Rapid change in energy status in fighting animals: causes and effects of strategic decisions

Energetic costs of fighting, such as high lactate or low glucose, have been shown in a range of species to correlate with the decisions made by each opponent, particularly the decision by one opponent, the 'loser', to end the fight by 'giving up'. Studies based on complete fights of differing duration, however, do not provide information on the changes in the physiological correlates of fighting that may take place during the course of the encounter, or how these changes may influence the capability and decisions of the contestants. We interrupted fights between hermit crabs, Pagurus bernhardus, at specific points, and related energy status to the preceding activities. Costs rose quickly with a rapid accumulation of lactic acid in attackers and declining muscular glycogen in defenders. Changes in physiological status appeared much earlier than the changes in behaviour that they may have caused. Furthermore, some physiological changes might have been an effect, rather than the cause, of fight decisions. (c) 2005 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Discourses and Strategic Visions: The U.S. Research University as an Institutional Manifestation of Neoliberalism in a Global Era

It is argued widely that the academy today is in the process of significant change—in the institutional assumptions of what constitutes the university and the construction of knowledge and in its relations with the city and the world. This article addresses the evolution of the modern university in the context of the discourses of contemporary globalizing institutions. Further, it empirically assesses the organizational priorities of U.S. research universities in light of the application of these discourses to their objectives and practices, finding that they are playing a key role in the formal representation of the institutional direction, goals, and values of American higher education.

Perceptions and reality: Economic voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections

One of the most influential explanations of voting behaviour is based on economic factors: when the economy is doing well, voters reward the incumbent government and when the economy is doing badly, voters punish the incumbent. This reward-punishment model is thought to be particularly appropriate at second order contests such as European Parliament elections. Yet operationalising this economic voting model using citizens' perceptions of economic performance may suffer from endogeneity problems if citizens' perceptions are in fact a function of their party preferences rather than being a cause of their party preferences. Thus, this article models a 'strict' version of economic voting in which they purge citizens' economic perceptions of partisan effects and only use as a predictor of voting that portion of citizens' economic perceptions that is caused by the real world economy. Using data on voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections for 23 European Union electorates, the article finds some, but limited, evidence for economic voting that is dependent on both voter sophistication and clarity of responsibility for the economy within any country. First, only politically sophisticated voters' subjective economic assessments are in fact grounded in economic reality. Second, the portion of subjective economic assessments that is a function of the real world economy is a significant predictor of voting only in single party government contexts where there can be a clear attribution of responsibility. For coalition government contexts, the article finds essentially no impact of the real economy via economic perceptions on vote choice, at least at European Parliament elections.