El protocolo judicial en España

Programa de doctorado: Nuevas perspectivas del Derecho Privado

Privacy By Design e Data Protection Officer: aspetti normativi e buone prassi nel trattamento dei dati personali.

La Tesi tratta i concetti di Privacy e Protezione dei Dati personali, contestualizzandone il quadro normativo e tecnologico con particolare riferimento ai contesti emergenti rappresentati – per un verso – dalla proposta di nuovo Regolamento generale sulla protezione dei dati personali (redatto dal Parlamento Europeo e dal Consiglio dell’Unione Europea), – per un altro – dalla metodologia di progettazione del Privacy by Design e – per entrambi – dalla previsione di un nuovo attore: il responsabile per la protezione dei dati personali (Privacy Officer). L’elaborato si articola su tre parti oltre introduzione, conclusioni e riferimenti bibliografici. La prima parte descrive il concetto di privacy e le relative minacce e contromisure (tradizionali ed emergenti) con riferimento ai contesti di gestione (aziendale e Big Data) e al quadro normativo vigente. La seconda Parte illustra in dettaglio i principi e le prassi del Privacy by Design e la figura del Privacy Officer formalmente riconosciuta dal novellato giuridico. La terza parte illustra il caso di studio nel quale vengono analizzate tramite una tabella comparativa minacce e contromisure rilevabili in un contesto aziendale.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Executive Reorganization: Building a State Government That Worked for People -- Tom Harrison, Diana Dowling & Sheena Wilson “In the Crucible of Change”

One of the primary accomplishments of Governor Forrest Anderson in 1969-71 was the reorganization of the Executive Branch of Montana government, something that had been attempted six different times between 1919 and 1962 as state government had grown from twenty agencies to almost 200 uncontrolled boards, bureaus and commissions. The chaotic structure of the executive branch disempowered governors of both parties and empowered the private corporations and organizations that were the power structure of Montana. With remarkable political acumen, Governor Anderson figured out how to get that near impossible job done. Central to his efforts was the creation of an Executive Reorganization Commission, including eight legislators and the Governor, the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment that limited the executive branch to no more than twenty departments under the Governor, and the timely completion of a massive research effort to delineate the actual structure of the twenty departments. That story is told in this episode by three major players in the effort, all involved directly with the Executive Reorganization Commission: Tom Harrison, Diana Dowling and Sheena Wilson. Their recollections reflect an insider’s perspective of this significant accomplishment that helped change Montana “In the Crucible of Change.” Tom Harrison is a former Republican State Representative and State Senator from Helena, who was a member of the Executive Reorganization Commission. As Majority Leader in the Montana House of Representatives in 1971, he was the primary sponsor of the House’s executive reorganization bill and helped shepherd the Senate’s version to passage. Harrison was the Republican candidate for Attorney General in 1976 after which he practiced private law for 3 more decades. He served in the Montana Army National Guard for almost 34 years, rising to the rank of Colonel in the position of Judge Advocate General. He was a founding Director of Federal Defenders of Montana (legal representation for indigents accused within the Federal Judicial System); appointed Chairman of the original Montana State Fund (workers' compensation insurance) by Gov. Stephens; served as President of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association, Helena Kiwanis Club and St. Peter's Community Hospital Foundation, as well as Chairman and Director of AAA MountainWest; and was a founder, first Chairman and Director of the Valley Bank of Helena for over 25 years. Diana Dowling was an attorney for the Executive Reorganization Commission and helped draft the legislation that was passed. She also worked for Governor Forrest Anderson and for the 1972 Constitutional Convention where she prepared and directed publication of official explanation of the new Constitution that was mailed to all Montana voters. Diana was Executive Director of the Montana Bar Association and for 20 years held various legal positions with the Montana Legislative Council. For 12 years she was a commissioner on the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and for 7 years was a member of Montana State Board of Bar Examiners. Diana was the first director of the Montana Lottery, an adjunct professor at both Carroll College and the UM Law School, and an administrative officer for Falcon Press Publishing Co. Diana is currently - and intends to continue being - a perpetual college student. Sheena Wilson came fresh out of the University of Montana to become a Research Assistant for the Executive Reorganization Commission. Later she worked for seven years as a field representative in Idaho and Montana for the Mountain Plains Family Education Program, for thirteen years with Congressman Pat Williams as Executive Assistant in Washington and Field Assistant here in Montana, owned and managed a Helena restaurant for seven years, worked as Executive Assistant for State Auditor John Morrison and was Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Brian Schweitzer his full 8 years in the Governorship. Though currently “retired”, Sheena serves on the Montana Board of Investments, the Public Employees Retirement Board and the Capitol Complex Advisory Council and is a partner in a dry-land wheat farm in Teton County that was homesteaded by her great uncle.

Legislative Legacy: Big Changes in Legislative Article of 1972 Constitution -- Jerry Loendorf, Arlyne Reichert & Rich Bechtel “In the Crucible of Change”

The fulcrum upon which were leveraged many of the dramatic progressive changes in Montana that are documented "In the Crucible of Change" series was the lead up to, preparation, writing and adoption of the 1972 Montana Constitution. As Montana citizens exhibited their concern over the dysfunctional state government in MT under its 1889 Constitution, one of the areas that stood out as needing serious change was the Montana Legislature. Meeting for only sixty calendar days every two years, the Legislature regularly tried to carry off the subterfuge of stopping the wall clock at 11:59 PM on the sixtieth day and placing a shroud over it so they could continue to conduct business as if it were still the 60th day. Lawyers hired by the Anaconda Company drafted most bills that legislators wanted to have introduced. Malapportionment, especially in the State Senate where each county had one Senator regardless of their population, created a situation where Petroleum County with 800 residents had one senator while neighboring Yellowstone County with 80,000 people also had one senator -- a 100-1 differential in representation. Reapportionment imposed by rulings of the US Supreme Court in the mid-1960s created great furor in rural Montana to go along with the previous dissatisfaction of the urban centers. Stories of Anaconda Company “thumbs up – thumbs down” control of the votes were prevalent. Committee meeting and votes were done behind closed doors and recorded votes were non-existent except for the nearly meaningless final tally. People were in the dark about the creation of laws that affected their daily lives. It was clear that change in the Legislature had to take the form of change in the Constitution and, because it was not likely that the Legislature would advance Constitutional amendments on the subject, a convention seemed the only remedy. Once that Convention was called and went to work, it became apparent that the Legislative Article provided both opportunity for change and danger that too dramatic a change might sink the whole new document. The activities of the Legislative Committee and the whole Convention when acting upon Legislative issues provides one of the more compelling stories of change. The story of the Legislative Article of the Montana Constitution is discussed in this episode by three major players who were directly involved in the effort: Jerry Loendorf, Arlyne Reichert and Rich Bechtel. Their recollections of the activities surrounding the entire Constitutional Convention and specifically the Legislative Article provide an insider’s perspective of the development of the entire Constitution and the Legislative portion which was of such a high degree of interest to the people of Montana during the important period of progressive change documented “In the Crucible of Change.” Jerry Loendorf, who served as Chair of the Legislative Committee at the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, received a BA from Carroll College in 1961 and a JD from the University of Montana Law School in 1964. Upon graduation he served two years as a law clerk for the Montana Supreme Court after which he was for 34 years a partner in the law firm of Harrison, Loendorf & Posten, Duncan. In addition to being a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Jerry served on the Board of Labor Appeals from 2000 to 2004. He was designated a Montana Special Assistant Attorney General to represent the state in federal court on the challenge to the results of the ratification election of Montana's Constitution in 1972. Jerry served on the Carroll College Board of Directors in the late 1960s and then again as a member of the Board of Trustees of Carroll College from 2001 to 2009. He has served on the Board of Directors of the Rocky Mountain Development Council since 1970 and was on the board of the Helena YMCA from 1981 to 1987. He also served on the board of the Good Samaritan Ministries from 2009 to 2014. On the business side, Jerry was on the Board of Directors of Valley Bank to Helena from 1980 to 2005. He is a member of the American Bar Association, State Bar of Montana, the First Judicial District Bar Association, and the Montana Trial Lawyers Association. Carroll College awarded Jerry the Warren Nelson Award 1994 and the Insignias Award in 2007. At Carroll College, Jerry has funded the following three scholarship endowments: George C and Helen T Loendorf, Gary Turcott, and Fr. William Greytek. Arlyne Reichert, Great Falls Delegate to the Constitutional Convention and former State Legislator, was born in Buffalo, NY in 1926 and attended University of Buffalo in conjunction with Cadet Nurses Training during WWII. She married a Montanan in Great Falls in 1945 and was widowed in 1968. She is mother of five, grandmother of seven, great-grandmother of four. Arlyne was employed by McLaughlin Research Institute in Great Falls for 23 years, serving as Technical Editor of Transplantation Journal in 1967, retiring as Assistant Director in 1989. In addition to being a state legislator (1979 Session) and a delegate to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, she has filled many public roles, including Cascade County Study Commissioner (1974), MT Comprehensive Health Council, US Civil Rights Commission MT Advisory Committee, MT Capitol Restoration Committee, and Great Falls Public Library Trustee. Arlyne has engaged in many non-profit activities including League of Women Voters (State & Local Board Officer – from where her interest in the MT Constitutional change developed), Great Falls Public Radio Association (President & Founder), American Cancer Society (President Great Falls Chapter), Chair of MT Rhodes Scholarship Committee, and Council Member of the National Civic League. She also served a while as a Television Legislative Reporter. Arlyne has been recipient of numerous awards, the National Distinguished Citizens Award from the National Municipal League, two Women of Achievement Awards from Business & Professional Women, the Salute to Women Award by YWCA, Heritage Preservation Award from Cascade County Historical Society and the State of Montana, and the Heroes Award from Humanities Montana. She remains active, serving as Secretary-Treasurer of Preservation Cascade, Inc., and as Board Member of the McLaughlin Research Institute. Her current passion is applied to the preservation/saving of the historic 10th Street Bridge that crosses the Missouri River in Great Falls. Rich Bechtel of Helena was born in Napa, California in 1945 and grew up as an Air Force brat living in such places as Bitberg, Germany, Tripoli, Libya, and Sevilla, Spain. He graduated from Glasgow High School and the University of Montana. Rich was a graduate assistant for noted Montana History professor Professor K. Ross Toole, but dropped out of graduate school to pursue a real life in Montana politics and government. Rich has had a long, varied and colorful career in the public arena. He currently is the Director of the Office of Taxpayer Assistance & Public Outreach for MT’s Department of Revenue. He previously held two positions with the National Wildlife Federation in Washington, DC (Sr. Legislative Representative [1989-91] and Sr. Legislative Representative for Wildlife Policy [2004-2006]). While in Washington DC, he also was Assistant for Senator Lee Metcalf (D-MT), 1974-1976; Federal-State Coordinator for State of Montana, 1976-1989; Director of the Western Governors’ Association Washington Office, 1991-2000; and Director of Federal Affairs for Governor Kitzhaber of Oregon, 2001- 2003. Earlier in Montana Government, between 1971 and 1974, Rich was Research Analyst for MT Blue Ribbon Commission on Postsecondary Education, Legislative Consultant and Bill Drafter for MT Legislative Council, Research Analyst for the MT Constitutional Convention Commission where he provided original research on legislatures, as well as Researcher/Staff for the MT Constitutional Convention Legislative Committee, from where he drafted the various provisions of the Legislative Article and the majority and minority reports on behalf of the Committee members. Rich has represented Montana’s Governor on a trade and cultural mission to Republic of China and participated in US-German Acid Rain Committee sessions in Germany and with European Economic Community environmental officials in Belgium. He is married to Yvonne Seng (Ph.D.) - T’ai Chi apprentice; author and birder.

The EU as an Effective Trade Power? Strategic Choice of Judicial Candidates in the Context of the World Trade Organization

Drawing on the European Union (EU) foreign policy literature on effectiveness, this article studies how the European Union chooses judges to serve on the World Trade Organization’s key judicial institution: the Appellate Body. Conceptually, the article differentiates between effectiveness in representation and effectiveness in impact. The article shows how delegation to the European Commission has increased the strategic agenda-setting power for championing its preferred candidates. The article further compares European and US practice in nominating candidates. Overall, the article finds that effectiveness in representation has increased over time. In terms of effectiveness in impact, the article shows how the international environment conditions the EU’s influence. The article also exposes the difficulties of studying the effectiveness of EU external relations due to the peculiar decision-making processes dominant in judicial bodies.

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

Legal Change: Integrating Selective Litigation, Judicial Preferences, and Precedent

The claim that the common law displays an economic logic is a centerpiece of the positive economic theory of law. A key question in this literature is whether this outcome is due to the conscious efforts of judges, or the result of invisible hand processes. This paper develops a model in which to two effects combine to determine the direction of legal change. The main conclusions are, first, that judicial bias can prevent the law from evolving toward efficiency if the fraction of judges biased against the efficient rule is large enough; and second, that precedent affects the rate of legal change but not its direction.

Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, And Social Values

This paper studies the institutional structure of criminal sentencing, focusing on the interaction between legislatures, which set sentencing ranges ex ante, and judges, who choose actual sentences from within those ranges ex post. The key question concerns the optimal degree of judicial discretion, given the sequential nature of the process and the possibly divergent interests of legislatures and judges regarding the social function of criminal punishment. The enactment of sentencing reform in the 1970s and 80s provides both a context for the model and an opportunity to evaluate its conclusions.