Democracy and the curse of natural resources

We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our political economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources may be bad for democracy by harming political turnover. Our model also suggests a non-linear dependence of human capital on natural resources. For low levels of democracy human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed. This theoretical finding is corroborated in both cross section and panel data regressions.

A Computable general equilibrium approach to hypothetical extractions and missing links

Identifying key sectors or key locations in an interconnected economy is of paramount importance for improving policy planning and directing economic strategy. Hence the relevance of categorizing them and hence the corresponding need of evaluating their potential synergies in terms of their global economic thrust. We explain in this paper that standard measures based on gross outputs do not and cannot capture the relevant impact due to self- imposed modeling limitations. In fact, common gross output measures will be systematically downward biased. We argue that an economy wide Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach provides a modeling platform that overcomes these limitations since it provides (i) a more comprehensive measure of linkages and (ii) an alternate way of accounting for links' relevance that is in consonance with standard macromagnitudes in the National Income and Product Accounts.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Cuerpos liminales, identidades diferidas: la des/construcción de Ken Bugul, EK y Lucrècia Neves

Tres personajes, tres cuerpos liminales, periféricos, nómades cuya lucha es comprender su corporeidad y poder narrarse conforme a sus deseos. Sin discurso propio, sin nombre, sin memoria, son cuerpos hechos de reflejos, de construcciones realizadas por el otro; cuerpos resistentes que se des-construyen en cada página para poder encontrar un punto, aunque sea uno solo, que las mantenga a flote. Tres cuerpos, tres mujeres que escarban en la llaga de un mapa creado por discursos ajenos, por miradas panópticas que las excluyen de la posibilidad de ser legítimamente cuerpos narrados y leídos por ellas mismas. Tres cuerpos fronterizos, nómades; tres cuerpos cyborg.

What works best for getting the unemployed back to work: employment services or small-business assistance programs? evidence from Romania

Recent empirical evidence has found that employment services and small-business assistance programmes are often successful at getting the unemployed back to work. Â One important concern of policy makers is to decide which of these two programmes is more effective and for whom. Â Using unusually rich (for transition economies) survey data and matching methods, I evaluate the relative effectiveness of these two programmes in Romania. Â While I find that employment services (ES) are, on average, more successful than a small-business assistance programme (SBA), estimation of heterogeneity effects reveals that, compared to non-participation, ES are effective for workers with little access to informal search channels, and SBA works for less-qualified workers and those living in rural areas. Â When comparing ES to SBA, I find that ES tend to be more efficient than SBA for workers without a high-school degree, and that the opposite holds for the more educated workers.

North-South trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs), market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where IPRs are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. An important implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, is consistent with evidence from a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990. The paper also provides empirical support for the mechanism linking North-South trade to the direction of technical change: an increase in import penetration from low-wage, low-IPRs, countries is followed by a sharp fall in R&D investment in a panel of US manufacturing sectors.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Calibration of CES functions for real-world multisectoral modeling

We show how to calibrate CES production and utility functions when indirect taxation affecting inputs and consumption is present. These calibrated functions can then be used in computable general equilibrium models. Taxation modifies the standard calibration procedures since any taxed good has two associated prices and a choice of reference value units has to be made. We also provide an example of computer code to solve the calibration of CES utilities under two alternate normalizations. To our knowledge, this paper fills a methodological gap in the CGE literature.

The Total fiscal cost of indirect taxation: an approximation using Catalonia's recent input-output table

In this note we quantify to what extent indirect taxation influences and distorts prices. To do so we use the networked accounting structure of the most recent input-output table of Catalonia, an autonomous region of Spain, to model price formation. The role of indirect taxation is considered both from a classical value perspective and a more neoclassical flavoured one. We show that they would yield equivalent results under some basic premises. The neoclassical perspective, however, offers a bit more flexibility to distinguish among different tax figures and hence provide a clearer disaggregate picture of how an indirect tax ends up affecting, and by how much, the cost structure.

A Retail benchmarking approach to eficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network covera.

The Spread of free-riding behavior in a social network

We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.

La fundamentación de los códigos de conducta de la Administración Pública

L’entorn administratiu d’aquests últims anys ha evidenciat la proliferació dels codis de conducta de l’Administració pública, un instrument procedent de l’experiència anglosaxona, especialment de la nord-americana, que en el present està en apogeu a l’Estat espanyol. La realitat ha exigit el desenvolupament d’un mecanisme extrínsec capaç de procurar la comprensió de determinats estàndards ètic-institucionals, així com d’orientar l’actuació d’uns empleats públics que, amb caràcter general, es troben lluny d’encarnar aquella que podríem considerar característica del mite de l’administrador ben educat. Així, sorgeix la voluntat ferma de recórrer a una figura que alguns han qualificat d’organitzativa, la finalitat de la qual rau en cobrir aquelles àrees de l’activitat administrativa que presenten una situació especialment sensible, responent a la necessitat d’una reforma administrativa multidireccional que afronti els nous reptes. El fenomen actual dels codis ètics no ha romàs immune a la influència d’uns determinats corrents de pensament, que no només han definit els fonaments específics dels mateixos –subjacents en la formulació dels principis que incorporen−, sinó també la base del marc ètic-públic en el qual els codis es troben immersos. Els codis de conducta dels funcionaris públics anglosaxons estan arrelats, principalment, en les ètiques fundacionals (teleològica utilitarista i deontològica kantiana) i, de manera indirecta, en aquells preceptes jurídics que en el seu moment varen acollir els principis ètic-públics fundacionals, conformant el que avui denominem ètica institucional, inserida en un marc jurídic-positiu. Per aquest motiu podem afirmar la naturalesa híbrida dels codis de conducta, majoritàriament ètica però no exclusiva que, atenent als principis constitucionals, encapçalarà el diàleg entre la tradicional disjuntiva Ètica-Dret. La necessitat d’elaboració i d’implantació dels codis de conducta al servei del bé dels ciutadans ha conduït, sense més ni més, a la recepció del model nord-americà a l’Estat espanyol, desproveïda de qualsevol element distintiu entre ambdues cultures. D’aquesta manera, l’Administració pública espanyola ha incorporat uns codis ètics de fonamentació únicament fundacional, sense ni tan sols procurar un marc d’aplicació conforme a les exigències públiques del nostre Estat. En desavinença a aquest fet, proposem un model en el que, prescindint –i fins i tot assumint− d’una irreversible formulació fundacional dels codis, l’aplicació d’aquestes figures assenti la base en l’ètica de les virtuts. Les normes i els deures definits en els codis de conducta dels empleats públics no poden esdevenir realitats morals primàries, sinó que han d’estar en funció de la vida segons la virtut. Aquesta concepció ètica dirigeix l’home fins a un nivell de reflexió que li permet indagar racionalment sobre el bé veritable de la vida humana, obrint camí a la perfecció d’una conducta que, en última instància, li proporcionarà l’autèntica llibertat d’acord amb les seves pròpies conviccions.

Labor productivity in Spain: 1977-2002

This study examines the evolution of labor productivity across Spanish regions during the period from 1977 to 2002. By applying the kernel technique, we estimate the effects of the Transition process on labor productivity and its main sources. We find that Spanish regions experienced a major convergence process in labor productivity and in human capital in the 1977-1993 period. We also pinpoint the existence of a transition co-movement between labor productivity and human capital. Conversely, the dynamics of investment in physical capital seem unrelated to the transition dynamics of labor productivity. The lack of co-evolution can be addressed as one of the causes of the current slowdown in productivity. Classification-JEL: J24, N34, N940, O18, O52, R10

Incentives for interdisciplinary research

This paper is a positive analysis of the driving forces in interdisciplinary research. I take the perspective of a research institution that has to decide how to apply its resources among the production of two types of knowledge: specialized or interdisciplinary. Using a prize mechanism of compensation, I show that the choice of interdisciplinarity is compatible with profit maximization when the requirement for the production is sufficiently demanding, and when the new interdisciplinary field is not too neutral. Productive gains due to complementarities of efforts is the main advantage of interdisciplinary organization.

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio