Shiva's dance: Crisis, local institutions and private firms

The uneven spatial distribution of start-ups and their respective survival may reflect comparative advantages resulting from the local institutional background. For the first time, we explore this idea using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to assess the relative efficiency of Portuguese municipalities in this specific context. We depart from the related literature where expenditure is perceived as a desirable input by choosing a measure of fiscal responsibility and infrastructural variables in the first stage. Comparing results for 2006 and 2010, we find that mean performance decreased substantially 1) with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis, 2) as municipal population increases and 3) as financial independence decreases. A second stage is then performed employing a double-bootstrap procedure to evaluate how the regional context outside the control of local authorities (e.g. demographic characteristics and political preferences) impacts on efficiency.

Discussing Chevalier’s data on the efficiency of tariffs for american and french canals in the 1830s

This article revisits Michel Chevalier’s work and discussions of tariffs. Chevalier shifted from Saint-Simonism to economic liberalism during his life in the 19th century. His influence was soon perceived in the political world and economic debates, mainly because of his discussion of tariffs as instruments of efficient transport policies. This work discusses Chevalier’s thoughts on tariffs by revisiting his masterpiece, Le Cours d’Économie Politique. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was conducted to test Chevalier’s hypothesis on the inefficiency of French tariffs. This work showed that Chevalier’s claims on French tariffs are not validated by DEA.

Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: in depth analysis of the functional components of government expenditures

NIPE - WP 02/2016

Globalization and Europeanization: Analysing Change

The main motivation for exploring the relationship between globalization and Europeanization is the understanding of the importance of exogenous factors for policy change at the domestic level. Can we distinguish the impact of Europeanization to that of globalization? What is the relationship between globalization and Europeanization and what can we learn about the impact of the two phenomena upon political institutions, public policies, identities and values of EU member-states? Can we distinguish the traces of globalization to those of Europeanization upon the domestic level? The paper draws upon International Relations and International Political Economy theories of globalization as well as upon the Europeanization literature. Both phenomena are multi-dimensional and in order to assess their impact and their relationship three dimensions are explored: political institutions, public policies and values and identities. It is concluded that the two phenomena are interwoven and that there is no antithetical relationship between them. Their core is similar, based on the values of neo-liberalism, representative democracy and open market economy.

Learning from Shocks and the Decision to Open

Two claims pervade the literature on the political economy of market reforms: that economic crises cause reforms; and that crises matter because they bring into question the validity of the economic model held to be responsible for them. Economic crises are said to spur a process of learning that is conducive to the abandonment of failing models and to the adoption of successful models. But although these claims have become the conventional wisdom, they have been hardly tested empirically due to the lack of agreement on what constitutes a crisis and to difficulties in measuring learning from them. I propose a model of rational learning from experience and apply it to the decision to open the economy. Using data from 1964 through 1990, I show that learning from the 1982 debt crisis was relevant to the first wave of adoption of an export promotion strategy, but learning was conditional on the high variability of economic outcomes in countries that opened up to trade. Learning was also symbolic in that the sheer number of other countries that liberalized was a more important driver of others’ decisions to follow suit.

Democracy and the curse of natural resources

We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our political economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources may be bad for democracy by harming political turnover. Our model also suggests a non-linear dependence of human capital on natural resources. For low levels of democracy human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed. This theoretical finding is corroborated in both cross section and panel data regressions.

A Foundation System and a State System - Private-School Implications on Welfare and Education Expenditure

This paper examines the effects of two different education - financing systems: a foundation system and a state system on the level and distribution of resources devoted to education in the presence of private schools. We use political economy approach where households differ in their level of income, and the central tax rate used to nance education is determined by a majority vote. Our analysis focuses on implications of allowing for a private-school option. To evaluate the importance of private schools we develop a computational model and calibrate it using USA data. The results reveal that the private school option is very important quantitatively in terms of welfare, total resources spent on education and equity.

La participation des consommateurs à la construction de l'autorité des normes internationales : vers une économie politique internationale de la traduction

Cette thèse explore les implications politiques de la montée en puissance des normes internationales sur nos sociétés contemporaines et pose la problématique des dynamiques participatives des représentants des consommateurs au sein des formes de pouvoir non étatique à l'aide du cas de l'Organisation internationale de normalisation (ISO). Le renforcement du pouvoir des normes internationales et autres spécifications techniques soulève d'importants enjeux démocratiques qui portent aussi bien sur la représentativité des acteurs qui les élaborent, sur l'articulation des prérogatives publiques et privées dans la gouvernance de la mondialisation, que sur le rôle de l'expertise dans la reconnaissance de ces nouvelles formes de pouvoir. La participation du monde associatif intervient sur ces différents enjeux de manière complexe. Cette recherche s'inscrit à la suite des études en relations internationales/économie politique internationale sur les formes d'autorité non étatique et s'inspire du concept de traduction issu de la sociologie des sciences et techniques pour mettre en lumière le rôle des spécifications techniques dans la construction d'une société de consommation centrée sur la liberté de choix et la façon dont les associations de consommateurs se saisissent des arènes de normalisation pour y faire valoir des préoccupations collectives, leur expertise et leur identité. Cette thèse défend l'idée que les consommateurs participent à la construction de l'autorité des normes internationales par leur rôle dans la traduction qui permet de relier les spécifications techniques au fonctionnement des marchés, au cadre réglementaire de la loi et aux préoccupations sociétales. L'analyse repose sur une observation ethnographique des délibérations d'un comité technique de l'ISO, une recherche-­‐action, la réalisation d'entretiens et la consultation de documents d'archives de l'ISO. -- This thesis explores the political significance of the rise of international standards on contemporary societies and questions the participatory dynamics of consumers' representatives within nonstate forms of power, using the case of the International organization for standardization (ISO). The power granted to international standards and other technical specifications raises important democratic issues regarding the representativity of standard-­‐ writers, the public-­‐private relationships involved in this form of governance or the expertise sustaining the recognition of such new forms of power. The participation of civil society associations affect such issues in complex ways. This research relies on international relations/international political economy approaches of nonstate authority and takes inspiration from the concept of translation developed by science and technology studies to highlight the crucial role played by technical specifications in building a consumer society based on the freedom of choice as well as how consumers' associations take stock of standardization arenas to promote collective issues and claim their expertise and identity. This thesis argues that consumers contribute to the construction of the authority of international standards through their role in the translation that links international standards to the market society, the regulatory state as well as to societal preoccupation. The analysis is based on an ethnographic observation of deliberations within an ISO technical committee, a research-­‐action, interviews as well as on the consultation of ISO archives.

Gare aux hybrides : mythes et réalités de la gouvernance de la mondialisation

Hybrid is often used as a default attribute reflecting lack of clear understanding of the influence of new patterns and actors of structural change beyond states, firms and institutions traditionally involved in regulatory practices across nations. The article argues that the notion of hybrid has a distinct relevance for engaging shortcomings of global governance literature. It explores the lessons to be drawn from ancient mythology by highlighting that ontological ambiguity and emotional ambivalence represent core features of hybrid creatures. It then builds upon critical scholarship in global political economy to conceptualise three generic levels of transfers of authority at which situating the hybrid dimension of governance in contemporary capitalism. Following this approach, the concept of hybrid explicates the ambiguity between formal and informal transfers of authority, which in turn provides an insight into the contested nature of the procedures used to reinforce this type of governance practices.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit

We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)