999 resultados para Innovation cooperation
Resumo:
We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.
Resumo:
When individuals in a population can acquire traits through learning, each individual may express a certain number of distinct cultural traits. These traits may have been either invented by the individual himself or acquired from others in the population. Here, we develop a game theoretic model for the accumulation of cultural traits through individual and social learning. We explore how the rates of innovation, decay, and transmission of cultural traits affect the evolutionary stable (ES) levels of individual and social learning and the number of cultural traits expressed by an individual when cultural dynamics are at a steady-state. We explore the evolution of these phenotypes in both panmictic and structured population settings. Our results suggest that in panmictic populations, the ES level of learning and number of traits tend to be independent of the social transmission rate of cultural traits and is mainly affected by the innovation and decay rates. By contrast, in structured populations, where interactions occur between relatives, the ES level of learning and the number of traits per individual can be increased (relative to the panmictic case) and may then markedly depend on the transmission rate of cultural traits. This suggests that kin selection may be one additional solution to Rogers's paradox of nonadaptive culture.
Resumo:
We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.
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One of the key emphases of these three essays is to provide practical managerial insight. However, good practical insight, can only be created by grounding it firmly on theoretical and empirical research. Practical experience-based understanding without theoretical grounding remains tacit and cannot be easily disseminated. Theoretical understanding without links to real life remains sterile. My studies aim to increase the understanding of how radical innovation could be generated at large established firms and how it can have an impact on business performance as most businesses pursue innovation with one prime objective: value creation. My studies focus on large established firms with sales revenue exceeding USD $ 1 billion. Usually large established firms cannot rely on informal ways of management, as these firms tend to be multinational businesses operating with subsidiaries, offices, or production facilities in more than one country. I. Internal and External Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Investment The goal of this chapter is to focus on CVC as one of the mechanisms available for established firms to source new ideas that can be exploited. We explore the internal and external determinants under which established firms engage in CVC to source new knowledge through investment in startups. We attempt to make scholars and managers aware of the forces that influence CVC activity by providing findings and insights to facilitate the strategic management of CVC. There are research opportunities to further understand the CVC phenomenon. Why do companies engage in CVC? What motivates them to continue "playing the game" and keep their active CVC investment status. The study examines CVC investment activity, and the importance of understanding the influential factors that make a firm decide to engage in CVC. The main question is: How do established firms' CVC programs adapt to changing internal conditions and external environments. Adaptation typically involves learning from exploratory endeavors, which enable companies to transform the ways they compete (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990). Our study extends the current stream of research on CVC. It aims to contribute to the literature by providing an extensive comparison of internal and external determinants leading to CVC investment activity. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the influence of internal and external determinants on CVC activity throughout specific expansion and contraction periods determined by structural breaks occurring between 1985 to 2008. Our econometric analysis indicates a strong and significant positive association between CVC activity and R&D, cash flow availability and environmental financial market conditions, as well as a significant negative association between sales growth and the decision to engage into CVC. The analysis of this study reveals that CVC investment is highly volatile, as demonstrated by dramatic fluctuations in CVC investment activity over the past decades. When analyzing the overall cyclical CVC period from 1985 to 2008 the results of our study suggest that CVC activity has a pattern influenced by financial factors such as the level of R&D, free cash flow, lack of sales growth, and external conditions of the economy, with the NASDAQ price index as the most significant variable influencing CVC during this period. II. Contribution of CVC and its Interaction with R&D to Value Creation The second essay takes into account the demands of corporate executives and shareholders regarding business performance and value creation justifications for investments in innovation. Billions of dollars are invested in CVC and R&D. However there is little evidence that CVC and its interaction with R&D create value. Firms operating in dynamic business sectors seek to innovate to create the value demanded by changing market conditions, consumer preferences, and competitive offerings. Consequently, firms operating in such business sectors put a premium on finding new, sustainable and competitive value propositions. CVC and R&D can help them in this challenge. Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) presented evidence that CVC investment is associated with value creation. However, studies have shown that the most innovative firms do not necessarily benefit from innovation. For instance Oyon (2007) indicated that between 1995 and 2005 the most innovative automotive companies did not obtain adequate rewards for shareholders. The interaction between CVC and R&D has generated much debate in the CVC literature. Some researchers see them as substitutes suggesting that firms have to choose between CVC and R&D (Hellmann, 2002), while others expect them to be complementary (Chesbrough & Tucci, 2004). This study explores the interaction that CVC and R&D have on value creation. This essay examines the impact of CVC and R&D on value creation over sixteen years across six business sectors and different geographical regions. Our findings suggest that the effect of CVC and its interaction with R&D on value creation is positive and significant. In dynamic business sectors technologies rapidly relinquish obsolete, consequently firms operating in such business sectors need to continuously develop new sources of value creation (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Qualls, Olshavsky, & Michaels, 1981). We conclude that in order to impact value creation, firms operating in business sectors such as Engineering & Business Services, and Information Communication & Technology ought to consider CVC as a vital element of their innovation strategy. Moreover, regarding the CVC and R&D interaction effect, our findings suggest that R&D and CVC are complementary to value creation hence firms in certain business sectors can be better off supporting both R&D and CVC simultaneously to increase the probability of generating value creation. III. MCS and Organizational Structures for Radical Innovation Incremental innovation is necessary for continuous improvement but it does not provide a sustainable permanent source of competitiveness (Cooper, 2003). On the other hand, radical innovation pursuing new technologies and new market frontiers can generate new platforms for growth providing firms with competitive advantages and high economic margin rents (Duchesneau et al., 1979; Markides & Geroski, 2005; O'Connor & DeMartino, 2006; Utterback, 1994). Interestingly, not all companies distinguish between incremental and radical innovation, and more importantly firms that manage innovation through a one-sizefits- all process can almost guarantee a sub-optimization of certain systems and resources (Davila et al., 2006). Moreover, we conducted research on the utilization of MCS along with radical innovation and flexible organizational structures as these have been associated with firm growth (Cooper, 2003; Davila & Foster, 2005, 2007; Markides & Geroski, 2005; O'Connor & DeMartino, 2006). Davila et al. (2009) identified research opportunities for innovation management and provided a list of pending issues: How do companies manage the process of radical and incremental innovation? What are the performance measures companies use to manage radical ideas and how do they select them? The fundamental objective of this paper is to address the following research question: What are the processes, MCS, and organizational structures for generating radical innovation? Moreover, in recent years, research on innovation management has been conducted mainly at either the firm level (Birkinshaw, Hamel, & Mol, 2008a) or at the project level examining appropriate management techniques associated with high levels of uncertainty (Burgelman & Sayles, 1988; Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1993; Kanter, North, Bernstein, & Williamson, 1990; Leifer et al., 2000). Therefore, we embarked on a novel process-related research framework to observe the process stages, MCS, and organizational structures that can generate radical innovation. This article is based on a case study at Alcan Engineered Products, a division of a multinational company provider of lightweight material solutions. Our observations suggest that incremental and radical innovation should be managed through different processes, MCS and organizational structures that ought to be activated and adapted contingent to the type of innovation that is being pursued (i.e. incremental or radical innovation). More importantly, we conclude that radical can be generated in a systematic way through enablers such as processes, MCS, and organizational structures. This is in line with the findings of Jelinek and Schoonhoven (1993) and Davila et al. (2006; 2007) who show that innovative firms have institutionalized mechanisms, arguing that radical innovation cannot occur in an organic environment where flexibility and consensus are the main managerial mechanisms. They rather argue that radical innovation requires a clear organizational structure and formal MCS.
Resumo:
In cooperative multiagent systems, agents interac to solve tasks. Global dynamics of multiagent teams result from local agent interactions, and are complex and difficult to predict. Evolutionary computation has proven a promising approach to the design of such teams. The majority of current studies use teams composed of agents with identical control rules ("geneti- cally homogeneous teams") and select behavior at the team level ("team-level selection"). Here we extend current approaches to include four combinations of genetic team composition and level of selection. We compare the performance of genetically homo- geneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, genetically homogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection, genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, and genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection. We use a simulated foraging task to show that the optimal combination depends on the amount of cooperation required by the task. Accordingly, we distinguish between three types of cooperative tasks and suggest guidelines for the optimal choice of genetic team composition and level of selection
Resumo:
AbstractOBJECTIVETo report the nurse's experience of inclusion in interdisciplinary clinical study about technological innovation, involving people with spinal cord injury.METHODDescriptive experience report. The empirical support was based on notes about perspectives and practice of clinical research, with a multi-professional nursing, physical education, physiotherapy and engineering staff.RESULTThe qualification includes the elaboration of the document for the Ethics Committee, familiarization among the members of staff and with the studied topic, and also an immersion into English. The nurse's knowledge gave support to the uptake of participants and time adequacy for data collection, preparation and assistance of the participants during the intervention and after collection. Nursing theories and processes have contributed to reveal risky diagnoses and the plan of care. It was the nurse's role to monitor the risk of overlapping methodological strictness to the human aspect. The skills for the clinical research must be the object of learning, including students in multidisciplinary researches.CONCLUSIONTo qualify the nurse for clinical research and to potentialize its caregiver essence, some changes are needed in the educational system, professional behavior, attitude and educational assistance.
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We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shapethe development of markets and the law. In a setup where more resourceful parties candistort contract enforcement to their advantage, we find that the introduction of astandard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting twoeffects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it crowds out the use ofinnovative contracts, hindering contractual innovation. We shed light on the largescale commercial codification occurred in the 19th century in many countries (evenCommon Law ones) during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade.
Resumo:
Economists and economic historians want to know how much better life is today than in the past.Fifty years ago economic historians found surprisingly small gains from 19th century US railroads,while more recently economists have found relatively large gains from electricity, computers and cellphones. In each case the implicit or explicit assumption is that researchers were measuring the valueof a new good to society. In this paper we use the same techniques to find the value to society ofmaking existing goods cheaper. Henry Ford did not invent the car, and the inventors of mechanisedcotton spinning in the industrial revolution invented no new product. But both made existing productsdramatically cheaper, bringing them into the reach of many more consumers. That in turn haspotentially large welfare effects. We find that the consumer surplus of Henry Ford s production linewas around 2% by 1923, 15 years after Ford began to implement the moving assembly line, while themechanisation of cotton spinning was worth around 6% by 1820, 34 years after its initial invention.Both are large: of the same order of magnitude as consumer expenditure on these items, and as largeor larger than the value of the internet to consumers. On the social savings measure traditionally usedby economic historians, these process innovations were worth 15% and 18% respectively, makingthem more important than railroads. Our results remind us that process innovations can be at least asimportant for welfare and productivity as the invention of new products.
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We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.