The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

Tug-of-war over EU's policy towards its neighbours. OSW Commentary No. 49, 2011-03-09

The revolutions in North Africa, the approaching end of the ‘strategic review’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiated by the European Commission, and the beginning of negotiations on the European Union’s new financial perspective, have intensified the debate among the member states and EU institutions on what policy the EU will adopt towards its neighbourhood in the future. The discussion concerns not only the shape of the ENP but also non-ENPI foreign policy instruments which Brussels applies towards neighbouring countries, such as the thematic instruments and loan support. Serious differences of opinion have emerged among the member states. The countries located in the southern part of the EU want Brussels to boost its policy towards North Africa, even at the expense of engagement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Meanwhile Central European countries, including Germany, favour a more balanced approach towards both directions. The future shape of the ENP, as well as the EU’s other foreign policy instruments, will have a strong impact on the approach the EU adopts towards its Eastern neighbourhood. If some of the proposals are realised, especially the southern member states’ request to transfer some of the funds from the Eastern to the Southern neighbourhood, the chances of meeting the Eastern Partnership goals, such as the association of the partner countries with the EU and the creation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas, could be reduced.