Iowa Department of Transportation Fiscal Year 2002 Report of Savings by Using Videoconferencing through Iowa Communications Network to the Iowa General Assembly, 2002

ICN Videoconferencing by the Iowa Department of Transportation

Iowa Utilities Board Fiscal Year 2002 Regulatory Plan Prepared Pursuant to Executive Order Nine, August 1, 2001

Report for the Iowa Utilities Board

Budget Report Fiscal Year 2005

Budget from the Governor's Office

Iowa Utilities Board Fiscal Year 2004 Regulatory Plans Pursuant to Executive Order Nine, August 1, 2003

Report for Iowa Utilities Board

Iowa Department of Transportation Fiscal Year 2003 Report of Savings by Using Videoconferencing Through Iowa Communications Network, Iowa Department of Transportation, December 2003

Iowa DOT savings through use of Iowa Communications Network (ICN)videoconferencing.

Biodiesel Fuel Revolving Fund Expenditures Fiscal Year 2003 Report, Iowa Department of Transportation, January 2004

Report of expenditures from the biodiesel fuel revolving fund for biodiesel fuel used in Iowa Department of Transportation vehicles.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2003

Annual Report of Law Enforcement Training Programs

Annual Report for the Iowa Highway Safety Program, Federal Fiscal Year 2003

Annual Highway Safety Evaluation Report for the Governor's Traffic Safety Bureau, Iowa Department of Public Safety

Educational Excellence Program for Fiscal Years 1999 - 2002

A Review of the Educational Excellence Program for Fiscal Years 1999 - 2002 and the Student Achievement and Teacher Quality Program for Fiscal Year 2002 within the Department of Education

The prosecution service function within the spanish criminal justice system

The Spanish judicial system is independent and headed by the Supreme Court. Spain has a civil law system. The criminal procedure is governed by the legality principle--by opposition to the opportunity or expediency principle--which implies that prosecution must take place in all cases in which sufficient evidence exists of guilt. Traditionally, the role of the PPS in Spain has been very limited during the investigative stage of the process. That stage is under the responsibility of the Examining Magistrate (EM). Since the end of the 1980s, a series of modifications has been introduced in order to extend the functions of the PPS. In 1988, the PPS received extended competences which allow them to receive reports of offenses. Upon knowing of an offense (reported or known to have been committed), the PPS can initiate the criminal proceeding. The PPS is also allowed to lead a sort of plea bargain under a series of restrictive conditions and only for some offenses. At the same time, the PPS received extended competences in the juvenile justice criminal proceeding in 2000. With all this said, the role of the PPS has not changed radically and, during the investigative stage of the process, their main role remains the presentation of the accusation, playing a more active role during the trial stage of the proceeding. In this article the national criminal justice system of Spain is described. Special attention is paid to the function of the PPS within this framework and its relationship to police and courts. The article refers to legal provisions and the factual handling of criminal cases.

Iowa Utilities Board Fiscal Year 2005 Regulatory Plan Pursuant to Executive Order Nine, August 2, 2004

Regulatory Plan for Fiscal Year 2005

Iowa Utilities Board Fiscal Year 2003 Regulatory Plan Prepared Pursuant to Executive Order Nine, August 26, 2002

Regulatory Plan for Fiscal Year 2003

Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Spanish Version, 2004

Brochure produced by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission

Determinants of Decentralization within the Firm: Some Empirical Evidence from Spanish Small and Medium- Sized Enterprise

This paper examines empirically the determinants of decentralization of decision- making in the firm for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that tend to be highly centralized. By decentralization of decisions we mean the delegation of decision rights from the owner or manager to the plant supervisor or even to floor workers. Our findings show that the allocation of authority to basic workers or a team of workers depends on firm characteristics such as firm size, the use of internal networks or the number of workplaces, and workers characteristics, in particular, the composition of the laborforce in terms of education and seniority and whether or not workers receive pay incentives. External factors such as the intensity of competition and the firm s export intensity are also important determinants of the allocation of authority.

Rational Partisan Theory with fiscal policy and an independent central bank

The empirical evidence testing the validity of the rational partisan theory (RPT) has been mixed. In this article, we argue that the inclusion of other macroeconomic policies and the presence of an independent central bank can partly contribute to explain this inconclusiveness. This article expands Alesina s (1987) RPT model to include an extra policy and an independent central bank. With these extensions, the implications of RPT are altered signi ficantly. In particular, when the central bank is more concerned about output than public spending (an assumption made by many papers in this literature), then the direct relationship between in flation and output derived in Alesina (1987) never holds. Keywords: central bank, conservativeness, political uncertainty. JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.