Adaptive Mesh Refinement FEM for Damage Evolution of Heterogeneous Brittle Media

Damage evolution of heterogeneous brittle media involves a wide range of length scales. The coupling between these length scales underlies the mechanism of damage evolution and rupture. However, few of previous numerical algorithms consider the effects of the trans-scale coupling effectively. In this paper, an adaptive mesh refinement FEM algorithm is developed to simulate this trans-scale coupling. The adaptive serendipity element is implemented in this algorithm, and several special discontinuous base functions are created to avoid the incompatible displacement between the elements. Both the benchmark and a typical numerical example under quasi-static loading are given to justify the effectiveness of this model. The numerical results reproduce a series of characteristics of damage and rupture in heterogeneous brittle media.

Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

Catastrophic Rupture Induced Damage Coalescence in Heterogeneous Brittle Media

In heterogeneous brittle media, the evolution of damage is strongly influenced by the multiscale coupling effect. To better understand this effect, we perform a detailed investigation of the damage evolution, with particular attention focused on the catastrophe transition. We use an adaptive multiscale finite-element model (MFEM) to simulate the damage evolution and the catastrophic failure of heterogeneous brittle media. Both plane stress and plane strain cases are investigated for a heterogeneous medium whose initial shear strength follows the Weibull distribution. Damage is induced through the application of the Coulomb failure criterion to each element, and the element mesh is refined where the failure criterion is met. We found that as damage accumulates, there is a stronger and stronger nonlinear increase in stress and the stress redistribution distance. The coupling of the dynamic stress redistribution and the heterogeneity at different scales result in an inverse cascade of damage cluster size, which represents rapid coalescence of damage at the catastrophe transition.

Emergence of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Population: A Discrete-Time Replicator Dynamics Analysis

The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: individuals are able to identify the type of every other individual, but fail to recognize their own type, and thus behave under partial information conditions. The interactions between individuals are described by 2 × 2 symmetric games where individuals can either cooperate or defect. The evolution of such populations is studied in the framework of evolutionary game by means of the replicator dynamics. Overlapping generations are considered, so the replicator equations are formulated in discrete-time form. The well-posedness conditions of the system are derived. Depending on the parameters of the game, a restriction may exist for the generation length. The stability analysis of the dynamical system is carried out and a detailed description of the behavior of trajectories starting from the interior of the state-space is given. We find that, provided the conditions of well-posedness are verified, the linear stability of monomorphic states in the discrete-time replicator coincides with the one of the continuous case. Specific from the discrete-time case, a relaxed restriction for the generation length is derived, for which larger time-steps can be used without compromising the well-posedness of the replicator system.