Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces. OSW COMMENTARY 190/23.11.2015

The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The bumpy road. Difficult reform process in Ukraine. OSW Commentary, Number 192|30.11.2015

The post-Maidan Ukrainian government found itself forced to launch a comprehensive state reform process due to both the deep crisis in all the key areas of the state’s operation and the enormous demand for change among the Ukrainian public. The promise to carry out structural reforms based on the European model became a key point in Kyiv’s political rhetoric. However, one year after the formation of the second cabinet led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2 December 2014) and one and a half years since the inauguration of Petro Poroshenko as president (7 June 2014), it is clear that the reform process in Ukraine is moving at a snail’s pace and is far from fulfilling its post-Maidan declarations. It has also provoked increasing frustration among the public due to the lack of expected effects.

Aftermath of the Maidan. Ukrainian society two years after the revolution. OSW Commentary Number 199/04.03.2016

Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, it is clear that hopes of a quick reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukrainian state as a political and institutional system have not been fulfilled. The resistance of the bureaucrats, politicians and oligarchs who make up the informal, corrupt systems has proven to be very strong, and the will of part of the political elite and the EU and the United States to implement the procedures they have suggested has proved insufficient. If not for the war and the economic collapse, which forced Kyiv to seek external financial assistance and political support, the modernisation of the state would have proceeded even more slowly and with yet greater difficulty.

How to get out of the crisis without reforms? The Belarusian authorities confront growing economic problems. OSW Commentary NUMBER 202/21.03.2016

2015 saw a drop in Belarus’s GDP for the first time in almost 20 years, which is primarily the result of a significant reduction in levels of production and export. As a consequence, there was also a serious depletion of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, as well as a progressive weakening of the Belarusian rouble. The macroeconomic figures from January and February 2016 show that these trends are not only continuing, but they are also becoming even more severe, which confirms that Belarus now finds itself in a prolonged economic crisis. On one hand, the reason for this state of affairs is the protracted economic recession in Russia, which is Belarus’s main economic partner, together with the drastic global decline in prices for fuel, which is a key Belarusian export. On the other hand, meanwhile, an equally important reason for the current crisis is the failure of the Belarusian economic model. President Aleksandr Lukashenko, out of fear that his authoritarian system of government will be dismantled and that public discontent will rise, has categorically rejected the proposals for even partial reforms put forward by some of his entourage, who are aware of the need for the immediate transformation of the country’s anachronistic and very costly economic model, based as it still is on quasi-Soviet management policies.

Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 205/31.03.2016

Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy and its enhanced military activity in the Nordic-Baltic region has led to revaluations in Sweden’s and Finland’s security and defence policies and a rethinking of the formats of their military co-operation. While remaining outside NATO, the two states have been developing closer bilateral defence co-operation and working more closely with the United States, while at the same time developing co-operation with NATO. Sweden and Finland perceive the United States as the guarantor of regional and European security. From their point of view, the United States is currently the country that has both the necessary military capabilities and the political will to react in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region, in which both countries would inevitably become involved despite their non-aligned status. For Sweden and Finland, intensified co-operation with the United States offers an alternative to NATO membership, which is currently out of the question for domestic political reasons. Meanwhile, the US has also become increasingly aware of the strategic importance of the two states, which, for the purposes of contingency planning, are in fact an extension of NATO’s north-eastern flank.

The shadow of Chornobyl. Ukraine thirty years after the disaster. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 210/22.04.2016

Thirty years after the Chornobyl nuclear power plant disaster, its aftermath and consequences are still a permanent element of the economic, environmental and social situation of Ukraine, Belarus and some regions of Russia. Ukraine, to which the scope of this text is limited, experienced the most severe shock because, among other factors, the plant where the accident took place was located just 100 km away from Kyiv. Its consequences have affected the course of political developments in the country, and have become part of the newly-shaped national identity of independent Ukraine. The country bore the huge cost of the clean-up effort but did not give up on nuclear energy, and today nuclear power plants generate more than half of its electricity. The system of social benefits for people recognised as disaster survivors, which was put in place by the Soviet government, has become a huge burden on the country’s budget; if implemented fully, it would account for more than 10% of total public spending, and is therefore being implemented to only a partial extent. This system has reinforced the Ukrainian people’s sense of helplessness and dependence on the state. The disaster has also become part of the ‘victim nation’ blueprint of the Ukrainian national myth, which it has further solidified. The technological and environmental consequences of the disaster, and hence also its economic costs, will persist for centuries, while the social consequences will dissipate as the affected generation passes away. In any case, Chornobyl will remain an important part of the life of the Ukrainian state and society.

One year of Ukraine’s De-communisation. A change in the historical narrative. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 211/16.05.2016

A year ago, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted four bills on the policy of national memory: on granting access to the archives of the repressive organs of the Communist totalitarian regime in the years 1917–1991, on the legal status and commemoration of Ukrainian independence fighters in the twentieth century, on the immortalisation of the victory over Nazism in the Second World War, 1939–1945, and on the condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and the forbidding of their symbolism from being promoted. The laws came into force on 21 May 2015. After a year, it can be stated that only the latter two are being observed – the official narrative regarding World War II has been changed, mainly due to the activity of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR), but also as a result of public statements by President Petro Poroshenko. The process of removing from public places the names and commemorations referring to the Soviet era is underway, and the fears that this may trigger serious conflicts have not proved true. From roughly a thousand placenames subject to de-communisation some two thirds have been changed so far (parliamentary bills regarding the remaining ones are awaiting approval) and most statues of Communist leaders have been removed. However, the law concerning independence fighters, which raised the most serious controversies, did not have any practical consequences. Moreover, nothing suggests that this could change. The implementation of the de-communisation laws is associated with a significant change in Ukrainian patriotic narrative: it is no longer focused on national martyrdom and it is beginning to emphasize heroic motives, which is in line with wartime needs. The fact that some of these motives are likely to trigger problems in Ukraine’s relations with Poland seems to be viewed as a marginal ‘by-product’.

100 mów pogrzebowych wypowiedzianych przy zwłokach osób różnego wieku i stanu /

Mode of access: Internet.

Stronnictwo Demokratyczno-Narodowe w świetle nauki katolickiej /

Includes bibliographical references.

Studya i szkice z dziejów literatury polskiej;

Mode of access: Internet.

Obrona sztandaru, mieszczańska powieść historyczna.

At head of title: Ludwik Stasiak.

La campanella : rondo, from the 2nd concerto, op. 7 /

Mode of access: Internet.

Europa a Polska w dobie wojny o sukcesyę austryacką w latach 1740-1745 ...

Cover of v. 2 (Dokumenty) dated 1913.

Slavia occidentalis.

At head of title: Posnańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk. Wydział Filologiczno-Filozoficzny.