809 resultados para Political Inheritance
Resumo:
The Austroalpine nappe systems in SE-Switzerland and N-Italy preserve remnants of the Adriatic rifted margin. Based on new maps and cross-sections, we suggest that the complex structure of the Campo, Grosina/Languard, and Bernina nappes is inherited largely from Jurassic rifting. We propose a classification of the Austroalpine domain into Upper, Middle and Lower Austroalpine nappes that is new because it is based primarily on the rift-related Jurassic structure and paleogeography of these nappes. Based on the Alpine structures and pre-Alpine, rift-related geometry of the Lower (Bernina) and Middle (Campo, Grosina/Languard) Austroalpine nappes, we restore these nappes to their original positions along the former margin, as a means of understanding the formation and emplacement of the nappes during initial reactivation of the Alpine Tethyan margin. The Campo and Grosina/Languard nappes can be interpreted as remnants of a former necking zone that comprised pre-rift upper and middle crust. These nappes were juxtaposed with the Mesozoic cover of the Bernina nappe during Jurassic rifting. We find evidence for low-angle detachment faults and extensional allochthons in the Bernina nappe similar to those previously described in the Err nappe and explain their role during subsequent reactivation. Our observations reveal a strong control of rift-related structures during the subsequent Alpine reactivation on all scales of the former distal margin. Two zones of intense deformation, referred to as the Albula-Zebru and Lunghin-Mortirolo movement zones, have been reactivated during Alpine deformation and cannot be described as simple monophase faults or shear zones. We propose a tectonic model for the Austroalpine nappe systems that link inherited, rift-related structures with present-day Alpine structures. In conclusion, we believe that apart from the direct regional implications, the results of this paper are of general interest in understanding the control of rift structures during reactivation of distal-rifted margins.
Resumo:
The objective of this work was to determine the inheritance mode of seed coat color in sesame. Two crosses and their reciprocals were performed: UCLA37 x UCV3 and UCLA90 x UCV3, of which UCLA37 and UCLA90 are white seed, and UCV3 is brown seed. Results of reciprocal crosses within each cross were identical: F1 seeds had the same phenotype as the maternal parent, and F2 resulted in the phenotype brown color. These results are consistent only with the model in which the maternal effect is the responsible for this trait. This model was validated by recording the seed coat color of 100 F2 plants (F3 seeds) from each cross with its reciprocal, in which the 3:1 expected ratio for plants producing brown and white seeds was tested with the chi-square test. Sesame seed color is determined by the maternal genotype. Proposed names for the alleles participating in sesame seed coat color are: Sc1, for brown color; and Sc2, for white color; Sc1 is dominant over Sc2.
Resumo:
The objective of this work was to determine the inheritance of the long juvenile period trait in natural variants of the Doko, BR 9 (Savana), Davis, Embrapa 1 (IAS 5RC), and BR 16 soybean cultivars. Complete diallel crosses were made between the Doko and BR 16 cultivars and their variants. A 3:1 segregation ratio was observed in the F2 populations of the 'Doko' x Doko-18T, 'Doko' x Doko-Milionária, 'Davis' x São Carlos, and 'BR 9 (Savana)' x MABR92-836 (Savanão) crosses, indicating that the long juvenile period trait is controlled by a pair of recessive genes. The difference in late flowering between the Doko cultivar and both of its variants was caused by a recessive spontaneous mutation at the same genetic locus. However, the variants Doko-18T and Doko-Milionária are identical mutants that share a pair of genes that control the long juvenile period under short-day conditions. These mutants can be used in breeding programs to develop cultivars adapted to low-latitude tropical regions.
Resumo:
This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.
Resumo:
Since independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) became key actors in European regulatory governance in the 1990s, a significant share of policy-making has been carried out by organizations that are neither democratically elected nor directly accountable to elected politicians. In this context, public communication plays an important role. On the one hand, regulatory agencies might try to use communication to raise their accountability and thereby to mitigate their democratic deficit. On the other hand, communication may be used with the intent to steer the behavior of the regulated industry when more coercive regulatory means are unfeasible or undesirable. However, empirical research focusing directly on how regulators communicate is virtually non-existent. To fill this gap, this paper examines the public communication of IRAs in four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland) and three sectors (financial services, telecommunications, and broadcasting). The empirical analysis, based on qualitative interviews and a quantitative content analysis, indicates that the organization of the communication function follows a national pattern approach while a policy sector approach is helpful for understanding the use of communication as a soft tool of regulation.
Resumo:
While equal political representation of all citizens is a fundamental democratic goal, it is hampered empirically in a multitude of ways. This study examines how the societal level of economic inequality affects the representation of relatively poor citizens by parties and governments. Using CSES survey data for citizens' policy preferences and expert placements of political parties, empirical evidence is found that in economically more unequal societies, the party system represents the preferences of relatively poor citizens worse than in more equal societies. This moderating effect of economic equality is also found for policy congruence between citizens and governments, albeit slightly less clear-cut.