Reviewing the EU ETS review? Report of the CEPS TAsk Force on "Does the ETS market produce the 'right' price signal"? CEPS Task Force Report, 12 November 2012

Drawing on discussions within a CEPS Task Force on the revised EU emissions trading system, this report provides a comprehensive assessment of the pros and cons of the various measures put forward by different stakeholders to address the level and stability of the price of carbon in the EU. It argues that the European Commission, the member states, the European Parliament and other stakeholders need to give serious consideration to introducing some kind of ‘dynamic’ adjustment provision to address the relatively inelastic supply. The report also suggests that there is a need to improve communication of market-sensitive information, for example by leaving the management of the ETS to a specialised body.

Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new cost-sharing model in Brazil

By the turn of the twenty-first century, UNDP had embraced a new form of funding based on ‘cost-sharing’, with this source accounting for 51 per cent of the organisation’s total expenditure worldwide in 2000. Unlike the traditional donor - recipient relationship so common with development projects, the new cost-sharing modality has created a situation whereby UNDP local offices become ‘subcontractors’ and agencies of the recipient countries become ‘clients’. This paper explores this transition in the context of Brazil, focusing on how the new modality may have compromised UNDP’s ability to promote Sustainable Human Development, as established in its mandate. The great enthusiasm for this modality within the UN system and its potential application to other developing countries increase the importance of a systematic assessment of its impact and developmental consequences.

Estimating drizzle drop size and precipitation rate using two-colour lidar measurements

A method to estimate the size and liquid water content of drizzle drops using lidar measurements at two wavelengths is described. The method exploits the differential absorption of infrared light by liquid water at 905 nm and 1.5 μm, which leads to a different backscatter cross section for water drops larger than ≈50 μm. The ratio of backscatter measured from drizzle samples below cloud base at these two wavelengths (the colour ratio) provides a measure of the median volume drop diameter D0. This is a strong effect: for D0=200 μm, a colour ratio of ≈6 dB is predicted. Once D0 is known, the measured backscatter at 905 nm can be used to calculate the liquid water content (LWC) and other moments of the drizzle drop distribution. The method is applied to observations of drizzle falling from stratocumulus and stratus clouds. High resolution (32 s, 36 m) profiles of D0, LWC and precipitation rate R are derived. The main sources of error in the technique are the need to assume a value for the dispersion parameter μ in the drop size spectrum (leading to at most a 35% error in R) and the influence of aerosol returns on the retrieval (≈10% error in R for the cases considered here). Radar reflectivities are also computed from the lidar data, and compared to independent measurements from a colocated cloud radar, offering independent validation of the derived drop size distributions.

Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors

Formal and analytical risk models prescribe how risk should be incorporated in construction bids. However, the actual process of how contractors and their clients negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not clearly articulated in the literature. Using participant observation, the entire tender process was shadowed in two leading UK construction firms. This was compared to propositions in analytical models and significant differences were found. 670 hours of work observed in both firms revealed three stages of the bidding process. Bidding activities were categorized and their extent estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), documents (13%), off-days (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%) and travel (1%). Risk allowances of 1-2% were priced in some bids and three tiers of risk apportionment in bids were identified. However, priced risks may sometimes be excluded from the final bidding price to enhance competitiveness. Thus, although risk apportionment affects a contractor’s pricing strategy, other complex, microeconomic factors also affect price. Instead of pricing in contingencies, risk was priced mostly through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. The findings explain why some assumptions underpinning analytical models may not be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens in practice is important for those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids.