Therapeutic Discourse and the American Public Philosophy: On American Liberalism's Troubled Relationship with Psychology

I explore the main currents of postwar American liberalism. One, sociological, emerged in response to the danger of mass movements. Articulated primarily by political sociologists and psychologists and ascendant from the mid-fifties till the mid-seventies, it heralded the "end of ideology." It emphasized stability, elitism, positive science and pluralism; it recast normatively sound politics as logrolling and hard bargaining. I argue that these normative features, attractive when considered in isolation, taken together led to a vicious ad hominem style in accounting for views outside the postwar consensus. It used pseudo-scientific literature in labeling populists, Progressives, Taft conservatives, Goldwaterites, the New Left and others "pathological," viz. mentally ill. Hence, "therapeutic discourse." I argue that philosophical liberalism, which reasserts the role of political theory in working out norms and adjudicating disagreement, is a more profitable way of thinking about and defending from critics liberalism. I take the philosopher John Rawls as the tradition's modern representative. This inquiry is important because the themes of sociological liberalism are making a comeback in American public discourse, and with them perhaps the baggage of therapeutic discourse. I present a cautionary tale.

Ethics in a capitalistic society

The problem of semantics is inherent in any discussion of ethics. The general term "ethics" is itself commonly confused. In addition, systems of ethics must be built upon assumptions, and assumptions are necessarily subject to lengthy debate. These two problems are encountered in my investigation of the ethical practices of the modern business community and to remedy the situation I have taken two steps: the first being an attempt to clarify the meaning of terms used therein;-and the second being a clear description of the assumptions utilized to further my analysis. To satisfy those who would disagree with these assumptions, I have attempted to outline the consequences of differing premises. The first assumption in my discussion is that the capitalistic economy is powered by the motivation supplied by man's self-interest. We are conditioned to basing our courses of action upon an orientation toward gratifying this self-interest. Careers are chosen by blending aptitude, interest, and remuneration. of course, some people are less materially inclined than others, but the average member of our capitalistic society is concerned with the physical rewards derived from his employment. Status and happiness are all-important considerations in pursuing a chosen course of action, yet all too often they are measured in physical terms. The normal self-interest natural to mankind is heightened in capitalism, due to the emphasis placed upon material compensation. Our thinking becomes mechanistic as life devolves into a complex game played by the rules. We are accustomed to performing meaningless or unpleasant duties to fulfill our gratifications. Thought, consequently, interferes with the completion of our everyday routines. We learn quickly not to be outspoken, as the outspoken one threatens the security of his fellow man. The majority of the people are quite willing to accept others views on morality, and indeed this is the sensible thing to do as one does not risk his own neck. The unfortunate consequence of this situation has been the substitution of the legal and jural for the moral and ethical. Our actions are guided by legal considerations and nowhere has this been more evident than in the business community. The large legal departments of modern corporations devote full time to inspecting the legality of corporate actions. The business community has become preoccupied with the law, yet this is necessarily so. Complex, modern, capitalistic society demands an elaborate framework of rules and regulations. Without this framework it would be impossible to have an orderly economy, to say nothing of protecting the best interests of the people. However, the inherent complexities, contradictions, and sometimes unfair aspects of our legal system can tempt men to take things into their own hands. From time to time cases arise where men have broken laws while acting in good faith, and other cases where men have been extremely unethical without being illegal. Examples such as these foster the growth of cynicism, and generally create an antagonistic attitude toward the law on the part of business. My second assumption is that the public, on the whole, has adopted an apathetic attitude toward business morality. when faced with an ethical problem, far too many people choose to cynically assume that, if I don't do it someone else will. "The danger of such an assumption lies in that it eliminates many of the inhibitions that normally would preclude unethical action. The preventative factor in contemplating an unethical act not only lies in it going against the "right course of action", but also in that it would display the actor as one of the few, immoral practitioners. However, if the contemplator feels that many other people follow the same course of action, he would not feel himself to be so conspicuous. These two assumptions underly my entire discussion of modern business ethics., and in my judgment are the two most important causal factors in unethical acts perpetrated by the business community. The future elimination of these factors seems improbable, if not futile, yet there is no reason to consider things worse than they ever have been before. The heightened public interest in business morality undoubtedly lies in part in the fact that examples of corporate malpractice are of such magnitude in scope, and hence more newsworthy.

Fragmentos da história das concepções de mundo na construção das ciências da natureza: das certezas medievais às dúvidas pré-modernas

A concepção filosófica do mundo se inicia com os gregos sintetizados por Platão e Aristóteles. Para o primeiro o mundo físico é aparente e para se chegar à verdade é preciso se lembrar das idéias originais que determinam seu significado. Para o segundo as coisas físicas são dirigidas pelas idéias e para entendê-las é preciso a lógica. Durante o helenismo a escola de Alexandria elabora o neoplatonismo, a base da Patrística. Após a queda de Roma, os filósofos bizantinos guardam a herança clássica. A Igreja constrói uma visão neoplatônica da cristandade, a Escolástica. No oriente os persas também sofreram a influência grega. Entre os árabes do Oriente o pensamento neoplatônico orienta filósofos e religiosos de forma que para eles a razão e a fé não se separam. Aí a ciências se desenvolvem na física, na alquimia, na botânica, na medicina, na matemática e na lógica, até serem subjugadas pela doutrina conservadora dos otomanos. Na Espanha mulçumana sem as restrições da teologia, a filosofia de Aristóteles é mais bem compreendida do que no resto do Islã. Também aí todas as ciências se desenvolvem rápido. Mas a Espanha sucumbe aos cristãos. Os árabes e judeus apresentam Aristóteles à Europa Ocidental que elabora um Aristóteles cristão. A matemática, a física experimental, a alquimia e a medicina dos árabes influenciam intensamente o Ocidente. Os artesãos constroem instrumentos cada vez mais precisos, os navegadores constroem navios e mapas mais eficientes e minuciosos, os armeiros calculam melhor a forma de lançamento e pontaria de suas armas e os agrimensores melhor elaboram a medida de sua área de mapeamento. Os artistas principalmente italianos, a partir dos clássicos gregos e árabes, criam a perspectiva no desenho, possibilitando a matematização do espaço. Os portugueses, junto com cientistas árabes, judeus e italianos, concluem um projeto de expansão naval e ampliam os horizontes do mundo. Os pensadores italianos, como uma reação à Escolástica, constroem um pensamento humanista influenciado pelo pensamento grego clássico original e pelos últimos filósofos bizantinos. Por todas essas mudanças se inicia a construção de um novo universo e de um novo método, que viria décadas mais tarde.

Nexus: da relacionalidade do princípio à metafísica do inominável em Nicolau de Cusa

We indicate the idea of nexus or conexio, thought of as intelligible connection with the intelligent, the foundation on which the reason why you can understand and name, even if inadequately, what the intellect sees incomprehensible and unnameably. Thus, it opens a way for our research: we will take the idea of nexus as fundamental to the interpretation of the divine names and the "metaphysics of the unnameably" and we show how the divine names, mainly in possest, mirrored in the Trinity, relatedness of the principle and therefore also the nexus. For that you need to think some preliminary questions: we will place Nicholas of Cusa in the tradition of medieval Christian Neoplatonism, we resume some discussions on the problem of naming and the philosophy of language in his thinking, we will reflect such thinking is molded from active dialogue with the tradition and how it is your speculation is founded upon the dynamic and dialectical relationship between philosophy and theology to be thought of in our text using the relationship between faith and understandig (intellectus). After introductory clarify these issues we will come to consider introductory understanding of the Trinitarian Beginning and speculation about the nexus taking as its starting point from where the De venatione sapientiae nexus or conexio is designed as a hunting field of wisdom and the First Book of De docta ignorantia where the maximum is now thought of as one and triune. From the Second Book of the same work and the Idiota. De mente we will show in what sense the universe and men, as imago dei, imitate the eternal Trinity. Finally, we will resume the notion of the scientia aenigmatica of De beryllo and some information that will clarify that Nicholas assumes the divine names as enigmas. Finally, we will try to show that the enigmatic or symbolic names also mirror the triune Beginning principle. So, before we return some traces of this aspect in some divine names and texts of the "late period" and then conclude with that which in itself already indicates the nexus and therefore the trinity: possest

O conceito de liberdade em o ser e o nada de Jean-Paul Sartre

This dissertation aims to address the concept of freedom from the perspective of the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre with reference to the main work Being and Nothingness. After presenting the concept of freedom we will try to show that it is related to the notion of responsibility, which will lead, ultimately, to define the Sartrean philosophy as a philosophy of action. In the first chapter we will present in passing the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, philosopher from which Sartre will develop his concept of freedom. The Husserlian notion of consciousness (intentionality) is the way to develop his analysis of Sartre phenomenon of being. From this analysis Sartre submits their concepts of being in-itself and being for-itself. Being initself is defined as the things of the world devoid of consciousness, are the things that surround us. The In-itself has as its main brand positivity: it is what it is, is all that can be said about him. In turn being For-itself is the very being of man, which differs radically from the In-itself. The For-itself has as its main intentionality, ie, its ability to project outside itself in existence. That's when Sartre shows that this type of being realizes its existence on the basis of a constant nihilation. Here comes the notion of anything. Among the relations of the For-itself with the surrounding world stands a very special: relationship between consciousnesses. It is when we discuss the issue of another. Intersubjectivity, through sartrean analysis of look, show that the For-itself assumes a new existential dimension: the being-for others. That's when Sartre will emphasize his notion of conflict. The conflict in intersubjectivity would come from the fact that you want to take another- For-itself as an object. Given this we will analyze what Sartre called the concrete relations with others. The philosopher submit such relations in the form of ducts and conduits assimilation of ownership. In the first my-self to try to "get lost" in the consciousness of another, ownership of my conduct in-itself tries to "take ownership" of the subjectivity of the other and try to treat others as things, as objects. In this sense Sartre examines the experiences of love, masochism, indifference, desire and sadism. Following this route we will enter the land of freedom itself, which is the major theme of our work. Since Sartre defines the For-itself as a being that is projected to create your way of being, it can only define it as freedom. The freedom of the For-itself is taken in terms of autonomy of choice. Once the For-itself has no way of being a thing as being in-itself, it just may be picking up, that is, making your being. Here Sartre speaks of the anguish that would be the symptom of freedom itself. The fact that the For-itself have to choose on whether the call as one being distressed. However, in most cases the For-itself tries to escape from the anguish of freedom and takes refuge in bad faith. After setting the man (For-itself) as freedom Sartre defends that he is totally responsible for what he does of himself. Once the philosopher holds that man is not predetermined, ie, does not have an a priori essence, his philosophy has as its basic assumption the action. If Sartre argues that the For-itself must constantly choose your way of being, the action is the basis on which man will exercise his own freedom. In this sense we conclude the work with an approach to work Existentialism is a Humanism, which represent the entry of the philosopher on the practical aspects of life

The Development of Science Education Research in Brazil and Contributions from the History and Philosophy of Science

Over the last 50 years a new research area, science education research, has arisen and undergone singular development worldwide. In the specific case of Brazil, research in science education first appeared systematically 40 years ago, as a consequence of an overall renovation in the field of science education. This evolution was also related to the political events taking place in the country. We will use the theoretical work of Rene Kaes on the development of groups and institutions as a basis for our discussion of the most important aspects that have helped the area of science education research develop into an institution and kept it operating as such. The growth of this area of research can be divided into three phases: The first was related to its beginning and early configurations; the second consisted of a process of consolidation of this institution; and the third consists of more recent developments, characterised by a multiplicity of research lines and corresponding challenges to be faced. In particular, we will analyse the special contributions to this study gleaned from the field known as the history and philosophy of science.

The informational turn in Philosophy: any novelty in the study of Mind?

The concept of information is analyzed starting from Adams' hypothesis in The Informational Turn in Philosophy, according to which there has been a far-reaching turn in Philosophy following the publication of Turing's article "Computing Machinery and Intelligence". Adams maintains that new guidelines are being indicated in philosophical research, having the concept of "information" as the basis for treatment of classical problems, such as the relationships between mind-body, perception-action, and the nature of knowledge, amongst others. Partially agreeing with Adams, we believe, however, that his hypothesis faces difficulties, the most fundamental of which concerns the different meanings given to the concept of information. We argue that even though the concept of information underlying the mechanicist proposal of Turing, according to which "to think is to compute", is indeed being employed in Philosophy, this is not because of its mechanistic nature, but mainly due to the representationist presupposition dominant in this area. From this point of view, the informational turn in philosophy would not provide any great novelty, given that since the earliest days philosophical approaches to the nature of mind have always been mainly representationist. The novelty would not lie specifically in the Turing thesis, but in reflections on the nature of information, especially ecological information, and its relation to action.