Municipal fiscal Health

Seminario internacional financiamiento de ciudades metrópolis Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá 2014

Rethinking Fiscal Decentralization Policies in Developing Economies: A Case Study of Ghana

This thesis invites geographers to pay more attention to public policy research by addressing the need to rethink fiscal decentralization policies in Ghana. By applying “Simandan’s wise stance in human geography” and “Grix’s building blocks of social research design”, I developed a conceptual framework that unites two incommensurable ontological and epistemological research positions in geography—the positive and normative positions. I used the framework to investigate two key research questions. First, does fiscal decentralization actually work in Ghana? Through quantitative analysis of empirical revenue and expenditure data (1994-2011) of local governments in Ghana, this study reveals significant issues of inefficiency, inequity, and unaccountability. Local governments generate less revenue, and therefore depend largely on central government transfers for developing their jurisdictions. Worse yet, these transfers are highly unpredictable in terms of amount and timing. Even though a multivariate regression analysis revealed that these transfers are apolitical, the actual disbursement formula tends to focus on equality instead of equity. Additionally, the unclear expenditure assignments in each locality make accountability difficult. In view of these problems, I addressed the question: why is fiscal decentralization held out as a good thing in Ghana? By drawing lessons from Foucault’s and Escobar’s critical discourse analysis, I traced a genealogy of Ghana’s fiscal decentralization. I found that the policy is held out as a good thing in Ghana because of the triangular operation of multiplicities of power, knowledge, and truth regimes at the local, national and international scale. I concluded that although nation-states remains a necessary causal link in fiscal decentralization policy process in Ghana, direct and indirect international involvement have profound effect on these policies. Therefore, rethinking fiscal decentralization involves acknowledging the complex intermingling effects that global, national, and local territories produce.

Informalidad laboral: ineficiencia fiscal y desprotección social

La informalidad laboral ha sido durante d ecadas el com un denominador entre las econom ías latinoamericanas. En Colombia, a pesar de haberse despertado un inter es por realizar un seguimiento a este segmento del mercado de trabajo desde el año 1986, parece no haberse dado ning ún tipo de regulaci ón o polí tica que pretendiese reducir la proporci on de los informales dentro del total de la poblaci on ocupada. Siendo la informalidad laboral un factor contrací clico con un coefi ciente de correlaci ón bastante bajo y dadas las modestas tasas de crecimiento de la economía colombiana, hasta febrero de 2010, un 57,8% de la poblaci on urbana ocupada del pa ís a un pertenece a tan indeseado sector del mercado laboral. Este trabajo pretende mostrar por qu e la informalidad laboral es un indicador relevante de la situaci ón de la economía colombiana, y por qu e debe tenerse en cuenta a la hora de tomar diversos tipos de decisiones y polí ticas econ ómicas, sin que este indicador quede a la sombra de la tasa de desempleo. Para esto se hace una clasi caci ón y posterior estimaci on de los costos fiscales consecuentes del actual escenario de formalidad-informalidad y, fi nalmente, se calcula un índice que pretende mostrar los efectos de la informalidad sobre la sostenibilidad fiscal del Sector Salud en el paí s.

Poverty impacts of increased openness and fiscal policies in a dollarized economy: a CGE-micro approach for Ecuador

We quantify the effects on poverty and income distribution in Ecuador of bilateral trade liberalization with the US and a budget-neutral value added tax increase which seeks to compensate tariff revenue losses. We stress the study of fiscal policies that the government could tap in order to compensate for tariff revenue loss. This is a very important issue for Ecuador because this country adopted the US dollar as its currency in 2000, forgiving the use of important policy instruments. To study these issues we combine a reduced-form micro household income and occupational choice model (using 2005/6 data from the Ecuadorian LSMS) with a standard single-country computable general equilibrium model (employing a 2004 SAM). We follow a sequential approach that simulates the full distributional impact of trade and tax policies. We find that the impact of these policy changes on extreme poverty and income distribution is small but positive.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update. CEPS Policy Brief No. 283, 11 September 2012

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national sovereign. This policy paper first sketches the building blocks of a banking union. Importantly, a new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) should start simultaneously with the ECB assuming supervisory powers. A combination of European supervision and local resolution cannot work because it is not ‘incentive compatible’. Next, this paper proposes a transition period to gradually phase in the European deposit insurance coverage. Finally, we calculate that a European Deposit Insurance Fund would amount to about €30-50 billion for the 75 euro area banks that were subject to the EBA stress tests. This Fund could be created over a period of time through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once up and running, the Fund would then turn into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund to also deal with the resolution of one or more of these European banks.

The euro crisis: ten roots, but fewer solutions. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/17, October 2012

Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.

The policy mix and macroeconomic adjustment in the Euro area. CEPS Commentary, 15 October 2012

Against the background of the IMF’s latest global economic forecast, Jørgen Mortensen and Cinzia Alcidi raise questions in a new CEPS Commentary about the timing of the implementation and the effects of the three main categories of economic policy – fiscal, monetary and structural.

The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism

The known unknowns and the unknown unknowns of the EMU. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/18, October 2012

Extensive prior research on the economics of European monetary union highlighted some potential risks (the known unknowns) but overlooked others (the unknown unknowns). Asymmetries among participating countries, the potentially destabilising character of a one-size-fits all monetary policy, the weakness of adjustment mechanisms, the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline, the possibility of sovereign solvency crises and their adverse consequences were all known and understood. But policymakers often relied on a complacent reading of the evidence. • The potential for financial disruption was vastly underestimated. Economists generally did not consider, or underestimated, the possibility of balance of payment crises such as those experienced by southern European countries, or the risk of a feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. • Remedying EMU’s systemic deficiencies is on the policy agenda. Banking union would go a long way towards addressing the fault lines. The urgent question for economists is if it is going to be enough and, if not, what else should complement the ‘bare-bones’ EMU of Maastricht.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

Policy interventions to promote healthy eating: a review of what works, what does not and what is promising

Unhealthy diets can lead to various diseases, which in turn can translate into a bigger burden for the state in the form of health services and lost production. Obesity alone has enormous costs and claims thousands of lives every year. Although diet quality in the European Union has improved across countries, it still falls well short of conformity with the World Health Organization dietary guidelines. In this review, we classify types of policy interventions addressing healthy eating and identify through a literature review what specific policy interventions are better suited to improve diets. Policy interventions are classified into two broad categories: information measures and measures targeting the market environment. Using this classification, we summarize a number of previous systematic reviews, academic papers, and institutional reports and draw some conclusions about their effectiveness. Of the information measures, policy interventions aimed at reducing or banning unhealthy food advertisements generally have had a weak positive effect on improving diets, while public information campaigns have been successful in raising awareness of unhealthy eating but have failed to translate the message into action. Nutritional labeling allows for informed choice. However, informed choice is not necessarily healthier; knowing or being able to read and interpret nutritional labeling on food purchased does not necessarily result in consumption of healthier foods. Interventions targeting the market environment, such as fiscal measures and nutrient, food, and diet standards, are rarer and generally more effective, though more intrusive. Overall, we conclude that measures to support informed choice have a mixed and limited record of success. On the other hand, measures to target the market environment are more intrusive but may be more effective.

A note on policy, the composition of public expenditures and economic growth

In this article we study the growth and welfare effects of fiscal and monetary policies in economies where public investment is part of the productive process we present four different models that share the same technology with public infrastructure as a separate argument of the production function. We show that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization we show that the optimal tax rate is greater than the rate that maximizes growth and the optimal rate of money creation is below the growth maximizing rate. With public infrastructure in the production function we no longer obtain superneutrality in the Sidrausky model.

A note on growth, welfare and public policy

In this note the growth anti welfare effects of fiscal anti monetary policies are investigated in three economies where public investment is part of the productive process It is shown that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation but that there is no direct relationship between government size, productivity and growth or between inflation and growth. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization and the optimal tax rate and government size are greater than those that maximize growth. Money is not superneutral anti the optimal rate of money creation is below the maximizing rate of growth.