Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

The role of central bank operating procedures in an economy with productive government spending

The choice of either the rate of monetary growth or the nominal interest rate as the instrument controlled by monetary authorities has both positive and normative implications for economic performance. We reexamine some of the issues related to the choice of the monetary policy instrument in a dynamic general equilibrium model exhibiting endogenous growth in which a fraction of productive government spending is financed by means of issuing currency. When we evaluate the performance of the two monetary instruments attending to the fluctuations of endogenous variables, we find that the inflation rate is less volatile under nominal interest rate targeting. Concerning the fluctuations of consumption and of the growth rate, both monetary policy instruments lead to statistically equivalent volatilities. Finally, we show that none of these two targeting procedures displays unambiguously higher welfare levels.

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Parental Leave and Mothers' Careers: The Relative Importance of Job Protection and Cash Benefits

Job protection and cash benefits are key elements of parental leave (PL) systems. We study how these two policy instruments affect return-to-work and medium-run labour market outcomes of mothers of newborn children. Analysing a series of major PL policy changes in Austria, we find that longer cash benefits lead to a significant delay in return-to-work, particularly so in the period that is job-protected. Prolonged parental leave absence induced by these policy changes does not appear to hurt mothers' labour market outcomes in the medium run. We build a non-stationary model of job search after childbirth to isolate the role of the two policy instruments. The model matches return-to-work and return to same employer profiles under the various factual policy configurations. Counterfactual policy simulations indicate that a system that combines cash with protection dominates other systems in generating time for care immediately after birth while maintaining mothers' medium-run labour market attachment.

Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly

Local consumption and territorial based accounting for CO2 Emissions

We examine the complications involved in attributing emissions at a sub-regional or local level. Speci cally, we look at how functional specialisation embedded within the metropolitan area can, via trade between sub-regions, create intra-metropolitan emissions interdependencies; and how this complicates environmental policy implementation in an analogous manner to international trade at the national level. For this purpose we use a 3-region emissions extended input-output model of the Glasgow metropolitan area (2 regions: city and surrounding suburban area) and the rest of Scotland. The model utilises data on commuter flows and household consumption to capture income and consumption flows across sub-regions. This enables a carbon attribution analysis at the sub-regional level, allowing us to shed light on the signi cant emissions interdependencies that can exist within metropolitan areas.

Integración de políticas medio ambientales: Transformaciones institucionales en España

La Integración de la Políticas Ambientales (IPA) consiste en la incorporación de los objetivos ambientales en todos los estadios de elaboración e implementación de las políticas no ambientales (o sectoriales), con un reconocimiento específico de dicho objetivo como principio director de la programación y la puesta en práctica. Se complementa con la previsión de las consecuencias ambientales mediante una evaluación de conjunto de la política con objeto de minimizar las contradicciones entre las políticas ambientales y no ambientales dando prioridad a las primeras. La naturaleza transversal de la IPA no se ajusta a la forma tradicional de gobernanza jerárquica basada en la autoridad del Estado, la diferenciación sectorial, y los instrumentos típicos de dirección y control. Por ello, no es extraño que la IPA se encuentre a menudo asociada a los llamados "nuevos modos de gobernanza". Esta tesis propone analizar empíricamente el estado de la cuestión en España con respecto a la Integración de la política ambiental , tanto a nivel estatal como autonómico (Cataluña, País Vasco), yendo más allá de los compromisos políticos a favor de un mayor grado de integración de los factores ambientales en las demás políticas. En particular, los ámbitos de investigación seleccionados para esta finalidad son el de las políticas de mitigación de las causas y los efectos del cambio climático, y las políticas de desarrollo sostenible. En términos de ‘variable independiente’ La hipótesis que se quiere comprobar es que la acción llevada a cabo por la Unión Europea ha generado profundos cambios en las estructuras de las instituciones mencionadas y en los procesos de elaboración y implementación de determinadas políticas (energía y transporte) así como en las relaciones entre sectores de la administración pública y entre el sector público y el privado.

Los efectos sobre el medio ambiente en las nuevas democracias, las dictaduras y las democracias tradicionales

El principal objeto de esta investigación es determinar y evaluar si la evolución o transición hacia formas cerradas o abiertas de gobernar -autocracias y democracias- ha llevado aparejada una menor o mayor contribución a la calidad del medio ambiente. La conclusión es clara, los nuevos gobiernos democráticos tienen más probabilidades de responder a los intereses medioambientales y, por lo tanto, son más propensos a respaldar las convenciones internacionales que las autocracias.

Los retos de la Salud en el contexto de la Unión Europea

Boletín semanal para profesionales sanitarios de la Secretaría General de Salud Pública y Participación Social de la Consejería de Salud

Las aguas que bañan el litoral andaluz, en adecuadas condiciones sanitarias según el informe de inicio de temporada de baño de 2008

Boletín semanal para profesionales sanitarios de la Secretaría General de Salud Pública y Participación Social de la Consejería de Salud

La comarca del campo de Gibraltar, por debajo de los niveles de concentración de benceno fijados por Europa

Boletín semanal para profesionales sanitarios de la Secretaría General de Salud Pública y Participación Social de la Consejería de Salud

El registro de sustancias y preparados químicos (Reach), un paso más en la protección de la salud y del medio ambiente en la Unión Europea

Boletín semanal para profesionales sanitarios de la Secretaría General de Salud Pública y Participación Social de la Consejería de Salud

Sources of comparative advantage in polluting industries

We study the determinants of comparative advantage in polluting industries. We combine data on environmental policy at the country level with data on pollution intensity at the industry level to show that countries with laxer environmental regulation have a comparative advantage in polluting industries. Further, we address the potential problem of reverse causality. We propose an instrument for environmental regulation based on meteorological determinants of pollution dispersion identified by the atmospheric pollution literature. We find that the effect of environmental regulation on the pattern of trade is causal and comparable in magnitude to the effect of physical and human capital.

Sources of comparative advantage in polluting industries (with appendix)

We study the determinants of comparative advantage in polluting industries. We combine dataon environmental policy at the country level with data on pollution intensity at the industry levelto show that countries with laxer environmental regulation have a comparative advantage in polluting industries. Further, we address the potential problem of reverse causality. We propose aninstrument for environmental regulation based on meteorological determinants of pollution dispersion identified by the atmospheric pollution literature. We find that the effect of environmentalregulation on the pattern of trade is causal and comparable in magnitude to the effect of physicaland human capital.