Numerical prediction of nanoparticle formation in flames

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2012

Designing crystallization based-enantiomeric separation for chiral compound-forming systems in consideration of polymorphism and solvate formation

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2014

Spatio-temporal pattern formation in microemulsions under different physical and chemical conditions

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Naturwissenschaften, Dissertation, 2016

Studies on skeleton formation in reptiles. Olivier Rieppel.

n.s. no.68(1992)

Protoptychus hatcheri Scott, 1895 : the mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.21(1991)

The mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. Steven M. McCarroll, John J. Flynn, William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.33(1996)

Two new rodent genera from the Oligocene White River formation (family Heteromyidae) / William G. Reeder --

v.10:no.35(1960)

An adianthine litoptern from the Deseado formation of Patagonia / by Bryan Patterson --. Results of the Marshall Field paleontological expeditions to Argentina and Bolivia, 1922-27.

v.8:no.2(1940)

A new phororhacoid bird from the Deseado formation of Patagonia / by Bryan Patterson. Results of the Marshall Field paleontological expeditions to Argentina and Bolivia, 1922-27.

v.8:no.8(1941)

Ectoprocta (Bryozoa) from the Permian Kaibab Formation, Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona / Frank K. McKinney --.

n.s. no.13(1983)

Sedimentary structures from the Carbondale Formation (Middle Pennsylvanian) of Northern Illinois / Charles W. Shabica --.

v.33:no.29(1978)

The mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.47(2002)

Fauna of the Vale and Choza : a new Trematopsid amphibian from the Vale formation / Everett Claire Olson --

v.10:no.26(1956)

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.