377 resultados para CGT concessions
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The macroeconomic results achieved by Belarus in 2012 laid bare the weakness and the inefficiency of its economy. Belarus’s GDP and positive trade balance were growing in the first half of last year. However, this trend was reversed when Russia blocked the scheme of extremely lucrative manipulations in the re-export of Russian petroleum products by Belarus and when the demand for potassium fertilisers fell on the global market. It became clear once again that the outdated Belarusian model of a centrally planned economy is unable to generate sustainable growth, and the Belarusian economy needs thorough structural reforms. Nevertheless, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka consistently continues to block any changes in the system and at the same time expects that the economic indicators this year will reach levels far beyond the possibilities of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, there is a risk that the Belarusian government may employ – as they used to do – instruments aimed at artificially stimulating domestic demand, including money creation. This may upset the relative stability of state finances, which the regime managed to achieve last year. The worst case scenario would see a repeat of what happened in 2011, when a serious financial crisis occurred, forcing Minsk to make concessions (including selling the national network of gas pipelines) to Moscow, its only real source of loans. It thus cannot be ruled out that also this time the only way to recover from the slump will be to receive additional loan support and energy subsidies from Russia at the expense of selling further strategic companies to Russian investors.
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The policy of rapprochement with Russia that President Victor Yanukovych and his entourage had been actively promoting in the first months of his presidency has slowed down notably. One of the reasons for this lowered pace is that current talks between Russia and Ukraine concern the spheres in which Kyiv is not ready to make concessions to Russia. Despite numerous top-level meetings, recent months have failed to bring a breakthrough in energy issues of key importance. First of all, no compromise was reached in gas issues where the divergence of interests is particularly large and where Ukraine has adopted a tough stance to negotiate the best conditions possible. Even though some agreements were signed during the October session of the inter-governmental committee presided over by the prime ministers (the agreement on linking the two states’ aircraft production and on the joint construction of a nuclear fuel production plant), these resulted from prior agreements. Economic negotiations will continue in the coming months but the observed deadlock is not likely to be broken any time soon. The results of these talks are likely to reflect the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, as well as the competition among Ukrainian business groups, some of which opt for closer cooperation with their Eastern neighbour. Ukraine’s consent to send oil to Belarus along the Odessa-Brody pipeline shows that the government in Kyiv is ready to engage in projects they consider profitable, even those that run counter to Russian interests. Ukraine’s adoption of this stance may trigger irritation in Moscow and lead to a cooling in bilateral relations.
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Measures undertaken by the Belarusian government in the areas of the economy, internal affairs and foreign policy in recent months have proven increasingly ineffective. Despite the deteriorating macroeconomic situation, Minsk is not implementing the reforms necessary to combat the crisis and its activity is limited only to feigned actions and administrative regulations. As a result, the economic situation is worsening but the chances of obtaining external loans as support, for example from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are decreasing. At the same time there is mounting fear among the regime of social unrest, therefore by raising salaries of the least well-off groups of citizens it is trying to compensate for the increased costs of living. On the other hand, the government is extending the scope of control over society and competences of enforcement bodies. Belarus’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy has also been diminishing substantially. Despite the EU’s declared willingness to reach an agreement and its encouragement, Lukashenko is not ready to make concessions in the political sphere (e.g. to rehabilitate political prisoners), and this is hindering the normalisation of relations with the West. Minsk furthermore feels a mounting pressure from Moscow, making the Belarusian negotiating position ever weaker. The lack of freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy, no possibility to maintain a costly economic model and the lack of support from the majority of society all prove that Alexander Lukashenko’s regime is in severe crisis. The system he established is no longer able to respond to current threats with adequate and effective strategies. This situation is challenging the regime’s stability and calls into question its viability in the longer term.
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The European process is based on compromises; when it comes to selling them to national electorates, countries behave differently. France feels compelled to declare victory; Germany has more often chosen to stress the concessions that it made, adding that they were painful but necessary for the sake of ‘Europe’. The reality is very different. In this new EuropEos Commentary, Riccardo Perissich, Executive Vice-President of the Council for the United States and Italy, describes that European reality, in unambiguous terms.
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How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.
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This paper argues that the UK government's renegotiation bid is too feeble to be deserving of concessions by its EU partners, but that the rest of the EU can give the British what they seem to want by pressing on themselves to federal union.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Map: Perth, Lanark & Richmond Settlements, district of Bathurst, Upper Canada with part of the adjacent county; Plans: [1]. Township of Drummond, ten miles square. This sketch shows how a township is divided into concessions & lots; [2]. Perth.
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Second series published by W. Shoberl; 3d series, by J. Murray. Third series has added t.p.
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Title from caption.
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Introductory.--The land régime and the freedom of trade.--Taxation.--Military expeditions.--The concessions.--Depopulation.--The abandoned infants.--Recruiting of soldiers and workmen.--Justice.--Institution of a committee.
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[I] Inception and development. Pre-exposition. Exposition. The exhibits. Concessions and utilities.-[II] Conclusions. Financial statement, 1901-1913. Illustrations. Appendices.
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Cover title.
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The last decade has witnessed a significant growth in transnational organised crime activities. It has also seen multiple efforts by the international community to come to terms with this rise of organised crime and to work towards an international instrument to combat the activities of criminal organisations. In December 2000, the United Nations opened for signature the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2001), also known as the Palermo Convention, a treaty that is supplemented by three protocols on trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, and trafficking in firearms and ammunition. The conclusion of the Convention marks the end of more than eight years of consultations on a universal instrument to criminalise and counteract transnational criminal organisations. This article illustrates the developments that led to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and reflects on the amendments and concessions that have been made to earlier proposals during the elaboration process. This article highlights the strengths of the Convention in the areas of judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance, and the shortcomings of the new Convention, in particular in failing to establish a universal, unequivocal definition of “transnational organized crime”.
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O que caracteriza uma pesquisa acadêmica num curso de doutorado é a apresentação de dois quesitos fundamentais. O primeiro é o elemento de inovação, capaz de enriquecer a pesquisa sobre o tema proposto. O segundo é o dos apontamentos como possibilidades de promoverem novos caminhos de releituras. Nesse sentido, nos convencemos de que a presente tese atende a expectativa, pois, o elemento inovador desta pesquisa é a desconstrução do conceito de saga da criação proposto por Karl Barth. É novo porque não encontramos, como suspeitávamos, nenhum autor, ou mesmo obra ou pesquisa que tenha proposto esta mesma tarefa. Ao contrário, há até alguns autores que enaltecem a pesquisa realizada por Karl Barth, como é o caso de Coats e Brueggemann. Apesar de reagirem a alguns pontos da teologia de Barth, porém, não o fizeram, especificamente, ao conceito de saga. O segundo quesito, estruturalmente ligado ao primeiro, é o que promove as possibilidades de releituras. A partir do pensamento de Paul Ricoeur propomos uma nova hermenêutica bíblica, fundamentada a partir daquilo que Ricoeur chamou de via longa, que utiliza-se de vários métodos, inclusive o histórico crítico, para se buscar uma interpretação do mundo do texto que gere sentido ao mundo frente ao texto. Acreditamos que esta proposta é capaz de superar a leitura puramente dogmática do mundo do texto. De acordo com Ricoeur, acreditamos que os elementos fundantes que pautaram a hermenêutica em torno do Dasein, ou mesmo, em torno da relação sujeito/objeto podem contribuir para uma nova hermenêutica, desde que não façam as mesmas concessões ao sujeito conhecente. Assim, a possibilidade de uma nova releitura se revela a partir daquilo que Ricoeur definiu, na relação dialética entre mundo do texto e mundo frente ao texto, como representância (réprésentance) revelante e transformante. E é nesse ponto que as Sagradas Escrituras ocupam o posto de fonte de revelação e inspiração.