Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

Liquidation du comptoir des halles et marchés ... 1° Rapport de M. Bacqua de Labarthe,... 2° Rapport de M. Raimbert,... 3° Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée générale des actionnaires du 8 février 1868. Résolutions adoptées

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