Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No

This note elaborates on a recent article by Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor(1992) who contend that fairly priced deposit insurance is incompatiblewithfree competition in the banking sector, in the presence of adverseselection.We show here that at soon as one introduces a real economic motivationfromprivate banks to manage the deposits from the public, then fairly priceddeposit insurance becomes possible. However, we also show that sucha fairlypriced insurance is never desirable, precisely because of adverseselection.We compute the characteristics of the optimal premium schedule, whichtradesoff between the cost of adverse selection and the cost of ``unfaircompetition ''.

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.

Boundedly rational credit cycles

We propose an evolutionary model of a credit market. We show that theeconomy exhibits credit cycles. The model predicts dynamics which are consistent with some evidence about the Great Depression. Real shocks triggerepisodes of credit--crunch which are observed in the process of adjustmenttowards the post shock equilibrium.

A unifying approach to the empirical evaluation of asset pricing models

Two main approaches are commonly used to empirically evaluate linear factor pricingmodels: regression and SDF methods, with centred and uncentred versions of the latter.We show that unlike standard two-step or iterated GMM procedures, single-step estimatorssuch as continuously updated GMM yield numerically identical values for prices of risk,pricing errors, Jensen s alphas and overidentifying restrictions tests irrespective of the modelvalidity. Therefore, there is arguably a single approach regardless of the factors being tradedor not, or the use of excess or gross returns. We illustrate our results by revisiting Lustigand Verdelhan s (2007) empirical analysis of currency returns.

Measuring time-varying economic fears with consumption-based stochastic discount factors

This paper analyzes empirically the volatility of consumption-based stochastic discount factors as a measure of implicit economic fears by studying its relationship with future economic and stock market cycles. Time-varying economic fears seem to be well captured by the volatility of stochastic discount factors. In particular, the volatility of recursive utility-based stochastic discount factor with contemporaneous growth explains between 9 and 34 percent of future changes in industrial production at short and long horizons respectively. They also explain ex-ante uncertainty and risk aversion. However, future stock market cycles are better explained by a similar stochastic discount factor with long-run consumption growth. This specification of the stochastic discount factor presents higher volatility and lower pricing errors than the specification with contemporaneous consumption growth.

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.

Merger failures

This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interactionbetween the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informationalasymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation andcoordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree tomerge and abstain from putting forth any post-merger effort, counting on the other partnerto make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goesahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers aremore likely to fail.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.