Consumer Advisory Bulletin, More Sources on Students and Credit Card Debt, October 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: More Sources on Students and Credit Card Debt Suggested by the Office of Attorney General Tom Miller

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, How to Deal With Credit Card Offers, August 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: How to Deal With Credit Card Offers

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Get Your FREE Credit Reports, June 2006

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Get Your FREE Credit Reports

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Advance Fee Loans and Credit Repair Schemes, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Advance Fee Loans and Credit Repair Schemes

Iowa Budget Report, Building on our Progress: Protecting our Priorities, 2009

*********** Some files are large and will take time to load. *********** Seven Files: 1)Report Cover, 2)Table of Contents, 3)Statewide Financial Summaries, 4)Department Budgets, 5)Capitol Projects, 6)Associated Financial Documents, 7)Budget Report. To Members of the 82nd General Assembly, As we begin the second year of our Administration, we are pleased to submit the Fiscal Year 2009 budget for the State of Iowa pursuant to Iowa Code Section 8.21 and our constitutional authority. This budget recognizes the progress that we began last year with improvements in education, economic development, energy independence, and health care; provides funding for new policy initiatives in these areas; and is based on fiscally sound budget practices. Building on last year’s accomplishments, our Fiscal Year 2009 General Fund budget proposes an additional $75 million for increasing teachers’ salaries as part of our goal to move Iowa closer to the national average. We lay the foundation for student achievement by recommending $32.1 million for pre-school education, and we also propose $177.5 million in total for community colleges and $726.2 million in total for Regents universities. To make our State more energy independent, our General Fund budget appropriates the second-year funding of $25 million for the new Iowa Power Fund. The newly established Office of Energy Independence will soon start making awards from the Power Fund. Apart from the budget, we will be making several proposals to implement the new State energy plan. We have pledged to expand the number of Iowans who have health-care coverage. As a result, we are recommending additional funding for enrollment growth in the State Children Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). These additional funds will help the State provide coverage for another 25 percent of children who are eligible but not yet enrolled in hawk-i and the Iowa Medicaid Program. To protect the safety of Iowans, we are recommending issuance of revenue bonds for approximately $260 million in net proceeds to build a new state penitentiary in Ft. Madison, renovate and expand the Women’s Correctional Institution at Mitchellville, upgrade kitchen facilities at the Rockwell City and Mt. Pleasant Correctional Institutions, and expand Community-Based Correctional Facilities in Ottumwa, Sioux City, Waterloo, and Des Moines. Additionally, we are including funding for developing a prototype program for providing parolees and low-risk offenders with mental health and drug abuse treatment and educational services to help them make a crime-free re-entry into our communities. As part of this Capitals Budget, we also propose using $20 million for the State’s matching share for building new facilities at the Iowa Veterans Home. Iowa Budget Report iv Fiscal Year 2009 Importantly, our budget continues to fully fund our State’s Reserve Funds to help buffer Iowa from any future economic downturn. We recommend reimbursing $78.2 million to the Property Tax Credit Fund as part of our multi-year proposal to correct bad budgeting practices and eventually restore $160.0 million to this Fund. To provide more transparency, we are transferring operational expenditures in the Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Fund to the General Fund and expenditures from the Endowment for Healthy Iowans and Healthy Iowans Tobacco Trust Funds to the General Fund. We believe that Iowa has charted a new course of becoming energy independent, providing quality pre-school education, recognizing the importance of our teachers, and providing greater health coverage for children. Our Fiscal Year 2009 budget and policy priorities reflect our continuing faith in Iowa’s ability to be the best state in the nation. We look forward to working with you in a bi-partisan and all-inclusive manner to build on our progress and protect our priorities. Sincerely, Chester J. Culver Governor Patty Judge Lt. Governor

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.

Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.