Experiences of Post-communist Western Balkan States

The Western Balkans integration within the EU has started a legal process which is the rejection of former communist legal/political approaches and the transformation of former communist institutions. Indeed, the EU agenda has brought vertical/horizontal integration and Europeanization of national institutions (i.e. shifting power to the EU institutions and international authorities). At this point, it is very crucial to emphasize the fact that the Western Balkans as a whole region has currently an image that includes characteristics of both the Soviet socialism and the European democracy. The EU foreign policies and enlargement strategy for Western Balkans have significant effects on four core factors (i.e. Schengen visa regulations, remittances, asylum and migration as an aggregate process). The convergence/divergence of EU member states’ priorities for migration policies regulate and even shape directly the migration dynamics in migrant sender countries. From this standpoint, the research explores how main migration factors are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and citizenship rights in Western Balkan countries. The proposal of interhybridity explores how the hybridization of state and non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labor migration-related problems. The economical and sociopolitical labor-migration model of Basu (2009) is overlapping with the multidimensional empirical framework of interhybridity. Indisputably, hybrid model (i.e. collaboration state and non-state actors) has a catalyst role in terms of balancing social problems and civil society needs. Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This will shape social and industrial relations with moral meanings of communication.

The Enlarged European Union and its Eastern Neighbours: Problems and Solutions. OSW Point of View, October 2003

The EU enlargement is scheduled to take place in 2004. After this date, it should be a priority for the EU to develop a coherent and comprehensive policy towards its nearest neighbours, i.e. countries bordering the Member States, which cannot join the EU in the nearest future due to their location or weaknesses of their political and economic systems. There are at least three reasons for this. Firstly, good relations with neighbours will underlie the broadly understood security of the Community. Relations with the nearest neighbours will determine both military security of the EU (including the combating of terrorism) and its ability to prevent other threats such as illegal migration, smuggling, etc. Secondly, good economic relations with neighbours may contribute to the Member States' economic growth in the longer term. And finally, the EU's ability to develop an effective and adequate policy towards its nearest neighbours will demonstrate its competence as a subject of international politics. In other words, the EU will not be recognised as a reliable political player in the global scene until it develops an effective strategy for its neighbourhood.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part III: More reform than renegotiation or repatriation. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 42/December 2014. [see Abstract for I and II]

This paper, the third in a series for a CEPS project on the ‘The British Question’, is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. The reviews considered in this paper cover the following EU policies: the single market for services, financial markets, the free movement of people, cohesion, energy, agriculture, fisheries, competition, social and employment policies, and fundamental rights. The declared objective of Prime Minister Cameron is to secure a ‘new settlement’ between the UK and the EU. From political speeches in the UK one can identify three different types of possible demand: reform of EU policies, renegotiation of the UK’s specific terms of membership, and repatriation of competences from the EU back to the member states. As most of the reviews are now complete, three points are becoming increasingly clear: i) The reform agenda – past, present or future - concerns virtually every branch of EU policy, including several cases reviewed here that are central to stated UK economic interests. The argument that the EU is ‘unreformable’ is shown to be a myth. ii) The highly sensitive cases of immigration from the EU and social policies may translate into requests for renegotiation of specific conditions for the UK, but further large-scale opt-outs, as in the case of the euro and justice and home affairs, are implausible. iii) While demands for repatriation of EU competences are voiced in general terms in public debate in the UK, no specific proposals emerge from the evidence as regards competences at the level at which they are identified in the treaties, and there is no chance of achieving consensus for such ideas among member states. Michael Emerson and Steven Blockmans, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-i-%E2%80%98competences-about-right-so-far%E2%80%99)(http://aei.pitt.edu/45599/); Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Steve Peers and Michael Wriglesworth, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 40, June 2014 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-ii-again-huge-contradiction-between-evidence-and-eurosc)(http://aei.pitt.edu/52452/).

Ukraine, Another point of view. OSW Point of View (Unspecified), February 2003

Ukraine is a difficult partner for the West, and recently, it has been perceived as an enfant terrible because of the Kolchuga affair. Western and Polish press describe Ukraine as an authoritarian regime plagued by an internal crisis or even threatened by destabilisation. This picture is certainly one-sided and oversimplified, and it fails to accurately present the reality of Ukraine. Apart from experiencing definitely adverse political developments, Ukraine has also been successful in some ways in terms of its internal and foreign policies and the economy. At the same time, certain processes take place among the Ukrainian elites, that might be difficult to capture in social surveys, but may become the starting point for the future modernisation and democratisation of the country. To realise that there are some favourable aspects to the changes occurring in Ukraine is not to recognise Ukraine as a country heading to democratisation and a market economy in the Western sense. Still, it is worthwhile to understand that the positive developments, even if isolated, do occur in Ukraine and that they could be strengthened by adequate policies of the Ukrainian authorities and the Western states.

Belarus-Russia: Whither Integration? OSW Point of View (unspecified), May 2003

Of the re-integration processes currently taking place in the former Soviet Union, the formation of a Russian-Belarusian so-called 'Union State' is one of the most advanced. A customs union was formally announced between the two countries as early as 1995 and the process of constructing the Union State itself was launched in December 1999. However, both events were largely driven by the perceived need to match societal demands, without much concrete action and the Union State remained largely 'virtual'. Only in the last few years has the Russian initiative allowed for moving from symbolic gestures to political action and since late 2002 debate and policy have intensified on specific issues of economic and political co-operation. However, despite such advances in the integration process, its objectives remain vague and there is little or no agreement on the principles that should govern the process. Furthermore, current bilateral relations questions still dominate the dialogue. The project seems at present to be driven mainly by the political interests of both countries' presidents and also, to a lesser extent, by the interests of business, political, military and security elites, each apparently motivated by self- and group-interest in the emerging dialogue of integration. In contrast to EU integration, the societies of the two countries involved appear to have had little or no say in the process. Thus, several questions naturally arise. What is the real nature of such integration? What motivates the parties involved? What stage has the process reached? What likely future course will it take? What might be the consequences of it for Belarusian independence? Answers to these questions should ultimately determine the stance and policies of the enlarged EU in this area.

Armed conflicts in the post-Soviet region: Present situation, prospects for settlement, consequences. OSW Study 9/2003

Unresolved conflicts continue to smoulder in Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. "Para-states" have formed in most conflict-affected areas. These have grown to become permanent players in the region. In Chechnya, guerrilla fights continue in the wake of the Russian army's siege of the republic. The conflict in Tajikistan ended in 1997 and the normalisation process is currently under way. Each of these conflicts has entailed profound political, social, ethnic and economic changes, as well as affecting other spheres of life. Presently, it is impossible to return to the pre-conflict situation. The "para-states" have fortified their independence and are no longer controlled by the external powers on which they depended in the initial phases of the conflicts.