Contractual restrictions on lawful use of information: sole-source databases protected by the back door?

This article is concerned with the risks associated with the monopolisation of information that is available from a single source only. Although there is a longstanding consensus that sole-source databases should not receive protection under the EU Database Directive, and there are legislative provisions to ensure that lawful users have access to a database’s contents, Ryanair v PR Aviation challenges this assumption by affirming that the use of non-protected databases can be restricted by contract. Owners of non-protected databases can contractually exclude lawful users from taking the benefit of statutorily permitted uses, because such databases are not covered from the legislation that declares this kind of contract null and void. We argue that this judgment is not consistent with the legislative history and can have a profound impact on the functioning of the digital single market, where new information services, such as meta-search engines or price-comparison websites, base their operation on the systematic extraction and re-utilisation of materials available from online sources. This is an issue that the Commission should address in a forthcoming evaluation of the Database Directive.

Public–private partnerships in Russia: dynamics contributing to an emerging policy paradigm

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are new in Russia and represent project implementation in progress. The government is actively pursuing PPP deployment in sectors such as transportation and urban infrastructure, and at all levels including federal, regional and especially local. Despite the lack of pertinent laws and regulations, the PPP public policy quickly transforms into a policy paradigm that provides simplified concepts and solutions and intensifies partnership development. The article delineates an emerging model of Russia’s PPP policy paradigm, whose structure includes the shared understanding of the need for long-term collaboration between the public sector and business, a changing set of government responsibilities that imply an increasing private provision of public services, and new institutional capacities. This article critically appraises the principal dynamics that contribute to an emerging PPP policy paradigm, namely the broad government treatment of the meaning of a partnership and of a contractual PPP; a liberal PPP approval process that lacks clear guidelines and consistency across regions; excessive emphasis on positive PPP externalities and neglect of drawbacks; and unjustifiably extensive government financial support to PPPs. Whilst a paradigm appears to be useful specifically for the policy purpose of PPP expansion, it may also mask inefficiencies such as higher prices of public services and greater government risks.

'Rules of engagement’: how experiential learning facilitates the formation of a public–private partnership in Russia

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent one can apply experiential learning theory (ELT) to the public-private partnership (PPP) setting in Russia and to draw insights regarding the learning cycle ' s nature. Additionally, the paper assesses whether the PPP case confirms Kolb ' s ELT. Design/methodology/approach – The case study draws upon primary data which the authors collected by interviewing informants including a PPP operator ' s managers, lawyers from Russian law firms and an expert from the National PPP Centre. The authors accomplished data source triangulation in order to ensure a high degree of research validity. Findings – Experiential learning has resulted in a successful and a relatively fast PPP project launch without the concessionary framework. The lessons learned include the need for effective stakeholder engagement; avoiding being stuck in bureaucracy such as collaboration with Federal Ministries and anti-trust agency; avoiding application for government funding as the approval process is tangled and lengthy; attracting strategic private investors; shaping positive public perception of a PPP project; and making continuous efforts in order to effectively mitigate the public acceptance risk. Originality/value – The paper contributes to ELT by incorporating the impact of social environment in the learning model. Additionally, the paper tests the applicability of ELT to learning in the complex organisational setting, i.e., a PPP.

Legal and regulatory barriers to effective public-private partnership governance in Kazakhstan

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical assessment of legal and regulatory impediments to effective governance of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Kazakhstan. Design/methodology/approach – The qualitative study develops propositions from the PPP literature and then tests them against findings from in-depth interviews. Interviewees have been selected by a purposeful sampling from PPP projects in Kazakhstan as well as from national and regional PPP centres. Findings – The identified barriers to effective PPP management include irregularities in the PPP legal framework, such as lack of legal definition of a PPP and controversy with the government guarantee’s legal status for its long-term payments to partnerships; bureaucratic tariff setting for partnership services; non-existent opportunity for private asset ownership; and excessive government regulation of PPP workers’ wage rates. Practical implications – The partners’ opposing perspectives on a number of PPP issues show that management needs to identify and carefully reconcile stakeholder values in a partnership in order to achieve more effective PPP governance. Practitioners, particularly those in the public agencies, have to be concerned with ways to reduce the government overregulation of the private operators, which is likely to result in greater PPP flexibility in management and, ultimately, higher efficiency in delivering the public services. Originality/value – By elucidating multiple examples of overregulation and PPPs’ inefficiency, the paper demonstrates that the government dominance in PPP management is conceptually inappropriate. Instead, the government should adopt the concept of co-production and manage its relations with the private sector partner in a collaborative fashion.

China and Kazakhstan’s oil and gas partnership at the start of the twenty-first century

Over the past decade, cooperation between China and Kazakhstan in the oil and gas sector has developed significantly. For China, security of its energy supply is a key strategic objective. This paper analyzes the evolution of Sino-Kazakh oil and gas relations, assesses their long-term prospects, and explores how Chinese demand for oil and gas could divert Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon resources from other energy markets. The netback approach has been used to assess the prices that China will need to offer other producers in Kazakhstan. Sino-Kazakh energy and economic cooperation could create a good basis for free economic zones and development of beneficial ties for both countries.

Models of Community Investment and Partnership Strategies and Processes for Ensuring Mutual Benefit between Institution and Community

Institutions continue to face increasing pressure from faculty, students, and other concerned constituents to divest endowment holdings from perceived social injustices. In this report, investment officers and advisory committee members offer insight into institutional practices used to respond to these concerns through the adoption of socially responsible investment policies and other socially responsible investment options. Contacts offer recommendations on balancing the administration’s fiduciary responsibility to ensure maximum endowment returns with the social concerns of institutional constituents.

Contingent Edis: a new contractual framework for minimizing the risk of incentive failures

Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

Contractual solutions to the holdup problem: a survey

In this survey, we presented the general idea and main results from what we understand that are the most important contributions to contractual solutions to the holdup problem literature. The aim of this paper is to push the previous analysis, uniform the notation and provide a snapshot on the most recent literature, as well as bring topics for future inquires on this issue.

Contratos relacionais na indústria aeronáutica brasileira : um estudo empírico do modelo de parcerias de risco da Embraer

O presente trabalho é um estudo empírico das práticas contratuais adotadas pela EMBRAER posteriormente ao seu processo de privatização em 1994, e do arranjo contratual empregado para viabilizar a realização dos projetos de aeronaves responsáveis pelo ressurgimento da empresa ao final da década 1990. Aspecto fundamental da engenharia contratual empreendida foi a formação das chamadas Parcerias de Risco entre a Embraer e um grupo selecionado de fornecedores-chave visando o co-desenvolvimento das aeronaves. A análise das informações obtidas na pesquisa aponta a importância epistemológica de se utilizar novos instrumentos de análise que permitam compreender melhor as práticas contratuais empregadas e seu papel no desenvolvimento. Assim, utilizamos a teoria relacional dos contratos como lente teórica para analisar o modelo de parcerias de risco e, por meio dela, investigar qual o papel exercido pelos elementos relacionais no sucesso dos programas ERJ 145 e EMBRAER 170/190. A hipótese central que norteia o trabalho é a de que, no inovador arranjo contratual que envolveu a Embraer, fornecedores estrangeiros e o BNDES, a relação contratual foi construída por meio de mecanismos promissórios e não-promissórios de projeção de trocas, e os padrões de normatividade estabelecidos entre as partes transcenderam o contrato escrito. A contribuição da teoria relacional dos contratos para a análise de tais práticas possui duplo caráter. A primeiro contribuição é eminentemente descritiva, ao fornecer um instrumental teórico mais abrangente e poderoso para compreender a real dinâmica das práticas contratuais em análise. A segunda contribuição, de natureza normativa, consiste em explicitar aspectos relacionais que compõem, juntamente com os elementos promissórios, uma certa normatividade interna ao contrato que informa a conduta dos agentes ao longo da relação. Nos programas ERJ 145 e EMBRAER 170/90, procuramos demonstrar como a formulação de um arranjo contratual mais relacional em substituição ao tradicional conjunto de relações contratuais de fornecimento descontínuas, foi fundamental para o sucesso dos projetos e até mesmo para a sua própria viabilização. Nesse sentido, a teoria relacional dos contratos fornece categorias de análise que não apenas oferecem um ferramental teórico mais adequado para descrever relações como a do caso em estudo, mas também fornece, por meio de uma descrição mais rica e abrangente, lições sobre como desenhar contratos. Isto é importante para demonstrar como a problemática das dimensões implícitas do contratos transcende o campo da teoria contratual e da justiça contratual e apresenta-se de grande relevância para a agenda de pesquisa em Direito e Desenvolvimento.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

The role of law and public-private collaboration in promoting innovative firms in Brazil: the case of the BNDES and the “criatec fund”

This paper presents the result of a qualitative empirical research about the “Criatec Fund”, a venture capital fund, privately managed and directed to innovative firms, that was created in 2007 by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). The paper discusses the role of law in the implementation of the Criatec Fund in three different legal dimensions: structural, regulatory and contractual. Based on interviews, this paper tries to test some hypothesis previously formulated by some scholars that studied new financial policies created by the BNDES. This study explains the institutional arrangements of this seed capital policy and the role of flexible legal instruments in the execution of this peculiar type of publicprivate partnership. It also poses some questions to the “law and development agenda” based on some insights from the economic sociology of law.

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.