Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.

Interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment: loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714

This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.

Radial measures of public services deficit for regional allocation of public funds

The goal of this paper is to present an optimal resource allocation model for the regional allocation of public service inputs. Theproposed solution leads to maximise the relative public service availability in regions located below the best availability frontier, subject to exogenous budget restrictions and equality ofaccess for equal need criteria (equity-based notion of regional needs). The construction of non-parametric deficit indicators is proposed for public service availability by a novel application of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models, whose results offer advantages for the evaluation and improvement of decentralised public resource allocation systems. The method introduced in this paper has relevance as a resource allocation guide for the majority of services centrally funded by the public sector in a given country, such as health care, basic and higher education, citizen safety, justice, transportation, environmental protection, leisure, culture, housing and city planning, etc.

North-South convergence and the allocation of CO2 emissions

We postulate a two-region world, comprised of North (calibrated after the US) and South(calibrated after China). Our optimization results show the compatibility of the following threedesiderata:(1) Global CO2 emissions follow a conservative path that leads to the stabilizationof concentrations at 450 ppm.(2) North and South converge to a path of sustained growth at 1% per year (28.2%per generation) in 2075.(3) During the transition to the steady state, North also grows at 1% per year whileSouth s rates of growth are markedly higher.The transition paths require a drastic reduction of the share of emissions allocated to North,large investments in knowledge, both in North and South, as well as very large investments ineducation in South. Surprisingly, in order to sustain North s utility growth rate, some output mustbe transferred from South to North during the transition.Although undoubtedly subject to many caveats, our results support a degree of optimism byproviding prima facie evidence of the possibility of tackling climate change in a way that is fairboth across generations and across regions while allowing for positive rates of humandevelopment.

Hierarchical location-allocation models for congested systems

In this paper we address the issue of locating hierarchical facilities in the presence of congestion. Two hierarchical models are presented, where lower level servers attend requests first, and then, some of the served customers are referred to higher level servers. In the first model, the objective is to find the minimum number of servers and theirlocations that will cover a given region with a distance or time standard. The second model is cast as a Maximal Covering Location formulation. A heuristic procedure is then presented together with computational experience. Finally, some extensions of these models that address other types of spatial configurations are offered.

Fixed and random effects in Classical and Bayesian regression

This paper proposes a common and tractable framework for analyzingdifferent definitions of fixed and random effects in a contant-slopevariable-intercept model. It is shown that, regardless of whethereffects (i) are treated as parameters or as an error term, (ii) areestimated in different stages of a hierarchical model, or whether (iii)correlation between effects and regressors is allowed, when the sameinformation on effects is introduced into all estimation methods, theresulting slope estimator is also the same across methods. If differentmethods produce different results, it is ultimately because differentinformation is being used for each methods.

Random measurement error and regression dilution bias.

Summary points: - The bias introduced by random measurement error will be different depending on whether the error is in an exposure variable (risk factor) or outcome variable (disease) - Random measurement error in an exposure variable will bias the estimates of regression slope coefficients towards the null - Random measurement error in an outcome variable will instead increase the standard error of the estimates and widen the corresponding confidence intervals, making results less likely to be statistically significant - Increasing sample size will help minimise the impact of measurement error in an outcome variable but will only make estimates more precisely wrong when the error is in an exposure variable

Effects of hatching asynchrony on sibling negotiation, begging, jostling for position and within-brood food allocation in the barn owl Tyto alba

When siblings differ markedly in their need for food, they may benefit from signalling to each other their willingness to contest the next indivisible food item delivered by the parents. This sib-sib communication system, referred to as 'sibling negotiation', may allow them to adjust optimally to investment in begging. Using barn owl (Two alba) broods. I assessed the role of within-brood age hierarchy on sibling negotiation, and in turn on jostling for position where parents predictably deliver food (i.e. nest-box entrance), begging and within-brood food allocation. More specifically, I examined three predictions derived from a game-theoretical model of sibling negotiation where a senior and a junior sibling compete for food resources (Roulin, 2002a, Johnstone and Roulin, 2003): (1) begging effort invested by the senior sibling should be less sensitive to the junior sibling's negotiation than vice versa; (2) the junior should invest less effort in sibling negotiation than its senior sibling but a similar amount of effort in begging; and (3) within-brood food allocation should be directly related to begging but only indirectly to sibling negotiation. Two-chick broods were created and vocalization in the absence (negotiation signals directed to siblings) and presence (begging signals directed to parents) of parents was recorded. In support of the first prediction, juniors begged at a low cadence after their senior sibling negotiated intensely, probably because negotiation reflects prospective investment in begging and hence willingness to compete. In contrast, the begging of senior siblings was not sensitive to their junior sibling's negotiation. In contrast to the second prediction, juniors negotiated and begged more intensely than their senior sibling apparently because they were hungrier rather than younger. In line with the third prediction, juniors monopolized food delivered by their parents when their senior sibling begged at a low level. The begging cadence of both the junior and senior sibling, the junior's negotiation cadence, the difference in age between the two nest-mates and jostling for position were not associated with the likelihood of monopolizing food. In conclusion, sibling negotiation appears to influence begging behaviour, which, in turn, affects within-brood food allocation. Juniors may negotiate to challenge their senior siblings, and thereby determine whether seniors are less hungry before deciding to beg for food. In contrast, seniors may negotiate to deter juniors from begging.

Comparing Random-based and k-Anonymity-Based Algorithms for Graph Anonymization

Recently, several anonymization algorithms have appeared for privacy preservation on graphs. Some of them are based on random-ization techniques and on k-anonymity concepts. We can use both of them to obtain an anonymized graph with a given k-anonymity value. In this paper we compare algorithms based on both techniques in orderto obtain an anonymized graph with a desired k-anonymity value. We want to analyze the complexity of these methods to generate anonymized graphs and the quality of the resulting graphs.

Buffer Capacity Allocation: A method to QoS support on MPLS networks

This paper describes an optimized model to support QoS by mean of Congestion minimization on LSPs (Label Switching Path). In order to perform this model, we start from a CFA (Capacity and Flow Allocation) model. As this model does not consider the buffer size to calculate the capacity cost, our model- named BCA (Buffer Capacity Allocation)- take into account this issue and it improve the CFA performance. To test our proposal, we perform several simulations; results show that BCA model minimizes LSP congestion and uniformly distributes flows on the network

The stationary distribution of a continuously varying strategy in a class-structured population under mutation-selection-drift balance.

Many traits and/or strategies expressed by organisms are quantitative phenotypes. Because populations are of finite size and genomes are subject to mutations, these continuously varying phenotypes are under the joint pressure of mutation, natural selection and random genetic drift. This article derives the stationary distribution for such a phenotype under a mutation-selection-drift balance in a class-structured population allowing for demographically varying class sizes and/or changing environmental conditions. The salient feature of the stationary distribution is that it can be entirely characterized in terms of the average size of the gene pool and Hamilton's inclusive fitness effect. The exploration of the phenotypic space varies exponentially with the cumulative inclusive fitness effect over state space, which determines an adaptive landscape. The peaks of the landscapes are those phenotypes that are candidate evolutionary stable strategies and can be determined by standard phenotypic selection gradient methods (e.g. evolutionary game theory, kin selection theory, adaptive dynamics). The curvature of the stationary distribution provides a measure of the stability by convergence of candidate evolutionary stable strategies, and it is evaluated explicitly for two biological scenarios: first, a coordination game, which illustrates that, for a multipeaked adaptive landscape, stochastically stable strategies can be singled out by letting the size of the gene pool grow large; second, a sex-allocation game for diploids and haplo-diploids, which suggests that the equilibrium sex ratio follows a Beta distribution with parameters depending on the features of the genetic system.