The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

Corporate governance in banking: the role of board of directors

We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.

Constrained school choice

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable property of the mechanisms is likely toget distorted. We study the non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guaranteestability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal actionas lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools.

Increasing the scalability and the speedup of a fish school distributed simulator

El present treball fa un anàlisi i desenvolupament sobre les millores en la velocitat i en l’escalabilitat d'un simulador distribuït de grups de peixos. Aquests resultats s’han obtingut fent servir una nova estratègia de comunicació per als processos lògics (LPs) i canvis en l'algoritme de selecció de veïns que s'aplica a cadascun dels peixos en cada pas de simulació. L’idea proposada permet que cada procés lògic anticipi futures necessitats de dades pels seus veïns reduint el temps de comunicació al limitar la quantitat de missatges intercanviats entre els LPs. El nou algoritme de selecció dels veïns es va desenvolupar amb l'objectiu d'evitar treball innecessari permetent la disminució de les instruccions executades en cada pas de simulació i per cadascun del peixos simulats reduint de forma significativa el temps de simulació.

Constrained school choice: an experimental study

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools play an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.

Elevated blood pressure prevalence in children did not follow the increase in overweight: results from a school-based study in a rapidly developing country, 1998-2006

Background: Blood pressure (BP) is strongly associated with body weight and there is concern that the pediatric overweight epidemic could lead to an increase in children's mean BP. Objectives: We analyzed BP trends from 1998 to 2006 among children of the Seychelles, a rapidly developing middle-income country in Africa. Methods: Serial school-based surveys of weight, height and BP were conducted yearly between 1998-2006 among all students of the country in four school grades (kindergarten, 4th, 7th and 10th years of compulsory school). We used the CDC criteria to define "overweight" (BMI _95th sex-, and age-specific percentile) and the NHBPEP criteria for "elevated BP" (BP _95th sex-, age-, and height specific percentile). Methods for height, weight, and BP measurements were identical over the study period. The trends in mean BMI and mean systolic/diastolic BP were assessed with linear regression. Results: 27,703 children aged 4-18 years (participation rate: 79%) contributed 43,927 observations on weight, height, and BP. The prevalence of overweight increased from 5.1% in 1998-2000 to 8.1% in 2004-2006 among boys, and from 6.1% to 9.1% among girls, respectively. The prevalence of elevated BP was 8.4% in 1998-2000 and 6.9% in 2004-2006 among boys; 9.8% and 7.8% among girls, respectively. Over the 9-years study period, age-adjusted body mass index (BMI) increased by 0.078 kg/m2/year in boys and by 0.083 kg/m2/year in girls (both sexes, P_0.001). Age- and height-adjusted systolic BP decreased by -0.37 mmHg/year in boys and by -0.34 mmHg/year in girls (both sexes, P_0.001). Diastolic BP did not change in boys (-0.02 mmHg/year, P: 0.40) and slightly increased in girls (0.07 mmHg/year, P: 0.003). These trend estimates were altered modestly upon further adjustment for BMI or if analyses were based on median rather than mean values. Conclusion: Although body weight increased markedly between 1998 and 2006 in this population, systolic BP decreased and diastolic BP changed only marginally. This suggests that population increases in body weight are not necessarily associated with corresponding rises in BP in children.

Public Governance, Health and Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa

In this paper we diverge from the existing empirical literature on FDI determinants in two ways. First, we decompose the sources of the foreign direct investment (FDI) gap between Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and other developing regions. Once market size has been accounted for, we nd that SSA's FDI de cit is mostly explained by insufficient provision of public goods: low human capital accumulation, especially health, in SSA explains 100-140% of the inter-regional FDI gaps. Second, we estimate the indirect effect of infectious diseases on FDI through their direct impact on health. We find that a 1% point rise in HIV prevalence in the adult population is associated with a decrease in net FDI inflows of 3.5%, while a country in which 100% of the population is at risk of contracting deadly malaria receives about 16% less FDI than a similar country located in a malaria-free region.

Does Public Governance Always Matter? How Experience of Poor Institutional Quality Influences FDI to the South

This paper investigates whether the higher prevalence of South multinational enterprises (MNEs) in risky developing countries may be explained by the experience that they have acquired of poor institutional quality at home. We confirm the intuition provided by our analytical model by empirically showing that the positive impact of good public governance on foreign direct investment (FDI) in a given host country is moderated significantly, and even in some cases eliminated, when MNEs have been faced with poor institutional quality at home.

A Foundation System and a State System - Private-School Implications on Welfare and Education Expenditure

This paper examines the effects of two different education - financing systems: a foundation system and a state system on the level and distribution of resources devoted to education in the presence of private schools. We use political economy approach where households differ in their level of income, and the central tax rate used to nance education is determined by a majority vote. Our analysis focuses on implications of allowing for a private-school option. To evaluate the importance of private schools we develop a computational model and calibrate it using USA data. The results reveal that the private school option is very important quantitatively in terms of welfare, total resources spent on education and equity.