The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

The EU as an Effective Trade Power? Strategic Choice of Judicial Candidates in the Context of the World Trade Organization

Drawing on the European Union (EU) foreign policy literature on effectiveness, this article studies how the European Union chooses judges to serve on the World Trade Organization’s key judicial institution: the Appellate Body. Conceptually, the article differentiates between effectiveness in representation and effectiveness in impact. The article shows how delegation to the European Commission has increased the strategic agenda-setting power for championing its preferred candidates. The article further compares European and US practice in nominating candidates. Overall, the article finds that effectiveness in representation has increased over time. In terms of effectiveness in impact, the article shows how the international environment conditions the EU’s influence. The article also exposes the difficulties of studying the effectiveness of EU external relations due to the peculiar decision-making processes dominant in judicial bodies.

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

Legal Change: Integrating Selective Litigation, Judicial Preferences, and Precedent

The claim that the common law displays an economic logic is a centerpiece of the positive economic theory of law. A key question in this literature is whether this outcome is due to the conscious efforts of judges, or the result of invisible hand processes. This paper develops a model in which to two effects combine to determine the direction of legal change. The main conclusions are, first, that judicial bias can prevent the law from evolving toward efficiency if the fraction of judges biased against the efficient rule is large enough; and second, that precedent affects the rate of legal change but not its direction.

Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, And Social Values

This paper studies the institutional structure of criminal sentencing, focusing on the interaction between legislatures, which set sentencing ranges ex ante, and judges, who choose actual sentences from within those ranges ex post. The key question concerns the optimal degree of judicial discretion, given the sequential nature of the process and the possibly divergent interests of legislatures and judges regarding the social function of criminal punishment. The enactment of sentencing reform in the 1970s and 80s provides both a context for the model and an opportunity to evaluate its conclusions.

The essays : or councils, civil and moral, of Sir Francis Bacon, ... With a table of the colours of good and evil. And a discourse of the wisdom of the ancients. To which is added, The character of Queen Elizabeth

The 'Table of colours' has separate pagination and half-title; 'The wisdom of the ancients,' which is translated by Sir Arthur Gorges, has separate pagination and titlepage p.135 misnumbered 145

Te conoz co Mascarita: Prácticas de identificación en el mundo judicial penal. En: Avá, nº 12

Si la “cuestión de la identidad” atraviesa todos los procedimientos judiciales, no siempre lo hace de la misma manera. Diversas son las formas en que se identifican a las personas así como los modos en que se conceptualizan y se llevan adelante esas formas de identificación y diversos son también los usos que se les asignan. Así pues, este trabajo pretende reflexionar sobre algunas prácticas de identificación, tales como la “rueda de reconocimiento” y otras, que tienen lugar en el mundo de la Justicia Penal. Interesa dar cuenta de cómo la “cuestión de la identidad”, la necesidad de determinar la identidad de las personas, atraviesa los procedimientos judiciales penales, sirviéndose para ello de diferentes materiales y adoptando usos y sentidos diversos.

Olsen A. Ghirardi: Lógica del proceso judicial. 275 págs. Editora de Marcos Lerner. Córdoba, 1987.

Fil: Pró, Diego F.. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía Argentina y Americana

Intervención judicial y contexto socio cultural : la puesta en marcha de un trabajo interdisciplinario "in situ"

Partiendo de una noción de acceso a la justicia, que no se restringe únicamente al acceso formal de los ciudadanos al sistema judicial y al adecuado ejercicio de derechos ante los Tribunales de Justicia, sino que también abarca la Prevención y Promoción de Derechos, la Solución Colaborativa de Conflictos, la Revisión y Propuesta de las Actuaciones Públicas mediante Acciones de Interés Público y Propuestas Legislativas; se implementaron, desde la Institución Judicial (Juzgado de Familia de Tupungato), acciones en el marco de buenas prácticas que se sustentas en tres ejes: Construcción de Ciudadanía, Desarrollo Humano Sustentable y Redes Sociales. Las mismas tienden a fortalecer las conexiones entre estructuras formales e informales de la comunidad, a fin de proveer efectivamente el Acceso a la Justicia a grupos que de otra manera podrían estar excluidos de ella y a la vez favorecer el empoderamiento de los grupos vulnerables en la búsqueda de soluciones a situaciones injustas en el ámbito de los procesos tramitan por ante los Juzgados de Familia. En dicho marco, el Juzgado referido puso en marcha un Juzgado Móvil que plantea una metodología de abordaje interdisciplinario, donde la intervención del Trabajador Social resulta relevante.

Estudio comparativo entre la Primera Circunscripción Judicial y la Tercera Circunscripción Judicial

La base de la investigación radica en comparar dos perspectivas de intervención en el proceso de adopción que se implementan en la provincia: una de ellas es la que se lleva a cado en el RUA (Registro Único de Adopción) de Capital (Primera Circunscripción Judicial) y por otro lado, la que se implementa por parte de los profesionales del Departamento de Gral. San Martín (Tercera Circunscripción Judicial). La finalidad de tal comparación es indagar cómo se lleva a cabo el proceso de adopción en ambas circunscripciones, desde la instancia en la que quienes desean convertirse en padres adoptivos se inscriben, hasta la integración definitiva del niño/niña en la nueva familia. En este proceso se tendrán en cuenta el cúmulo de representaciones sociales que giran en torno a la temática y las distintas formas de abordar y entender a la adopción en cuanto a la intervención profesional El puntapié de tal indagación, parte de conocer que la Primera Circunscripción Judicial cuenta con un EIA (Equipo Interdisciplinario de Adopción) que aborda el proceso de manera integral y está especializado en la temática; mientras que en la Tercera el trabajo se realiza con los profesionales del Juzgado de manera multidisciplinaria es decir, cada profesional desde su especialidad aborda la temática sin confrontar perspectivas a lo largo de todo el proceso. La importancia de abordar esta temática, radica en comenzar a problematizar las distintas y en algunos casos fragmentarias formas de intervenir en la práctica de la adopción, en las distintas circunscripciones de la provincia. Además, se presume que en torno a la misma giran una serie de representaciones sociales, mitos, prejuicios, no sólo por parte de la sociedad en general, sino también por parte de profesionales que se encargan de abordar esta práctica. Por lo que se apunta a abordar los aspectos básicos que hacen a la adopción, con el fin de garantizar que las intervenciones profesionales se centren en esos criterios.