When not-for-profit try to influence firms

I study the influence of not-for-profit entities in companies, through shareholders proposals in the U.S. largest companies. This paper analyzes the not-for-profit entities involved, the issues addressed by the proposals and the financial characteristics of target companies, as well as market reactions and voting outcomes. Results indicate that not-for-profit entities tend to target companies with higher profitability and value more frequently than general investors. Furthermore, the voting outcome is influenced by insider ownership and types of proposals. Finally, market reactions change with profitability, leverage, ownership structure and types of proposals.

Caught between changing tides: Gender and kinship in Cape Verde

Gender ideologies in Cape Verde are shifting. Individuals find themselves caught between changing tides, pushed and pulled in opposite directions by divergent gendered expectations. The article examines the different ways in which young women and men take recourse to tactics in response to the tensions that arise as they deal with changing gender ascriptions in the midst of their relations with community and kin. Women, in particular, are unevenly affected by traditional demands and expectations whilst they cross the boundaries of traditional gender roles in their pursuit of enhanced education and more sexual freedom. Yet, their actions are not characterized by an outright rejection of traditional gender ideologies, but rather by piecemeal tactical manoeuvres to plot a route through the centrifugal forces at play. keywords

Modelos de apoio às decisão na conceção e planeamento de um armazém

Programa Doutoral em Engenharia Industrial e de Sistemas.

Modelação de processos e implementação de ferramentas de Planeamento e Controlo da Produção numa empresa de produção de resguardos de banho

Dissertação de mestrado em Engenharia Industrial

Influência do clima afectivo induzido pelo treinador no comportamento táctico e estado afectivo dos jogadores

O presente estudo tem como objectivo perceber como o clima afectivo (positivo ou negativo) induzido pelo treinador influencia o comportamento táctico e o estado afectivo percepcionado pelos jogadores de futebol Sub-15 do Campeonato Distrital da Associação de Futebol de Lisboa. Seleccionaram-se três equipas que constituíram os três grupos do estudo: grupo de afectividade positiva (GAP), grupo de afectividade negativa (GAN) e o grupo controlo (GC). Após um pré-teste, à excepção do GC, com manifestação de afectividade neutra pelo treinador, os grupos experimentais foram submetidos a situações de afectividade positiva e negativa, durante três sessões de treino. Após este período de intervenção, realizou-se um pós-teste. Avaliou-se afectos percepcionados pelos jogadores, através da escala PANAS e o comportamento táctico, através da largura de jogo da equipa, com base na recolha de dados posicionais, verificando-se a regularidade da largura de jogo através da entropia amostral (SampEn). Foram encontradas diferenças significativas na regularidade do comportamento no GAN ̅ e ̅ mas não se encontraram diferenças nos afectos percepcionados pelos jogadores em nenhum dos grupos. Encontrou-se igualmente uma tendência positiva na largura da equipa no GAP. Os resultados sugerem que o clima afectivo do treinador apresenta-se como um constrangimento ambiental que influência o comportamento táctico dos jogadores. O clima afectivo positivo estabeleceu um aumento da largura da equipa, mostrando-se viável à procura de comportamentos adaptativos para a consecução de objectivos estabelecidos.

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Political autonomy and independence: theory and experimental evidence

We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

Democracy and the curse of natural resources

We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our political economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources may be bad for democracy by harming political turnover. Our model also suggests a non-linear dependence of human capital on natural resources. For low levels of democracy human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed. This theoretical finding is corroborated in both cross section and panel data regressions.

Automatic Mallampati Classification Using Active Appearance Models

Difficult tracheal intubation assessment is an important research topic in anesthesia as failed intubations are important causes of mortality in anesthetic practice. The modified Mallampati score is widely used, alone or in conjunction with other criteria, to predict the difficulty of intubation. This work presents an automatic method to assess the modified Mallampati score from an image of a patient with the mouth wide open. For this purpose we propose an active appearance models (AAM) based method and use linear support vector machines (SVM) to select a subset of relevant features obtained using the AAM. This feature selection step proves to be essential as it improves drastically the performance of classification, which is obtained using SVM with RBF kernel and majority voting. We test our method on images of 100 patients undergoing elective surgery and achieve 97.9% accuracy in the leave-one-out crossvalidation test and provide a key element to an automatic difficult intubation assessment system.

Democratization as a cost-saving device

We propose a theoretical analysis of democratization processes in which an elite extends the franchise to the poor when threatened with a revolution. The poor could govern without changing the political system by maintaining a continuous revolutionary threat on the elite. Revolutionary threats, however, are costly to the poor and democracy is a superior sys- tem in which political agreement is reached through costless voting. This provides a rationale for democratic transitions that has not been discussed in the literature.