Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Mythological Information

Combined media on photographic paper. 65" x 56" Private Collection

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

Documentation and sport information: the challenges and opportunities brought by new technologies

This text corresponds to the contents of the seminar “Information Services at the Sport Institutions” held by the author as part of the programme of activities of the Invited Professor of Olympism of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB) in 2001. The seminar discusses the potential of technologies such as the Internet in sports documentation.

The Olympic Movement and Information Society: New Internet Challenges and Opportunities

Article describing the current situation of the Internet, the use of Internet by sport institutions, and the relationship between the Internet and the Olympic Games, and the Olympic Movement. This paper was presented at the International Symposium on Television in the Olympic Games held in Lausanne in October 1998.

Transforming scientific information with everyday thinking: A social representations perspective

Cette thèse examine la circulation et l'intégration des informations scientifiques dans la pensée quotidienne d'après la théorie des représentations sociales (TRS). En tant qu'alternative aux approches traditionnelles de la communication de la science, les transformations survenant entre le discours scientifique et le discours de sens commun sont considérées comme adaptatives. Deux études sur la circulation des informations dans les media (études 1 et 2) montrent des variations dans les thèmes de discours exposés aux profanes, et parmi les discours de ceux-ci, en fonction de différentes sources. Ensuite, le processus d'ancrage dans le positionnement préalable envers la science est étudié, pour l'explication qu'il fournit de la réception et de la transmission d'informations scientifiques dans le sens commun. Les effets d'ancrage dans les attitudes et croyances préexistants sont reportés dans différents contextes de circulation des informations scientifiques (études 3 à 7), incluant des études de type corrélationnel, experimental et de terrain. Globalement, cette thèse procure des arguments en faveur de la pertinence de la TRS pour la recherche sur la communication de la science, et suggère des développements théoriques et méthodologiques pour ces deux domaines de recherche. Drawing on the social representations theory (SRT), this thesis examines the circulation and integration of scientific information into everyday thinking. As an alternative to the traditional approaches of science communication, it considers transformations between scientific and common-sense discourses as adaptive. Two studies, focused on the spreading of information into the media (Studies 1 and 2), show variations in the themes of discourses introduced to laypersons and in the themes among laypersons' discourses, according to different sources. Anchoring in prior positioning toward science is then studied for the explanation it provides on the reception and transmission of scientific information into common sense. Anchoring effects in prior attitudes and beliefs are reported in different contexts of circulation of scientific information (Studies 3 to 7) by using results from correlational, field, and experimental studies. Overall, this thesis provides arguments for the relevance of SRT in science communication research and suggests theoretical and methodological developments for both domains of research.

Co-movements between US and UK stock prices: the roles of macroeconomic information and time-series varying conditional correlations

This paper provides evidence on the sources of co-movement in monthly US and UK stock price movements by investigating the role of macroeconomic and financial variables in a bivariate system with time-varying conditional correlations. Crosscountry communality in response is uncovered, with changes in the US Federal Funds rate, UK bond yields and oil prices having similar negative effects in both markets. Other variables also play a role, especially for the UK market. These effects do not, however, explain the marked increase in cross-market correlations observed from around 2000, which we attribute to time variation in the correlations of shocks to these markets. A regime-switching smooth transition model captures this time variation well and shows the correlations increase dramatically around 1999-2000. JEL classifications: C32, C51, G15 Keywords: international stock returns, DCC-GARCH model, smooth transition conditional correlation GARCH model, model evaluation.

Using information from telephone panel surveys to predict reasons for refusal

One of the key problems in conducting surveys is convincing people to participate.¦However, it is often difficult or impossible to determine why people refuse. Panel surveys¦provide information from previous waves that can offer valuable clues as to why people¦refuse to participate. If we are able to anticipate the reasons for refusal, then we¦may be able to take appropriate measures to encourage potential respondents to participate¦in the survey. For example, special training could be provided for interviewers¦on how to convince potential participants to participate.¦This study examines different influences, as determined from the previous wave,¦on refusal reasons that were given by the respondents in the subsequent wave of the¦telephone Swiss Household Panel. These influences include socio-demography, social¦inclusion, answer quality, and interviewer assessment of question understanding and¦of future participation. Generally, coefficients are similar across reasons, and¦between-respondents effects rather than within-respondents effects are significant.¦While 'No interest' reasons are easier to predict, the other reasons are more situational. Survey-specific issues are able to distinguish¦different reasons to some extent.