Road Use Tax/Fund Primary Road Fund Budget: Reversions, September 11, 2008

Pursuant to Iowa Code Section 307.46(2) - This is the Iowa Department of Transportation's report on the use of reversions.

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Tax simulation in the SHP

This paper describes a simulation package designed to estimate the annual income taxes paid by respondents of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). In Switzerland, the 26 cantons have their own tax system. Additionally, tax levels vary between the over 2000 municipalities and over time. The simulation package takes account of this complexity by building on existing tables on tax levels which are provided by the Swiss Federal Tax Administration Office. Because these are limited to a few types of households and only 812 municipalities, they have to be extended to cover all households and municipalities. A further drawback of these tables is that they neglect several deductions. The tax simulation package fills this gap by taking additionally account of deductions for children, double-earner couples, third pillar and support for dependent persons according to cantonal legislation. The resulting variable on direct taxes not only serves to calculate household income net of taxes, but can also be a variable for analysis by its own account.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans December, 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans December, 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans February, 2009

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2008

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2008

Iowa Tax Expenditures Report 2005

Exemptions, exclusions, credits against tax and reductions in tax base that are tied to specific provisions in tax law; estimation of the annual dollar effect for each of those provisions.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Annual Report of the Iowa Grape and Wine Development Commission for Fiscal Year, 2007

FY2007 was a productive year for the Iowa Grape and Wine Development Commission. Fourteen proposals were recommended for funding totaling over $390,000 in outlays. Included in the approved proposals were funds for the establishment and staffing of a Midwest Grape and Wine Institute at Iowa State University, a newly created viticulturist position at Des Moines Area Community College, funding for the first annual Mid-American Wine Competition, and marketing and promotion of four regional cooperative wine events and one wine trail. Commission funding supported a survey of commercial wine producers and grape growers and a new brochure on Iowa’s vineyards. A committee was formed to provide details for a Scholarship Program to aid vineyard and winery staff with the expenses of accredited coursework. Based on the survey conducted and from other governmental and industry sources, the Iowa grape and wine industry appears to continue to be very viable and growth continues at a strong pace. Wine produced in the state for 2007 was estimated at a market value in excess of $12.3 million. A tabulation of the budget revealed that just over $800,000 in wine gallonage tax appropriations have been received into the Grape and Wine Development Fund from 15 FY2003 through FY2007. Expenditures have totaled just over $607,000 during that same time. Just over 80% of expenditures have gone to “Technical” spending. Over time, funds invested in “Technical” programs will translate into an increasingly educated and institutionally-supported industry. Local, regional, and statewide events also appear to be increasing in popularity and the Commission plans to continue and increase support for these events. It is hoped the Scholarship Program will be up and running and funding will need to be appropriated for that project. The Commission also believes many projects and events will become more and more self sustaining as they develop and mature. As they continue to support Iowa’s grape and wine industry, the members of the Commission look forward to working with individuals, commercial enterprises, state and federal agencies, and industry-sponsored institutions in the upcoming year and in years to come.