Quality and Competition: An Empirical Analysis across Industries, March 2006

This paper empirically explores the link between quality and concentration in a cross-section of manufactured goods. Using concentration data and product quality indicators, an ordered probit estimation explores the impact of concentration on quality that is defined as an index of quality characteristics. The results demonstrate that market concentration and quality are positively correlated across different industries. When industry concentration increases, the likelihood of the product being higher quality increases and the likelihood of observing a lower quality decreases.

High incidence of childhood hemolytic uremic syndrome in Switzerland is associated with indicators of livestock farming intensity

Background: Hemolytic-uremic syndrome (HUS) is a multisystem disorder associated with significant morbidity and mortality. Typically, HUS is preceded by an episode of (bloody) diarrhea mostly due to Shiga-toxin (Stx) producing Escherichia coli (STEC). The main reservoir for STEC is the intestine of healthy ruminants, mostly cattle, and recent studies have revealed an association between indicators of livestock density and human STEC infection or HUS, respectively. Nationwide data on HUS in Switzerland have been established through the Swiss Pediatric Surveillance Unit (SPSU) [Schifferli et al. Eur J Pediatr. 2010; 169:591-8]. Aims: Analysis of age-specific incidence rate of childhood HUS and possible association of Shiga-toxin associated HUS (Stx-HUS) with indicators of livestock farming intensity. Methods: Epidemiological and ecological analysis based on the SPSU data (1997-2003) and the database of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (data on population and agriculture). Results: One hundred-fourteen cases were registered, 88% were ≤5 years old. The overall annual incidence rate was 1.42 (0.60-1.91) and 4.23 (1.76-6.19) per 100000 children ≤5 and ≤16 years, respectively (P = 0.005). Stx-HUS was more frequent compared to cases not associated with STEC (P = 0.002). The incidence rate for Stx-HUS was 3.85 (1.76-5.65) in children ≤5, compared to 0.27 (0.00-0.54) per 100'000 children 5-16 years (P = 0.002), respectively. The incidence rate of cases not associated with STEC infection did not significantly vary with age (P = 0.107). Compared to data from Scotland, Canada, Ireland, Germany, England, Australia, Italy, and Austria the annual incidence rate of HUS in young children is highest in Switzerland. Ecological analysis revealed strong association between the incidence rate of Stx-HUS and indicators of rural occupation (agricultural labourer / population, P = 0.030), farming intensity (livestock breeding farms / population, P = 0.027) and cattle density (cattle / cultivated area, P = 0.013). Conclusions: Alike in other countries, HUS in Switzerland is mostly associated with STEC infection and affects predominantly young children. However, the incidence rate is higher compared to countries abroad and is significantly correlated with indicators of livestock farming intensity. The present data support the impact of direct and indirect contact with animals or fecal contaminants in transmission of STEC to humans.

Multisensory facilitation of behavior in monkeys: effects of stimulus intensity.

Multisensory stimuli can improve performance, facilitating RTs on sensorimotor tasks. This benefit is referred to as the redundant signals effect (RSE) and can exceed predictions on the basis of probability summation, indicative of integrative processes. Although an RSE exceeding probability summation has been repeatedly observed in humans and nonprimate animals, there are scant and inconsistent data from nonhuman primates performing similar protocols. Rather, existing paradigms have instead focused on saccadic eye movements. Moreover, the extant results in monkeys leave unresolved how stimulus synchronicity and intensity impact performance. Two trained monkeys performed a simple detection task involving arm movements to auditory, visual, or synchronous auditory-visual multisensory pairs. RSEs in excess of predictions on the basis of probability summation were observed and thus forcibly follow from neural response interactions. Parametric variation of auditory stimulus intensity revealed that in both animals, RT facilitation was limited to situations where the auditory stimulus intensity was below or up to 20 dB above perceptual threshold, despite the visual stimulus always being suprathreshold. No RT facilitation or even behavioral costs were obtained with auditory intensities 30-40 dB above threshold. The present study demonstrates the feasibility and the suitability of behaving monkeys for investigating links between psychophysical and neurophysiologic instantiations of multisensory interactions.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Individual vocal signatures in barn owl nestlings: does individual recognition have an adaptive role in sibling vocal competition?

To compete over limited parental resources, young animals communicate with their parents and siblings by producing honest vocal signals of need. Components of begging calls that are sensitive to food deprivation may honestly signal need, whereas other components may be associated with individual-specific attributes that do not change with time such as identity, sex, absolute age and hierarchy. In a sib-sib communication system where barn owl (Tyto alba) nestlings vocally negotiate priority access to food resources, we show that calls have individual signatures that are used by nestlings to recognize which siblings are motivated to compete, even if most vocalization features vary with hunger level. Nestlings were more identifiable when food-deprived than food-satiated, suggesting that vocal identity is emphasized when the benefit of winning a vocal contest is higher. In broods where siblings interact iteratively, we speculate that individual-specific signature permits siblings to verify that the most vocal individual in the absence of parents is the one that indeed perceived the food brought by parents. Individual recognition may also allow nestlings to associate identity with individual-specific characteristics such as position in the within-brood dominance hierarchy. Calls indeed revealed age hierarchy and to a lower extent sex and absolute age. Using a cross-fostering experimental design, we show that most acoustic features were related to the nest of origin (but not the nest of rearing), suggesting a genetic or an early developmental effect on the ontogeny of vocal signatures. To conclude, our study suggests that sibling competition has promoted the evolution of vocal behaviours that signal not only hunger level but also intrinsic individual characteristics such as identity, family, sex and age.

Report to Government Oversight Committee Regrading Soil and Water Conservation Districts Competition with Small Business, 2006

At the request of the Government Oversight Committee, the Ombudsman gathered information regarding competition by county Soil and Water Conservation Districts (SWCD) with small business through the sale of products and services. The goal of the Ombudsman’s review was to assist the Government Oversight Committee (Committee) in gaining an objective understanding of the issues so the Committee can ascertain whether there is a problem that requires legislation this legislative session. The Ombudsman focused on gathering specific information from four SWCD offices in central Iowa; Dallas, Greene, Guthrie and Jasper. These offices were specifically identified in documentation presented to the Government Oversight Committee by affected small business owners (contractors), Jon Judson of Diversity Farms and Dan Brouse of Iowa Restorations. However, with 100 SWCDs in Iowa,1 each with their own elected commissioners and each with different practices, priorities and fundraising activities, what the Ombudsman learned about these four counties may not be applicable to all the SWCDs in Iowa. The Ombudsman assigned the case to the Assistant Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman for Small Business, Kristie Hirschman. For reference purposes in this report, actions taken by Ms. Hirschman will be ascribed to the Ombudsman.

Pain intensity among institutionalized elderly: a comparison between numerical scales and verbal descriptors

AbstractOBJECTIVECorrelating two unidimensional scales for measurement of self-reported pain intensity for elderly and identifying a preference for one of the scales.METHODA study conducted with 101 elderly people living in Nursing Home who reported any pain and reached ( 13 the scores on the Mini-Mental State Examination. A Numeric Rating Scale - (NRS) of 11 points and a Verbal Descriptor Scale (VDS) of five points were compared in three evaluations: overall, at rest and during movement.RESULTSWomen were more representative (61.4%) and the average age was 77.0±9.1 years. NRS was completed by 94.8% of the elderly while VDS by 100%. The association between the mean scores of NRS with the categories of VDS was significant, indicating convergent validity and a similar metric between the scales.CONCLUSIONPain measurements among institutionalized elderly can be made by NRS and VDS; however, the preferred scale for the elderly was the VDS, regardless of gender.

The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing

In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

Let's (not) talk about sex: The effect of information provision on gender differences in performance under competition

We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.