The Family Preservation Philosophy and Therapy With Lesbian Clients

Family preservation is generally viewed in terms of a rather narrow practice definition. However, it's underlying philosophy offers a strong framework for building a positive, nonbiased helping alliance with lesbian clients in a therapeutic setting. The family preservation philosophy offers a unique heuristic for helping professionals to work with lesbians. Family preservation values teach that the therapist must start with the client's reality, recognize the particular needs of that client, and use the client's strengths in treatment. Also inherent in this perspective is respect and sensitivity to the lesbian client's "cultural context, experience, and history" (Family Preservation Institute, 1995). In other words, in the family preservation philosophy there is no assumption of heterosexuality in the therapeutic relationship; rather there is an assumption of unconditional positive regard. Further, clients are engaged in a dialogue and encouraged to name the challenges they encounter in their own words, from their own perspective. All of these principles will help empower lesbian clients. Lesbians may avoid traditional mental health services in times of need, preferring to depend on alternative services or friendship support networks. The choice not to seek help through mainstream agencies may be based on previous negative experience or on an assumption of the homophobic attitudes which are often inherent in such services. Traditional services are usually based on the medical model. Services based on the family preservation philosophy, however, have the capability of creating therapeutic relationships in which there is no assumption of heterosexuality, where the lesbian client is respected and viewed as a whole, healthy individual.

Jehuda Hallevi's philosophy in its principles

by David Neumark

Socrates on the Moral Mischief of Misology

In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned.

Religion as Social Reality. A Take on the Emic–Etic Debate in Light of John Searle’s Philosophy of Society

In this article I argue that the shift from a private to a public–social understanding of religion raises new ontological and epistemological questions for the scientific study of religion\s. These questions are deeply related to three central features of the emic– etic debate, namely the problems of intentionality, objectivity, and comparison. Focusing on these interrelated issues, I discuss the potential of John Searle’s philoso- phy of society for the scientific study of religion\s. Considering the role of intentional- ity at the social level, I present Searle’s concept of “social ontology” and discuss its epistemological implications. To clarify Searle’s position regarding the objectivity of the social sciences, I propose a heuristic model contrasting different stances within the scientific study of religion\s. Finally, I explore some problematic aspects of Searle’s views for a comparative study of religion\s, and sketch a solution within his frame- work. I shall argue that a distinction between the epistemological and ontological dimensions of religious affairs would help clarify the issues at stake in the past and future of the emic–etic debate.