992 resultados para small sided-games
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v.20:no.21(1936)
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We analyzed the alimentary tract of 66 specimens of Amphisbaena munoai Klappenbach, 1969 from the Serra do Sudeste, state of Rio Grande do Sul, southern Brazil. Forty specimens (60.6%) had prey items in their gut. The diet consisted mainly of small invertebrate prey, such as termites, insect larvae and ants. The most abundant prey item was termites, found in 62.5% of the non empty stomachs. The high number of individual prey items in the majority of stomachs, the small size of the regular prey items, and the absence of gut content in specimens of A. munoai kept alive for about two days, indicate that this species forages very frequently. The predominance of fossorial prey items and the occasional records of nomadic ants lead us to suggest that A. munoai usually feeds underground, and occasionally forages on the surface.
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no.11(1923)
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n.s. no.74(1993)
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We studied life history traits of females of the lizard Eurolophosaurus nanuzae (Rodrigues, 1981), an endemic species of rock outcrop habitats in southeastern Brazil. During October 2002 and 2003 we sampled three populations in sites that encompass the meridional portion of the geographic range of the species. Clutch size varied from one to three eggs, with most females carrying two eggs. Clutch size did not vary among populations, but was correlated to female body size. Only larger females produced clutches of three eggs. Females of the small-sized E. nanuzae produce eggs as large as those of medium-sized tropidurids, thus investing a considerable amount of energy to produce clutches resulting in high values of relative clutch mass.
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ABSTRACT Quantitative evaluations of species distributional congruence allow evaluating previously proposed biogeographic regionalization and even identify undetected areas of endemism. The geographic scenery of Northwestern Argentina offers ideal conditions for the study of distributional patterns of species since the boundaries of a diverse group of biomes converge in a relatively small region, which also includes a diverse fauna of mammals. In this paper we applied a grid-based explicit method in order to recognize Patterns of Distributional Congruence (PDCs) and Areas of Endemism (AEs), and the species (native but non-endemic and endemic, respectively) that determine them. Also, we relate these distributional patterns to traditional biogeographic divisions of the study region and with a very recent phytogeographic study and we reconsider what previously rejected as 'spurious' areas. Finally, we assessed the generality of the patterns found. The analysis resulted in 165 consensus areas, characterized by seven species of marsupials, 28 species of bats, and 63 species of rodents, which represents a large percentage of the total species (10, 41, and 73, respectively). Twenty-five percent of the species that characterize consensus areas are endemic to the study region and define six AEs in strict sense while 12 PDCs are mainly defined by widely distributed species. While detailed quantitative analyses of plant species distribution data made by other authors does not result in units that correspond to Cabrera's phytogeographic divisions at this spatial scale, analyses of animal species distribution data does. We were able to identify previously unknown meaningful faunal patterns and more accurately define those already identified. We identify PDCs and AEs that conform Eastern Andean Slopes Patterns, Western High Andes Patterns, and Merged Eastern and Western Andean Slopes Patterns, some of which are re-interpreted at the light of known patterns of the endemic vascular flora. Endemism do not declines towards the south, but do declines towards the west of the study region. Peaks of endemism are found in the eastern Andean slopes in Jujuy and Tucumán/Catamarca, and in the western Andean biomes in Tucumán/Catamarca. The principal habitat types for endemic small mammal species are the eastern humid Andean slopes. Notwithstanding, arid/semi-arid biomes and humid landscapes are represented by the same number of AEs. Rodent species define 15 of the 18 General Patterns, and only in one they have no participation at all. Clearly, at this spatial scale, non-flying mammals, particularly rodents, are biogeographically more valuable species than flying mammals (bat species).
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In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequencing situations with equal processing times.
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We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and independent demand processes. This illustrates that consolidation does not only lower joint costs (which was shown by Teo et al. (2001)), but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.
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In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.
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In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
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Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.
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Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.
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We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.