The Supreme Court’s Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at the Expense of Diversity

This paper is an examination of the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of federalism since constitutional repatriation in 1982. It argues that the lure of centralist efficiency is overpowering a fundamentally important part of our federal order: regionalism. The author contends that changes made by the Court to certain fundamental concepts of Canadian constitutional law now provide Parliament with greater latitude than before in the exercise of its legislative powers. According to the author, these changes are disturbing because they are structured so as to preclude consideration of the legitimate concerns of regional polities. Furthermore, he argues that the Court has reinforced the central government's power to regulate the economy, including intraprovincial matters affecting trade, by resorting to highly functional tests that emphasize economic efficiency over other criteria. This, he claims, makes it more difficult to invoke legitimate regional interests that would lead to duplication, overlapping and even, in the eyes of some, inefficiency. The author the focuses on the Court's treatment of environmental protection in an attempt to show the tension between the Court's desire to use a functional approach and the need to recognize regional interests. Finally, through an examination of recent case law, he attemps to demonstrate that the Court's dominant perspective remains functional despite its endorsement of a more community-oriented undestanding of federalism in Secession Reference. If the Court chooses to proceed in this manner, it will alienate regional polities and may encourage them to choose more radical means of asserting their differences. Further, the author argues that strict adherence to the functional effectiveness approach will undermine the very values that federalism is meant to promote.

Institutional Boundaries and Judicial Review - Some Thoughts on How the Court is Going About Its Business: Desperately Seeking Coherence

Cet article a précédemment été publié par la Supreme Court Law Review (Second Series).

Inherent Powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

This thesis is shows the result of the research work on the inherent Powers of the High Court in criminal jurisdiction. The criminal justice system in India recognizes inherent powers only of the High Court. The Theory and Philosophy of inherent powers are concerned the Distinction between civil and Criminal laws are of very little consequence. In formulating the research programme the confusion created by the concept of inherent powers and its application by High Court form the central point. How fully the concept is understood, how correctly the power is used, and how far it has enhanced the rationale of the administration of criminal justice, what is its importance and what are the solutions for the inherent power to earn a permanent status in the province of criminal jurisprudence are the themes of this study. The precipitation of new dimensions is the yardstick to acknowledge the inherent powers of the High Court and Supreme Court. It is of instant value in criminal justice system. This study concludes innovativeness provided by the inherent powers has helped the justice administration draw inspiration from the Constitution. A jurisprudence of inherent powers has developed with the weilding of inherent powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court. It is to unravel mystery of jurisprudence caused by the operation of the concept of inherent powers this research work gives emphasis. Its significance is all the more relevant when the power is exercised in the administration of criminal justice. Application or non application of inherent powers in a given case would tell upon the maturity and perfection of the standard of justice

Human rights and mortgage repossession: beyond property law using Article 8

Following the Supreme Court decisions in Manchester CC v Pinnock and Hounslow CC v Powell, this article examines the possible impact of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms upon protection of the home in creditor repossession proceedings. The central argument advanced is that, although occupiers may not all be protected through property law, they may enjoy an independent right to respect for their home under Article 8, which should be acknowledged in the legal frameworks governing creditor's enforcement rights against the home. The article suggests that the most common creditor enforcement route, through mortgage repossession proceedings, falls short in this regard. It takes as its primary focus the treatment of children in such proceedings to provide an example of the potential for a human rights-based property protection heralded by these two Supreme Court decisions.

Second Strike and you are (finally) out? The Quashing of the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Amendment no. 4)

The blog-post critically analyses the Israeli Supreme Court judgment (HCJ 8425/13 Anon v. Knesset et al) quashing the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Amendment no. 4), offering themes of comparative constitutional interest.

Arnold v. Britton: a ratio and two sets of obiter dicta

Arnold v Britton marks the final stage of the longstanding dispute as to the correct interpretation of a number of 99-year leases of chalets on a leisure park at Oxwich, in the Gower peninsula, near Swansea. The aspect of the case which has attracted most discussion has, understandably, been its main ratio: the proper way to construe a provision of a lease which arguably has an absurd result. This will be considered in this case-note. The judgment of the Supreme Court – particularly the judgment of Lord Neuberger PSC – does, however contain some observations on the possible reform of the law on service charges which are of interest to those engaged in this field. It also contains some obiter comments on ‘letting schemes’ which are – in the view of the present author – highly unorthodox. These three rather disparate issues which are raised by this case will be considered in turn. As they have little in common with each other, they will be considered as separate sections.

Enough energy to get half way to the moon

A proposal to abandon Melbourne's Supreme Court for a new high-tech facility prompted quite an outcry of dismay when it was reported in the Melbourne press earlier this year, and has highlighted sustainability issues in relation to heritage buildings in Victoria.

2.4 Judge W. M. Dinwiddie Boone County, Missouri, 13th Circuit Court

Two weeks later, Judge Dinwiddie issued his decision in favor of Canada and the University. Houston was expecting this and appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.

The Keyes to Reclaiming the Racial History Of the Roberts Court

This article advocates for a fundamental re-understanding about the way that the history of race is understood by the current Supreme Court. Represented by the racial rights opinions of Justice John Roberts that celebrate racial progress, the Supreme Court has equivocated and rendered obsolete the historical experiences of people of color in the United States. This jurisprudence has in turn reified the notion of color-blindness, consigning racial discrimination to a distant and discredited past that has little bearing to how race and inequality is experienced today. The racial history of the Roberts Court is centrally informed by the context and circumstances surrounding Brown v. Board of Education. For the Court, Brown symbolizes all that is wrong with the history of race in the United States - legal segregation, explicit racial discord, and vicious and random acts of violence. Though Roberts Court opinions suggest that some of those vestiges still exits, the bulk of its jurisprudence indicate the opposite. With Brown’s basic factual premises as its point of reference, the Court has consistently argued that the nation has made tremendous strides away from the condition of racial bigotry, intolerance, and inequity. The article accordingly argues that the Roberts Court reliance on Brown to understand racial progress is anachronistic. Especially as the nation’s focus for racial inequality turned national in scope, the same binaries in Brown that had long served to explain the history of race relations in the United States (such as Black-White, North-South, and Urban-Rural) were giving way to massive multicultural demographic and geographic transformations in the United States in the years and decades after World War II. All of the familiar tropes so clear in Brown and its progeny could no longer fully describe the current reality of shifting and transforming patterns of race relations in the United States. In order to reclaim the history of race from the Roberts Court, the article assesses a case that more accurately symbolizes the recent history and current status of race relations today: Keyes v. School District No. 1. This was the first Supreme Court case to confront how the binaries of cases like Brown proved of little probative value in addressing how and in what ways race and racial discrimination was changing in the United States. Thus, understanding Keyesand the history it reflects reveals much about how and in what ways the Roberts Court should rethink its conclusions regarding the history of race relations in the United States for the last 60 years.

Notes of proceedings and cases determined in the high court of errors and appeals, the court of chancery, and the orphans court of the state of Delaware, 1792-1832

Contains summaries of cases heard by the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Appeals Court in the counties of Sussex, Kent, and Newcastle covering a variety of legal topics. Supposedly based on Wilson's Red Book.

The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

Rules of court, 1905-1916 : made under the China orders in Council, 1904-1915, the foreign jurisdiction (admiralty) order in Council, 1910, and the China (companies) order in Council, 1915 /

At head of title: British jurisdiction in China.

The celebrated trial, Madeline Pollard vs. Breckinridge, the most noted breach of promise suit in the history of court records.

Trial of William Campbell Preston who was being sued by Miss Madeline Pollard for $50,000 in a breach of promise suit. Accused of promising to marry Miss Pollard and fathering a child and then failing to fulfill his promise. He was found guilty.

The Ontario law reports : cases determined in the Court of Appeal and in the High Court of Justice for Ontario.

Mode of access: Internet.

Cases decided in the Court of Claims of the United States at the ... with the rules of practice and the acts of Congress relating to the court /

Reporters: C.C. Mott and Archibald Hopkins, v. 8-48; William W. Scott, v. 49-50; Samuel A. Putnam, v. 51-53; Seth Shepard, v. 54-55; Harry N. Stull, v. 56-59; Ewart W. Hobbs, v. 61-74; Charles F. Kincheloe, v. 76-84; Charles F. Kincheloe and Harry N. Stull, v. 85; James A. Hoyt, v. 86-112.