936 resultados para Natural gas Hydrates
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The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).
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Japan’s two major electricity producing companies reached a preliminary agreement recently to establish a joint venture for the procurement of fossil fuel resources, primarily liquefied natural gas (LNG). The authors of this commentary ask whether this commercial initiative could serve as an example to Europe of how to increase the negotiating power of individual EU member states. They conclude that a private joint gas procurement company may indeed offer a solution for EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, instead of yet another source of confrontation. Given the political volatility in the region, it could well be the key to balancing out the need for security of supply with an offer to guarantee security of demand, thereby creating the climate for stable commercial relations.
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Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.
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Since taking power in 2009, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) has been trying to end Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas. Currently, natural gas accounts for about 50% of the country’s energy balance (excluding Transnistria), and Gazprom has a monopoly on the supply of gas to the republic. The key element of Chișinău’s diversification project is the construction of the Iasi-Ungheni pipeline, which is designed to link the Moldovan and Romanian gas transmission networks, and consequently make it possible for Moldova to purchase gas from countries other than Russia. Despite significant delays, construction work on the interconnector began in August 2013. The Moldovan government sees ensuring energy independence from Russia as its top priority. The significance and urgency of the project reflect Chișinău’s frustration at Moscow’s continued attempts to use its monopoly of Moldova’s energy sector to exert political pressure on the republic. Nonetheless, despite numerous declarations by Moldovan and Romanian politicians, the Iasi- -Ungheni pipeline will not end Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas before the end of the current decade. This timeframe is unrealistic for two reasons: first, because an additional gas pipeline from Ungheni to Chisinau and a compression station must be constructed, which will take at least five years and will require significant investment; and second, because of the unrelenting opposition to the project coming from Gazprom, which currently controls Moldova’s pipelines and will likely try to torpedo any energy diversification attempts. Independence from Russian gas will only be possible after the the Gazprom-controlled Moldova-GAZ, the operator of the Moldovan transmission network and the country’s importer of natural gas, is divided. The division of the company has in fact been envisaged in the EU’s Third Energy Package, which is meant to be implemented by Moldova in 2020.
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Introduction. Shale gas is an unconventional form of gas1 because its extraction is more difficult or less economical than that of conventional natural gas. It has become an important item of energy policy during the last years since new processes have allowed its extraction. In the medium term, shale gas should foster a reinforcement of the gas part in the world’s energy mix. In 2011, the IEA released an influential report entitled “Are we entering a golden age of gas?” This report suggests that shale gas could help substantially boost global gas use.2 It also warns at the same time that this success could bring into question the international goal of limiting the long-term increase in the global temperature to 2° C above pre-industrial levels. In the world economy, the impact of shale gas is increasing rapidly (especially in the USA, albeit apparently not as significantly as expected3). In the EU, its perspectives remain uncertain, for many reasons. Estimates are not reliable. Shale gas exploitation remains a controversial issue due to geology, lack of infrastructure and also fears for the environment and public health. The EU institutions seem to have a favorable attitude towards shale gas development while the Member States’ attitude seems to vary from enthusiasm to hesitation or opposition. Public opinion on the issue appears quite divided everywhere. This brief paper will examine various estimations of potential resources in the EU (§ 1), the potential costs and benefits (§ 2), the initiatives taken by the EU institutions (§ 3) and the national authorities (§ 4), and finally the emerging EU framework (§ 5). The conclusion is, rather surprisingly, that whatever happens on this front, this will not modify the present structural challenges of the EU in the domains of climate and energy.4
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In its Communication on an Energy Union published in February 2015, the European Commission committed itself to “explore the full potential of liquefied natural gas (LNG), including as a back-up in crisis situations when insufficient gas is coming into Europe through the existing pipeline system” and to address the potential of gas storage in Europe by developing a comprehensive LNG and storage strategy by the end of 2015 or early in 2016. This is a comprehensible move in the current context. Geopolitical tensions between the EU and Russia explain the EU’s willingness to further diversify its supply sources of natural gas to reinforce its long-term energy security on the one hand, and to strengthen its ability to solve future crises on the other hand. Moreover, the current market dynamics could support diversification towards LNG. Increasing the flexibility of LNG trade, decreasing LNG prices and LNG charter rates and an apparent price convergence between the European and the Asia-Pacific LNG imports would all reinforce the economic viability of such a strategy. This Policy Brief makes three main points: • For the LNG and gas storage strategy to work, it needs to be embedded in the realities of the natural gas market. • The key to a successful LNG strategy is to develop sufficient infrastructure. • The LNG strategy needs an innovation component.
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The outlook for natural gas demand is often considered bright, especially for gas used to generate electricity. This is because gas is the cleanest of all fossil fuels. The carbon intensity of modern gas-fired power stations is less than 50% that of modern coal plants. Moreover, gas-fired units are well-suited to follow rapid swings in supply and demand due to their flexibility. In the future, these balancing tasks will become more and more important given the intermittent character of the supply of wind and solar power. Gas seems to hold out the promise of being a key pillar of the energy transition and the perfect partner of renewables. Given the EU’s long-term climate policy goals, however, there is strong evidence that demand for gas for purposes of power generation peaked as early as 2010.
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Distributions of halogens (Cl, Br and I) in interstitial waters from sediments containing methane hydrate and in water of the hydrate itself are presented. High concentrations of halogens do not occur in interstitial waters from sediments that contain gas hydrates. The main reason for their low concentrations is the poverty of organic matter in sediments.
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The sediments of Hydrate Ridge/Cascadia margin contain extensive amounts of gas hydrate. A total of 57 sediment samples including gas hydrate were preserved in liquid nitrogen and have been imaged using computerized tomography to visualize hydrate distribution and shape. The analysis gives evidence that gas hydrate in vein and veinlet structures is the predominant shape in the deeper gas hydrate stability zone with dipping angles from 30° to 90°(vertical).
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An experiment was conceived in which we monitored degradation of GlcDGD. Independent of the fate of the [14C]glucosyl headgroup after hydrolysis from the glycerol backbone, the 14C enters the aqueous or gas phase whereas the intact lipid is insoluble and remains in the sediment phase. Total degradation of GlcDGD then is obtained by combining the increase of radioactivity in the aqueous and gaseous phases. We chose two different sediment to perform this experiment. One is from microbially actie surface sediment sampled in February 2010 from the upper tidal flat of the German Wadden Sea near Wremen (53° 38' 0N, 8° 29' 30E). The other one is deep subsurface sediments recovered from northern Cascadia Margin during Integrated Ocean Drilling Program Expedition 311 [site U1326, 138.2 meters below seafloor (mbsf), in situ temperature 20 °C, water depth 1,828 m. We performed both alive and killed control experiments for comparison. Surface and subsurface sediment slurry were incubated in the dark at in situ temperature, 4 °C and 20 °C for 300 d, respectively. The sterilized slurry was stored at 20 °C. All incubations were carried out under N2 headspace to ensure anaerobic conditions. The sampling frequency was high during the first half-month, i.e., after 1, 2, 7, and 14 d; thereafter, the sediment slurry was sampled every 2 months. At each time point, samples were taken in triplicate for radioactivity measurements. After 300 d of incubation, no significant changes of radioactivity in the aqueous phase were detected. This may be the result of either the rapid turnover of released [14C] glucose or the relatively high limit of detection caused by the slight solubility (equivalent to 2% of initial radioactivity) of GlcDGD in water. Therefore, total degradation of GlcDGD in the dataset was calculated by combining radioactivity of DIC, CH4, and CO2, leading to a minimum estimate.
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Gas hydrates are icelike materials that form when specific conditions of temperature, pressure, and gas composition are simultaneously satisfied. Among the first descriptions of gas hydrates under natural conditions was that of Hammerschmidt (1940), who found them in pipelines used to transport natural gas. Milton (1976) indicates that conditions are suitable for the presence of gas hydrates in areas affected by permafrost and cites studies suggesting that large quantities of gas exist in hydrate form.
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Prepared by G. J. Pagliano and others.
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F also available in microfiche.