Hacia la aplicación de las guías de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE) sobre precios de transferencia para empresas multinacionales y administraciones tributarias en Colombia

Los precios de transferencia ocupan el interés de los Estados en el mundo actual al constituir uno de los retos fundamentales del Derecho Internacional Tributario. En el seno de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), creada en 1961, se discutieron y desarrollaron diversas propuestas para regular el fenómeno. Estas, se materializaron en Modelos de Convenios Tributarios e instrumentos de soft law, que hoy en día constituyen los principios internacionalmente aceptados en la materia. Las Guías de la OCDE sobre precios de transferencia para empresas multinacionales y administraciones tributarias son el cuerpo normativo de soft law que se erigen, en el Ordenamiento Internacional, como el norte de las legislaciones a nivel interno para efectos de regulación de dicha temática. Su adopción por parte de los países miembros y no miembros de la OCDE se enfrenta a problemas teóricos derivados del quebrantamiento del decantado principio de reserva de ley tributaria y el respeto por la seguridad jurídica, razón por la cual su incorporación ha variado de Estado a Estado. El presente trabajo recoge la experiencia en varios países europeos y latinoamericanos y pretende proponer una fórmula de adopción en Colombia, coherente con los principios constitucionales tributarios y con virtualidad de superar las críticas realizadas por la doctrina a la aplicación directa de las Guías.

Optimal tax theory and the taxation of housing in the US and the UK

First, we survey recent research in the application of optimal tax theory to housing. This work suggests that the under-taxation of housing for owner occupation distorts investment so that owner occupiers are encouraged to over-invest in housing. Simulations of the US economy suggest that this is true there. But, the theoretical work excludes consideration of land and the simulations exclude consideration of taxes other than income taxes. These exclusions are important for the US and UK economies. In the US, the property tax is relatively high. We argue that excluding the property tax is wrong, so that, when the property tax is taken into account, owner occupied housing is not undertaxed in the US. In the UK, property taxes are relatively low but the cost of land has been increasing in real terms for forty years as a result of a policy of constraining land for development. The price of land for housing is now higher than elsewhere. Effectively, an implicit tax is paid by first time buyers which has reduced housing investment. When land is taken into account over-investment in housing is not encouraged in the UK either.

Occupational futures? Divesting real estate and corporate PFI

Property ownership can tie up large amounts of capital and management energy that business could employ more productively elsewhere. Competitive pressures, accounting changes and increasingly sophisticated occupier requirements are building demand for new and innovative ways to satisfy corporate occupation needs. The investment climate is also changing. Falling interest rates and falling inflation can be expected to undermine returns from the traditional FRI lease. In future, investment returns will be more dependent on active and innovative management geared to the needs of occupiers on whom income depends. Occupier and investor interests, therefore, look set to coincide, but unlocking the potential for both parties will depend on developing new finance and investment vehicles that align their respective needs. In the UK, examples include PFI in the public sector and off-balance sheet financing in the private sector. In the USA, “synthetic lease” structures have also become popular. Growing investment market experience in assessing risks and returns suggests scope for further innovative arrangements in the corporate sector. But how can such arrangements be structured? What are the risks, drivers and barriers?

Corporate institutions in a weakened welfare state: a Rawlsian perspective

This paper re-examines the import of Rawls’s theory of justice for private sector institutions in the face of the decline of the welfare state. The argument is based on a Rawlsian conception of justice as the establishment of a basic structure of society that guarantees a fair distribution of primary goods. We propose that the decline of the welfare state witnessed in Western countries over the past forty years prompts a reassessment of the boundaries of the basic structure in order to include additional corporate institutions. A discussion centered on the primary good of self-respect, but extensible to power and prerogatives as well as income and wealth, examines how the legislator should intervene in private sector institutions to counterbalance any unfairness that results from the decline of the welfare state.

Corporate capital structure revisited: incomplete markets and default

After Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented their capital structure irrelevance proposition, analysis of corporate Önancing choices involving debt and equity instruments have generally followed two trends in the literature, where models either incorporate informational asymmetries or introduce tax beneÖts in order to explain optimal capital structure determination (Myers, 2002). None of these features is present in this paper, which develops an asset pricing model with the purpose of providing a positive theory of corporate capital structure by replicating main aspects of standard contractual practice observed in real markets. Alternatively, the imperfect market structure of the economy is tailored to match what is most common in corporate reality. Allowance for default on corporate debt with an associated penalty of seizure of Örmís future cash áows by creditors is introduced, for instance. In this context, a qualitative assessment of Önancial managersídecisions is carried out through numerical procedures.

Inflation and income inequality: a shopping-time aproach: (Forthcoming, Journal of Development Economics)

Our work is based on a simpliÖed heterogenous-agent shoppingtime economy in which economic agents present distinct productivities in the production of the consumption good, and di§erentiated access to transacting assets. The purpose of the model is to investigate whether, by focusing the analysis solely on endogenously determined shopping times, one can generate a positive correlation between ináation and income inequality. Our main result is to show that, provided the productivity of the interest-bearing asset in the transacting technology is high enough, it is true true that a positive link between ináation and income inequality is generated. Our next step is to show, through analysis of the steady-state equations, that our approach can be interpreted as a mirror image of the usual ináation-tax argument for income concentration. An example is o§ered to illustrate the mechanism.

Yet another reason to tax goods

The optimal taxation of goods, labor and capital income is considered in a two period model where: i) private information changes through time; ii) savings are not observed, and; iii) savings a§ect preferences conditional on the realization of types. The simultaneous appearance of these three elements cause optimal commodity taxes to depend on o§-equilibrium savings. As a consequence, separability no longer su¢ ces for the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) to obtain. If preferences are homothetic AS is partially restored: taxes are uniform within periods, however, future consumption is taxed at a higher rate than current consumption.

Tax filing choices for the household under separable spheres bargaining

If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.

Neighborhood feedbacks, endogenous stratification, and income inequality

This paper explores the evolution of the cross-section income distribution in economies where endogenous neighborhood formation interacts with positive within-neighborhood feedback effects. We study an economy in which the economic success of adults is determined by the characteristics of the families in the neighborhood in which a person grows up. These feedbacks take two forms. First, the tax base of a neighborhood affects the leveI of education investment in offspring. Second, the effectiveness of education investment is affected by a neighborhood's in come distribution, reflecting factors such as role model or labor market connection effects. Conditions are developed under which endogenous stratification, defined as the tendency for families wi th similar incomes to choose to form common communities, will occur. When families are allowed to choose their neighborhoods, wealthy families will have an incentive to segregate themselves from the rest of the population. This resulting stratification is supported by house price differences between ricli and poor communities. Endogenous stratification can lead to pronounced intertemporal inequality as different families provide very different interaction environments for offspring. When the transformation of human capital into in come exhibits constant retums to scale, cross-section in come differences may also grow across time. As a result, endogenous stratification and neighborhood feedbacks can interact to produce long run inequality.

On the optimality of the Friedman Rule with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxation

We study the optimal “inflation tax” in an environment with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxes. We first derive the general conditions needed for the optimality of the Friedman rule in this setup. These general conditions are distinct in nature and more easily interpretable than those obtained in the literature with a representative agent and linear taxation. We then study two standard monetary specifications and derive their implications for the optimality of the Friedman rule. For the shopping-time model the Friedman rule is optimal with essentially no restrictions on preferences or transaction technologies. For the cash-credit model the Friedman rule is optimal if preferences are separable between the consumption goods and leisure, or if leisure shifts consumption towards the credit good. We also study a generalized model which nests both models as special cases.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.

The distribution of average and marginal effective tax rates in European Union member states

Macro-based summary indicators of effective tax burdens do not capture differences in effective tax rates facing different sub-groups of the population. They also cannot provide information on the level or distribution of the marginal effective tax rates thought to influence household behaviour. I use EUROMOD, an EU-wide tax-benefit microsimulation model, to compute distributions of average and marginal effective tax rates across the household population in fourteen European Union Member States. Using different definitions of ‘net taxes’, the tax base and the unit of analysis I present a range of measures showing the contribution of the tax-benefit system to household incomes, the average effective tax rates applicable to income from labour and marginal effective tax rates faced by working men and women. In a second step, effective tax rates are broken down to separately show the influence of each type of tax-benefit instrument. The results show that measures of effective tax rates vary considerably depending on incomes, labour market situations and family circumstances. Using single averages or macro-based indicators will therefore provide an inappropriate picture of tax burdens faced by large parts of the population.

Revamping asset quality to maximize income in office markets

We use a unique dataset of c. 2200 commercial towers located in the city of Sao Paulo from 2005:Q3 to 2014:Q3 to study the relationship between asset quality and potential income in different niches of the office market. Our evidence suggests a rent premium in the market for larger office space (corporate) and that building quality is more relevant in this segment. We hypothesize such difference is due to larger competition and commoditization in the market for smaller office space (office) as income in this segment tends to be insensible to different levels of asset quality when we control for spatial variation. We also find that rent premiums associated with building class are monotonically increasing, but not strictly positive across certain quality thresholds. Thus, landlords and developers should take into consideration the market niche and acceptable target building class levels when designing their investment plans in order to maximize income .

The income distribution problem in Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Tax performance and reform in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)

Includes bibliography