Audit report on the Central Iowa Employment and Training Consortium (CIETC) for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Central Iowa Employment and Training Consortium (CIETC) for the year ended June 30, 2006

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Labour market in the Catalan cotton textile sector: Employment and fertility (1850-1913)

This paper deals whit the dynamics of the Catalan textile labour market (theSpanish region that concentrated most of the industrial and factory activity duringthe 19 Century) and offers hypotheses and results on the impact it had on livingstandards and fertility levels. We observe the formation of an uneven labourmarket in which male supply for labour (excluding women and children) grewmuch faster than the demand. We stress the fact that labour supply is verydependant on institutional factors liked to the transmition of household propertybetween generations. Instead the slow path of growth of adult males demand forlabour is witnessing the limits of this industry to expand and to compete ininternational markets. The strategy of working class families to adapt to scarceopportunities of employment we document here is the diminution of legitimatefertility levels. Fertility control is the direct instrument we think workers have tocontrol their number in a situation that was likely to create labour surpluses in theshort and mid run.

Product market deregulation and the U.S. employment miracle

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matchingmodel with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual wage bargaining.Product market competition affects unemployment by two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect due to a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980 s and 1990 s could be attributed to product market deregulation. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individual bargaining, a decrease of less than two tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.

Body size, activity, employment and wages in Europe: A first approach

This paper examines the associations between obesity, employment status and wages for several European countries. Our results provide weak evidence that obese workers are more likely to be unemployed or tend to be more segregated in self-employment jobs than their non-obese counterparts. We also find difficult to detect statistically significant relationships between obesity and wages. As previously reported in the literature, the association between obesity, unemployment and wages seems to be different for men and women. Moreover, heterogeneity is also found across countries. Such heterogeneity can be somewhat explained by some labor market institutions, such as the collective bargaining coverage and the employer-provided health insurance.

Report of recommendations of the Public Employment Relations Board for the year ended June 30, 2007

Report of recommendations of the Public Employment Relations Board for the year ended June 30, 2007

Iowa Gender Wage Equity Study, 2008

In 1993, Iowa Workforce Development (then the Department of Employment Services) conducted a survey to determine if there was a gender gap in wages paid. The results of that survey indicated that females were paid 68 cents for every dollar paid to males. Another study was conducted in 1999 which found that females made approximately 73 cents for every dollar made by males in Iowa. These calculations took into account the average number of hours respondents worked weekly. In January 2008, Iowa Workforce Development (IWD) was contacted by the Iowa Commission on the Status of Women (ICSW) to request that IWD conduct research to update the 1999 gender wage equity study to determine if the wage disparity between males and females has changed since the 1999 study. This study was completed by IWD using 2007/2008 Laborshed data consisting of responses from 5,669 employed respondents. Of the respondents, 59.6 percent (3,379) were female, 40.3 percent (2,285) were male, and 0.1 percent (5) refused to identify their gender. Statewide sampling was provided by the University of Northern Iowa’s Institute for Decision Making based on the population per ZIP code. The results of the survey show that females who are paid an hourly wage earn 21.8 percent (78.2 cents for every dollar) less than males earn and females who are salaried earn 21.6 percent less than males. Additional survey results detail the occupational categories, industries and the education and experience levels. All of these characteristics contribute to the disparity.

Public Employment Relations Board Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Public Employment Relations Board

Organizational capital and employment fluctuations

In this paper I present a model in which production requires two types of labor inputs: regular productive tasks and organizational capital, which is accumulated by workers performing organizational tasks. By allocating more workers from organizational to productive tasks, firms can temporarily increase production without hiring. The availability of this intensive margin of labor adjustment, in combination with adjustment costs along the extensive margin (search frictions, firing costs, training costs), makes it optimal to delay employment adjustments. Simulations indicate that this mechanism is quantitatively important even if only a small fraction of workers perform organizational tasks, and explains why the hiring rate is persistent and why employment is slow to recover after the end of a recession.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

The political economy of employment protection

This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in agrowing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use toanalyze the political support for employment protection legislationssuch as the ones that are observed in most European countries.We analyze the possibility of Condorcet cycles due to the fact thatworkers about to become unemployed prefer both an increase and areduction in firing costs over the status quo. Despite this problem, we show the existence of local, and sometimes global majority winners.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. We show that the gains from, and consequently the politicalsupport for employment protection (as defined by maximunjob tenure) are larger, the lower the rate of creative destruction and the largerthe worker's bargaining power. Numerical simulations suggest a hump-shaped response of firing costs to these variables, as well as negative impact of exogeneous turnover on employment protection.

Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts

This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and theemployment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employmentcontracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows theeffects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Oncecalibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use moreintensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of thetotal employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We testand confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturingfirms with detailed information about the type of workers employedby the firms and about firm financing constraints.

Employment protection, international specialization and innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentivesfor R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firingcost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relativelysecure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle.Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where,roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country willspecialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existinggoods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primaryinnovation', that is, invention of new goods.

Performance Report for Fiscal Year, 2008

I am pleased to present the performance report for the Iowa Department for the Blind for fiscal year 2008. This report is provided in compliance with sections 8E.210 and 216B.7 of the Code of Iowa. It contains valuable information about results achieved because of the services that we and our partners provided to blind and visually impaired Iowans during the past fiscal year in the areas of Vocational Rehabilitation, Independent Living, Library Services, and Resource Management. We determine our competitive success in a number of ways. We look at the federal standards and indicators to learn our ranking in relation to the performance of other public rehabilitation agencies. We compare our library's production and circulation figures with those from previous years to determine trends. We set our own standards for success by looking at such factors as the number of successful case closures, average hourly wage at case closure, skills training provided, and compliance with regulations. Results show that the Department is working positively toward achieving its strategic goals of increasing the independence and productivity of blind Iowans and improving access to information for blind Iowans. Major accomplishments of the year included:  The selection of our Library as one of eight libraries to receive the new digital talking book machines and books in digital media from the National Library Service for the Blind and Physically Handicapped. Priority for distribution of the machines is given to Library patrons who are veterans.  The Department, the Iowa Braille School, and the Department of Education have been promoting the new expanded core curriculum as part of their continued efforts to improve the coordination and delivery of services to blind and visually impaired students in Iowa.  The Department's five-year grant funded Pathfinders mentoring program ended this year. A total of 49 blind youths aged 16-26 were paired with successful blind adult mentors. Assessments of the program clearly showed that participation in the program had a measurable positive effect on the youth involved.  Finally, earnings ratios and the percentage of employment for vocational rehabilitation clients of the Department are among the best in the nation, as measured by the U.S. Rehabilitation Services Administration's standards and indicators for the year ended September 30, 2007. Overall, we met or exceeded 13 of 18 targets included in this report. A discussion of the Department's services, customers, and organizational structure, and budget appears in the "Department Overview" that follows. Information pertaining to performance results appears in the final section of this document. The success of the Department's programs is evident in the success achieved by blind Iowans. It is reflected in the many blind persons who can be seen traveling about independently, going to their jobs and to the community and family activities in which they participate. Sincerely, Karen A. Keninger, Director Iowa Department for the Blind

Report on a special investigation of the University of Northern Iowa, Camp Adventure Youth Services program for the period April 1, 2007 through March 31, 2008

Report on a special investigation of the University of Northern Iowa, Camp Adventure Youth Services program for the period April 1, 2007 through March 31, 2008