A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2007

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2007

Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2006 Annual Report

This annual report highlights the many programs and initiatives with which the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division is involved.

Wireless E911 Emergency Communications Fund Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division of the Iowa Department of Public Defense independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements and supplementary information, June 30, 2006.

Audit report on the Wireless E911 Emergency Communication Fund of the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division of the Iowa Department of Public Defense for the year ended June 30, 2006

Three essays in dynamic corporate finance

Summary Throughout my thesis, I elaborate on how real and financing frictions affect corporate decision making under uncertainty, and I explore how firms time their investment and financing decisions given such frictions. While the macroeconomics literature has focused on the impact of real frictions on investment decisions assuming all equity financed firms, the financial economics literature has mainly focused on the study of financing frictions. My thesis therefore assesses the join interaction of real and financing frictions in firms' dynamic investment and financing decisions. My work provides a rationale for the documented poor empirical performance of neoclassical investment models based on the joint effect of real and financing frictions on investment. A major observation relies in how the infrequency of corporate decisions may affect standard empirical tests. My thesis suggests that the book to market sorts commonly used in the empirical asset pricing literature have economic content, as they control for the lumpiness in firms' optimal investment policies. My work also elaborates on the effects of asymmetric information and strategic interaction on firms' investment and financing decisions. I study how firms time their decision to raise public equity when outside investors lack information about their future investment prospects. I derive areal-options model that predicts either cold or hot markets for new stock issues conditional on adverse selection, and I provide a rational approach to study jointly the market timing of corporate decisions and announcement effects in stock returns. My doctoral dissertation therefore contributes to our understanding of how under real and financing frictions may bias standard empirical tests, elaborates on how adverse selection may induce hot and cold markets in new issues' markets, and suggests how the underlying economic behaviour of firms may induce alternative patterns in stock prices.

A-1a Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2007

A-1a - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - July 2007

A-1a Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2007

A-1a - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - August 2007

Credit lines: The other side of corporate liquidity

In this paper we offer the first large sample evidence on the availability and usage ofcredit lines in U.S. public corporations and use it to re-examine the existing findings oncorporate liquidity. We show that the availability of credit lines is widespread and thataverage undrawn credit is of the same order of magnitude as cash holdings. We test thetrade-off theory of liquidity according to which firms target an optimum level of liquidity,computed as the sum of cash and undrawn credit lines. We provide support for the existenceof a liquidity target, but also show that the reasons why firms hold cash and credit linesare very different. While the precautionary motive explains well cash holdings, the optimumlevel of credit lines appears to be driven by the restrictions imposed by the credit line itself,in terms of stated purpose and covenants. In support to these findings, credit line drawdownsare associated with capital expenditures, acquisitions, and working capital.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2007

A-1A - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - 09-07

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2005

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, December 2005

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program