Iowa Civil Rights Commission Preformance Plan, FY 2007

Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Human Rights - Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Department of Human Rights - Deaf Services Commission of Iowa, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Human Rights - Latino Affairs, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Audit report on the Iowa Department of Human Rights for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Department of Human Rights for the year ended June 30, 2006

Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction, June 2007

This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

The algebraic equality of two asymptotic tests for the hypothesis that a normal distribution has a specified correlation matrix

It is proved the algebraic equality between Jennrich's (1970) asymptotic$X^2$ test for equality of correlation matrices, and a Wald test statisticderived from Neudecker and Wesselman's (1990) expression of theasymptoticvariance matrix of the sample correlation matrix.

Compact matrix expressions for generalized Wald tests of equality of moment vectors

Asymptotic chi-squared test statistics for testing the equality ofmoment vectors are developed. The test statistics proposed aregeneralizedWald test statistics that specialize for different settings by inserting andappropriate asymptotic variance matrix of sample moments. Scaled teststatisticsare also considered for dealing with situations of non-iid sampling. Thespecializationwill be carried out for testing the equality of multinomial populations, andtheequality of variance and correlation matrices for both normal andnon-normaldata. When testing the equality of correlation matrices, a scaled versionofthe normal theory chi-squared statistic is proven to be an asymptoticallyexactchi-squared statistic in the case of elliptical data.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, The "Right-to-Cancel" Law - Know Your Rights!, May 2006

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: The "Right-to-Cancel" Law - Know Your Rights!

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Lemon Law" -- Know Your Rights!, February 2003

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Iowa's "Lemon Law" -- Know Your Rights!