Who Matters in Coordination Problems?

We consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self-ful lling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky. Based on their private information, agents - who have heterogeneous investment incentives - form expectations or 'sentiments' about the project's outcome. We find that the sum of these sentiments is constant across di erent strategy profiles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives. As a result, we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the di erent payo types. Applying this nding, we show that agents who bene t little from the project's success have a large impact on the coordination process. The agents with small bene ts invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost. As the average sentiment is constant, a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will \free up" a large amount of sentiment, provoking a large impact on the whole economy. Intuitively, these agents, insensitive to the project's outcome and hence to the actions of others, are in uential because they modify their equilibrium behavior only if the others change theirs substantially.

Screening of highly modular sugar-based ligand libraries in the enantioselective C-C coupling reactions

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la University of Nottingham, Gran Bretanya, entre març i abril del 2007. Aquest treball s’ha centrat en l’aplicació de compostos derivats de la D-(+)-glucosa, de la D-(+)-fructosa i la D-galactosa com a lligands de catalitzadors homogenis quirals en dos reaccions asimètriques: addició 1,2 a aldehids catalitzada per níquel i addició 1,4 conjugada catalitzada per coure.(veure figura adjunta al final del document). En primer lloc, s’ha estudiat l’aplicació dels compostos L1-L6 a les reaccions d’addició 1,2 a aldehids catalitzades per níquel. S’ha observat que la selectivitat del procés depèn principalment del grup funcional unit a l’esquelet del lligand, de les propietats estèriques del substituent en la funció oxazolina i de l’estructura del substrat. S’ha obtingut fins a un 59% d’excés enantiomèric utilitzant el precursor de catalitzador que conté el lligand L3a. En segon lloc, aquest treball descriu l’aplicació de les tres famílies de compostos (L1-L11) com a lligands en la reacció d’addició 1,4 catalitzada per coure de compostos organometàl•lics a diferents enones amb diferents propietats estèriques. L’ús de les llibreries de compostos fosfit-oxazolina (L1-L5) i fosfit-fosforamidit (L6) han proporcionat bones enantioselectivitats (fins a 80%) en l’addició de reactius de trialquilalumini a diferents enones. En canvi, la llibreria de compostos monofosfit (L7-L11) ha mostrat bones activitats però enantioselectivitats fins a 57%.

Le code-switching comme ressource stratégique pour la gestion de l'interaction multilingue : coordination et leadership dans un groupe de travail

In this article, we analyze a multilingual interaction in a students' working group and hypothesize a correlation between management of languages in interaction and leadership. We consider Codeswitching as one of the most relevant observables in multilingual interaction and attempt to analyze how it is used by speakers. After a brief presentation of three theoretical and analytical conceptions of Code-switching in interaction (Auer, Mondada & Myers Scotton), we define Code-switching as an interactional, strategical, multilingual resource exploited by speakers to achieve various interactionaland non interactional goals. We then show in two CA-like analysis how multilingual strategical resources occur in the interactional practices of the analyzed working group, and how they are exploited by speakers in order to organize interaction, work, tasks, and to construct one's leadership.We also consider the metadiscourses of the students about their own practices and multilingualism in general, in order to confront them to their actual multilingual practices. We draw the hypothesis that discrepancies observed between metadiscourses and practices can be explained through the development of (meta)discourses showing a unilingual conception in describing multilingual practices.

Using Effluent Charges in Promoting Investment in Water Pollution Control Technology: A Model of Coordination Failure among Firms

Untreated wastewater being directly discharged into rivers is a very harmful environmental hazard that needs to be tackled urgently in many countries. In order to safeguard the river ecosystem and reduce water pollution, it is important to have an effluent charge policy that promotes the investment of wastewater treatment technology by domestic firms. This paper considers the strategic interaction between the government and the domestic firms regarding the investment in the wastewater treatment technology and the design of optimal e­ffluent charge policy that should be implemented. In this model, the higher is the proportion of non-investing firms, the higher would be the probability of having to incur an e­ffluent charge and the higher would be that charge. On one hand the government needs to impose a sufficiently strict policy to ensure that firms have strong incentive to invest. On the other hand, it cannot be too strict that it drives out firms which cannot afford to invest in such expensive technology. The paper analyses the factors that affect the probability of investment in this technology. It also explains the difficulty of imposing a strict environment policy in countries that have too many small firms which cannot afford to invest unless subsidised.

Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures with Discretionary Policymaking

Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot coordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple equilibria it is first necessary to understand how an economy arrives to a particular equilibrium. In this paper we employ notions of learnability and self-enforceability to motivate and identify equilibria of particular interest. Central among these criteria are whether the equilibrium is learnable by private agents and jointly learnable by private agents and the policymaker. We use two New Keynesian policy models to identify the strategic interactions that give rise to multiple equilibria and to illustrate our methods for identifying equilibria of interest. Importantly, unless the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is learnable by private agents, we find little reason to expect coordination on that equilibrium.

Monetary Policy Delegation and Equilibrium Coordination

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual's decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one's private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighborhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual’s decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one’s private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighbourhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Glomus intraradices induces changes in root system architecture of rice independently of common symbiosis signaling

? Arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi colonize the roots of most monocotyledons and dicotyledons despite their different root architecture and cell patterning. Among the cereal hosts of arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi, Oryza sativa (rice) possesses a peculiar root system composed of three different types of roots: crown roots; large lateral roots; and fine lateral roots. Characteristic is the constitutive formation of aerenchyma in crown roots and large lateral roots and the absence of cortex from fine lateral roots. Here, we assessed the distribution of colonization by Glomus intraradices within this root system and determined its effect on root system architecture. ? Large lateral roots are preferentially colonized, and fine lateral roots are immune to arbuscular mycorrhizal colonization. Fungal preference for large lateral roots also occurred in sym mutants that block colonization of the root beyond rhizodermal penetration. ? Initiation of large lateral roots is significantly induced by G. intraradices colonization and does not require a functional common symbiosis signaling pathway from which some components are known to be needed for symbiosis-mediated lateral root induction in Medicago truncatula. ? Our results suggest variation of symbiotic properties among the different rice root-types and induction of the preferred tissue by arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi. Furthermore, signaling for arbuscular mycorrhizal-elicited alterations of the root system differs between rice and M. truncatula.

Prototipo de sistema metálico modular

Nou sistema modular basat en materials metàl·lics i compostos, dissenyats específicament per a alt grau d'accessibilitat física, temporal o permanent, a llocs d'accés limitat i per a facilitar la visita durant restauracions, així com les visites quotidianes a través de plataformes de sustentació de paviments

Coefficients of Drinfeld modular forms and Hecke operators

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."