Norway and the Bear. Norwegian defence policy- lessons for the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 38, January 2014

Norway is currently the only Western European state and ‘old’ NATO member that strongly relies on the traditional dimension of NATO's collective defence. It is also the only ally in Western Europe which perceives Russia as a threat to its military security, in the so-called High North. In order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the region, Norway has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Cooperation means improving collaboration with Russia in cross-border relations, in the petroleum sector and in the military sphere. The deterrent measures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collective defence alliance; increasing military cooperation with the United States; building up Norway’s own military capabilities; and developing military cooperation across Northern Europe. The primary objective of Oslo’s defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of crises and conflicts emerging in the High North which could prove too ‘big’ for Norway but too ‘small’ for NATO.

The bear watches the dragon. The Russian debate on China. OSW Point of View Number 31, February 2013

Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.

Is a Concordat over Ukraine now conceivable with Mishka the bear? CEPS Commentary, 21 December 2014

With the tumultuous year of ever-changing episodes in Ukraine coming to a close – from Yanukovich reneging at Vilnius last November, to the new Maidan, to Yanukovich fleeing for his life, to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and incursions into the eastern Donbass, the election of pro-European President Poroshenko, the war with over 4,000 dead, the election of a new pro-European parliament and now the crash of the rouble – Michael Emerson sees at last a possible the end-game in sight. In this commentary, he sketches the essential elements of a Concordat to be struck between Russia, Ukraine and the West that would allow the eastern Donbass to be drawn into more normal processes of political and economic negotiation and the badly wounded Russia to gradually return to more normal international relations.

A ship run aground Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy. OSW Commentary Number 173, 16 June 2015

The drop in Ukraine’s GDP by nearly 18% in the first three months of 2015 (versus the corresponding period in 2014) has confirmed the decline of the country’s economy. Over the last 14 months, the Ukrainian currency was subject to an almost threefold devaluation against the US dollar, and in April 2015 the inflation rate was 61% (year-on-year), which exacerbated the impoverishment of the general public and weakened domestic demand. The main reason behind the crisis has been the destruction of heavy industry and infrastructure in the war-torn Donbas region, over which Kyiv no longer has control, as well as a sharp decline in foreign trade (by 24% in 2014 and by 34% in the first quarter of 2015), recorded primarily in trading volume with Ukraine’s major trade partner, i.e. Russia (a drop of 43%). The conflict has also had a negative impact on the production figures for the two key sectors of the Ukrainian economy: agriculture and metallurgy, which account for approximately 50% of Ukrainian exports. The government’s response to the crisis has primarily been a reduction in the costs of financing the Donbas and an increase in the financial burden placed on the citizens and companies of Ukraine. No radical reforms which would encompass the entire system, including anti-corruption reforms, have been carried out to stop the embezzlement of state funds and to facilitate business activity. The reasons for not initiating reforms have included the lack of will to launch them, Ukraine’s traditionally slow pace of bureaucratic action and growing dissonance among the parties making up the parliamentary coalition. The few positive changes, including marketisation of energy prices and sustaining budgetary discipline (in the first quarter of 2015, budgetary revenues grew by 25%, though partly as a result of currency devaluation), are being carried out under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which is making the payment of further loan instalments to the tune of US$ 17.5 billion conditional upon reforms. Despite assistance granted by Western institutional donors and by individual states, the risk of Ukraine going bankrupt remains real. The issue of restructuring foreign debt worth US$ 15 billion has not been resolved, as foreign creditors who hold Ukrainian bonds have not consented to any partial cancellation of the debt. Whether Ukraine’s public finances can be stabilised will depend mainly on the situation in the east of the country and on the possible renewal of military action. It seems that the only way to rescue Ukraine’s public finances from deteriorating further is to continue to ‘freeze’ the conflict, to gradually implement wide-ranging reforms and to reach a consensus in negotiations with lenders.

Seasonal mean air temperatures and ice phenology characteristics of Great Bear Lake and Great Slave Lake (2002-2009)

Time series of brightness temperatures (T(B)) from the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer-Earth Observing System (AMSR-E) are examined to determine ice phenology variables on the two largest lakes of northern Canada: Great Bear Lake (GBL) and Great Slave Lake (GSL). T(B) measurements from the 18.7, 23.8, 36.5, and 89.0 GHz channels (H- and V- polarization) are compared to assess their potential for detecting freeze-onset/melt-onset and ice-on/ice-off dates on both lakes. The 18.7 GHz (H-pol) channel is found to be the most suitable for estimating these ice dates as well as the duration of the ice cover and ice-free seasons. A new algorithm is proposed using this channel and applied to map all ice phenology variables on GBL and GSL over seven ice seasons (2002-2009). Analysis of the spatio-temporal patterns of each variable at the pixel level reveals that: (1) both freeze-onset and ice-on dates occur on average about one week earlier on GBL than on GSL (Day of Year (DY) 318 and 333 for GBL; DY 328 and 343 for GSL); (2) the freeze-up process or freeze duration (freeze-onset to ice-on) takes a slightly longer amount of time on GBL than on GSL (about 1 week on average); (3) melt-onset and ice-off dates occur on average one week and approximately four weeks later, respectively, on GBL (DY 143 and 183 for GBL; DY 135 and 157 for GSL); (4) the break-up process or melt duration (melt-onset to ice-off) lasts on average about three weeks longer on GBL; and (5) ice cover duration estimated from each individual pixel is on average about three weeks longer on GBL compared to its more southern counterpart, GSL. A comparison of dates for several ice phenology variables derived from other satellite remote sensing products (e.g. NOAA Interactive Multisensor Snow and Ice Mapping System (IMS), QuikSCAT, and Canadian Ice Service Database) show that, despite its relatively coarse spatial resolution, AMSR-E 18.7 GHz provides a viable means for monitoring of ice phenology on large northern lakes.

(Table 1, page 605) Chemistry of concretions from Grand Lake (GL) and Ship Harbour Lake (SH), Nova Scotia and Mosque Lake (ML), Ontario

Studies by optical microscopy, x-ray diffraction, and electron probe techniques of ferromanganese concretions from three Canadian lakes reveal chemical banding of amorphous hydrated iron and manganese oxides. The average ratio of iron to manganese in concretions from these lakes varies from 0.43 to 2.56. The concentrations of cobalt, nickel, copper, and lead are one to two orders of magnitude below those reported for oceanic ferromanganese concretions.

Particulate concentrations and vertical fluxes of sedimentary material and chemical elements, composition of particulate and sinking material in the water column of the Bear Island Trough, Norwegian Sea, July 1995

CTD and nephelometric sounding data are considered along with parameters of the near-bottom currents and particulate fluxes measured by a subsurface mooring station in the northern part of the Bear Island Trough. It is shown that the near-bottom current is characterized by highly variable parameters, while distribution of suspended particulate matter demonstrates surface and bottom maxima. Horizontal and vertical fluxes of sedimentary material in the nepheloid layer are studied.

Ship.

[From Jasper Cropsey Sketch book, 1855-1856]

Lake, ship and trees.

[From Jasper Cropsey Sketch book, 1855-1856]