On the economics of energy consumption in 4G networks: the case of Spain

Reducing energy consumption is one of the main challenges in most countries. For example, European Member States agreed to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20% in 2020 compared to 1990 levels (EC 2008). Considering each sector separately, ICTs account nowadays for 2% of total carbon emissions. This percentage will increase as the demand of communication services and applications steps up. At the same time, the expected evolution of ICT-based developments - smart buildings, smart grids and smart transportation systems among others - could result in the creation of energy-saving opportunities leading to global emission reductions (Labouze et al. 2008), although the amount of these savings is under debate (Falch 2010). The main development required in telecommunication networks ?one of the three major blocks of energy consumption in ICTs together with data centers and consumer equipment (Sutherland 2009) ? is the evolution of existing infrastructures into ultra-broadband networks, the so-called Next Generation Networks (NGN). Fourth generation (4G) mobile communications are the technology of choice to complete -or supplement- the ubiquitous deployment of NGN. The risk and opportunities involved in NGN roll-out are currently in the forefront of the economic and policy debate. However, the issue of which is the role of energy consumption in 4G networks seems absent, despite the fact that the economic impact of energy consumption arises as a key element in the cost analysis of this type of networks. Precisely, the aim of this research is to provide deeper insight on the energy consumption involved in the usage of a 4G network, its relationship with network main design features, and the general economic impact this would have in the capital and operational expenditures related with network deployment and usage.

Techno-economics of ICT infrastructures: The impact of (user, network) requirements

- Towards a methodology for prospective deployment of ICT infrastructures - (Technologies & Architectures) - Key deployment parameters (network requirements) - User requirements - A proposal for Cost‐Benefit Analysis

Essays on Firm Heterogeneity with Empirical Applications in Economic History and Agricultural Economics

This thesis uses models of firm-heterogeneity to complete empirical analyses in economic history and agricultural economics. In Chapter 2, a theoretical model of firm heterogeneity is used to derive a statistic that summarizes the welfare gains from the introduction of a new technology. The empirical application considers the use of mechanical steam power in the Canadian manufacturing sector during the late nineteenth century. I exploit exogenous variation in geography to estimate several parameters of the model. My results indicate that the use of steam power resulted in a 15.1 percent increase in firm-level productivity and a 3.0-5.2 percent increase in aggregate welfare. Chapter 3 considers various policy alternatives to price ceiling legislation in the market for production quotas in the dairy farming sector in Quebec. I develop a dynamic model of the demand for quotas with farmers that are heterogeneous in their marginal cost of milk production. The econometric analysis uses farm-level data and estimates a parameter of the theoretical model that is required for the counterfactual experiments. The results indicate that the price of quotas could be reduced to the ceiling price through a 4.16 percent expansion of the aggregate supply of quotas, or through moderate trade liberalization of Canadian dairy products. In Chapter 4, I study the relationship between farm-level productivity and participation in the Commercial Export Milk (CEM) program. I use a difference-in-difference research design with inverse propensity weights to test for causality between participation in the CEM program and total factor productivity (TFP). I find a positive correlation between participation in the CEM program and TFP, however I find no statistically significant evidence that the CEM program affected TFP.

Subsidiarity between Law and Economics. Research Papers in Law, 1/2005

From the Introduction. The present contribution is an attempt to raise awareness between the 'trenches' by juxtaposing the two approaches to subsidiarity. Subsequently, I shall set out why, in economics, subsidiarity is embraced as a key principle in the design and working of the Union and how a functional subsidiarity test can be derived from this thinking. Throughout the paper, a range of illustrations and examples is provided in an attempt to show the practical applicability of a subsidiarity test. This does not mean, of course, that the application of the test can automatically "solve" all debates on whether subsidiarity is (not) violated. What it does mean, however, is that a careful methodology can be a significant help to e.g. national parliaments and the Brussels circuit, in particular, to discourage careless politicisation as much as possible and to render assessments of subsidiarity comparable throughout the Union. The latter virtue should be of interest to national parliaments in cooperating, within just six weeks, about a common stance in the case of a suspected violation of the principle. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a flavour of very different approaches and appreciation of the subsidiarity principle in European law and in the economics of multi-tier government. Section 3 elaborates on the economics of multi-tier government as a special instance of cost / benefit analysis of (de)centralisation in the three public economic functions of any government system. This culminates in a five-steps subsidiarity test and a brief discussion about its proper and improper application. Section 4 applies the test in a non-technical fashion to a range of issues of the "efficiency function" (i.e. allocation and markets) of the EU. After showing that the functional logic of subsidiarity may require liberalisation to be accompanied by various degrees of centralisation, a number of fairly detailed illustrations of how to deal with subsidiarity in the EU is provided. One illustration is about how the subsidiarity logic is misused by protagonists (labour in the internal market). A slightly different but frequently encountered aspect consists in the refusal to recognize that the EU (that is, some form of centralisation) offers a better solution than 25 national ones. A third range of issues, where the functional logic of subsidiarity could be useful, emerges when the boundaries of national competences are shifting due to more intense cross-border flows and developments. Other subsections are devoted to Union public goods and to the question whether the subsidiarity test might trace instances of EU decentralisation: a partial or complete shift of a policy or regulation to Member States. The paper refrains from an analysis of the application of the subsidiarity test to the other two public functions, namely, equity and macro-economic stabilisation.2 Section 5 argues that the use of a well-developed methodology of a functional subsidiarity test would be most useful for the national parliaments and even more so for their cooperation in case of a suspected violation of subsidiarity. Section 6 concludes.

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

Essays on coordination problems in economics

No estudo da economia, há diversas situações em que a propensão de um indivíduo a tomar determinada ação é crescente na quantidade de outras pessoas que este indivíduo acredita que tomarão a mesma ação. Esse tipo de complementaridade estratégica geralmente leva à existência de múltiplos equilíbrios. Além disso, o resultado atingido pelas decisões decentralizadas dos agentes pode ser ineficiente, deixando espaço para intervenções de política econômica. Esta tese estuda diferentes ambientes em que a coordenação entre indivíduos é importante. O primeiro capítulo analisa como a manipulação de informação e a divulgação de informação afetam a coordenação entre investidores e o bem-estar em um modelo de corridas bancárias. No modelo, há uma autoridade reguladora que não pode se comprometer a revelar a verdadeira situação do setor bancário. O regulador observa informações idiossincráticas dos bancos (através de um stress test, por exemplo) e escolhe se revela essa informação para o público ou se divulga somente um relatório agregado sobre a saúde do sistema financeiro como um todo. O relatório agregado pode ser distorcido a um custo – um custo mais elevado significa maior credibilidade do regulador. Os investidores estão cientes dos incentivos do regulador a esconder más notícias do mercado, mas a manipulação de informação pode, ainda assim, ser efetiva. Se a credibilidade do regulador não for muito baixa, a política de divulgação de informação é estado-contingente, e existe sempre um conjunto de estados em que há manipulação de informação em equilíbrio. Se a credibilidade for suficientemente baixa, porém, o regulador opta por transparência total dos resultados banco-específicos, caso em que somente os bancos mais sólidos sobrevivem. Uma política de opacidade levaria a uma crise bancária sistêmica, independentemente do estado. O nível de credibilidade que maximiza o bem-estar agregado do ponto de vista ex ante é interior. O segundo e o terceiro capítulos estudam problemas de coordenação dinâmicos. O segundo capítulo analisa o bem-estar em um ambiente em que agentes recebem oportunidades aleatórias para migrar entre duas redes. Os resultados mostram que sempre que a rede de pior qualidade (intrínseca) prevalece, isto é eficiente. Na verdade, um planejador central estaria ainda mais inclinado a escolher a rede de pior qualidade. Em equilíbrio, pode haver mudanças ineficientes que ampliem a rede de qualidade superior. Quando indivíduos escolhem entre dois padrões ou redes com níveis de qualidade diferentes, se todos os indivíduos fizessem escolhas simultâneas, a solução eficiente seria que todos adotassem a rede de melhor qualidade. No entanto, quando há fricções e os agentes tomam decisões escalonadas, a solução eficiente difere ix do senso comum. O terceiro capítulo analisa um problema de coordenação dinâmico com decisões escalonadas em que os agentes são heterogêneos ex ante. No modelo, existe um único equilíbrio, caracterizado por thresholds que determinam as escolhas para cada tipo de agente. Apesar da heterogeneidade nos payoffs, há bastante conformidade nas ações individuais em equilíbrio. Os thresholds de diferentes tipos de agentes coincidem parcialmente contanto que exista um conjunto de crenças arbitrário que justifique esta conformidade. No entanto, as estratégias de equilíbrio de diferentes tipos nunca coincidem totalmente. Além disso, a conformidade não é ineficiente. A solução eficiente apresentaria estratégias ainda mais similares para tipos distintos em comparação com o equilíbrio decentralizado.

The economics of reducing the county road system: three case studies in Iowa. Final report.

Transportation Department, Office of University Research, Washington, D.C.

The cost of municipal water supply : a case study /

Mode of access: Internet.

Economics of reproductive and infant health : an annotated bibliography from 1980 to 1993 /

Includes indexes.

Effects of geographic cost of living adjustments on welfare benefits /

Mode of access: Internet.

Preliminary report on cost of producing beef in Illinois.

Mode of access: Internet.

The cost of living in the United States in 1931.

Mode of access: Internet.

International cost-sharing arrangements.

Mode of access: Internet.

Low cost adequate food.

Mode of access: Internet.