Productividad, competencia e innovación en la banca privada española (1900-1914)

This study investigates the productivity differences and its sourcesacross a set of banks during the last years of the liberal era of theSpanish banking system (1900-1914). These years were characterised bymajor qualitative and quantitative changes in the banking industry includinga sharp increase in the size of the system, in the number of firms, andin its regional distribution. Employing DEA productivity analysis andthe Malmquist index, we discover that these changes were accompanied bya generalised increase in the efficiency of least productive banks. Also,we observe that the crisis of some regional banking groups, like theCatalan, can be linked with its low productivity levels. In consequence,in the light of our productivity evidence, we conclude that the increasein competition was beneficial for the system because helped to the successof the most efficient banks.

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.

Monetary policy in a systemic crisis

This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisisfrom the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standardmonetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through whichmonetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbankmarket. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed,central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted bystandard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did notallow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design newchannels for liquidity injection.

Financial development, financial fragility and growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility(namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.

Interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in the twentieth century

Spanish banking historiography asserts that the largest banks performed in the twentieth century as though they constituted a monopoly. One of their main coordination schemes would have been a network of interlocking bank directors that would include most of the financial firms. Evidence available for the 1920s and 1960s seems to confirm the veracity of this hypothesis. In this paper, more systematic evidence is presented to cover the whole twentieth century with the aim of checking whether these networks persisted over the entire period or they were by-products of temporary situations. Our results show that no general network remained for more than a decade. Therefore, it should be ruled out that interlocking directorates worked as a coordination device of an alleged banking cartel.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

Department of Commerce - Division of Banking Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Department of Commerce - Division of Banking

The choice of the form of representation in multinational banking: Evidence from Spain

This paper investigates foreign direct investment in the bankingsector. The attention has been addressed to test the importanceof OLI advantages as the determinants of the bank's decisionto invest in foreign locations. Nevertheless, since banks canexpand their activities abroad through different organizationalforms that imply different levels of foreign involvement, theissue of the form of representation has been tackled. Theresults show the importance of OLI advantages in the form ofrepresentation in multinational banking.

Iowa Commercial Banking, Strategic Plan, 2003

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division including, goals and mission.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Banking as an emerging technology: Hoare's Bank, 1702-1742

London s financial market underwent dramatic change after 1700. More limitedthan Paris or Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, London became the leadingfinancial centre in Europe in the eighteenth century. There is an extensive andgrowing literature on the causes of this change, but comparatively little on thechange itself. This article provides detailed information on the operation of theLondon financial market around 1700 by describing the operations of a nascentLondon bank.

Cross-border banking in Europe: An empirical investigation

This paper investigates bilateral trade in banking services within the European Union. The attention has been addressed to two main issues. First, to test the bank's motivations for setting up the different forms of overseas offices, and secondly, to assess the importance of barriers to entry across national European banking systems. Empirical results confirm the existence of different motivations for establishing representative offices, branches and subsidiaries in foreign locations. In addition, evidence has been achieved about the importance of non-regulatory barriers that could make difficult the existence of a single European market for banking services.

The timing of foreign direct investment under uncertainty: Evidence from the Spanish banking sector

This paper investigates the timing of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the banking sector. The importance of this issue would arise from the existence of differential benefits associated to be the first entrant in a foreign location. Nevertheless, when uncertainty is considered, the existence of some Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) advantages can make FDI less reversible and/or more delayable and therefore it may be optimal for the firm to delay the investment until the uncertainty is resolved. In this paper, the nature of OLI advantages in the banking sector has been examined in order to propose a prognostic model of the timing of foreign direct investment. The model is then tested for the Spanish case using duration analysis.