An external site controls closing of the epithelial Na+ channel ENaC.

Members of the ENaC/degenerin family of ion channels include the epithelial sodium channel (ENaC), acid-sensing ion channels (ASICs) and the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans degenerins. These channels are activated by a variety of stimuli such as ligands (ASICs) and mechanical forces (degenerins), or otherwise are constitutively active (ENaC). Despite their functional heterogeneity, these channels might share common basic mechanisms for gating. Mutations of a conserved residue in the extracellular loop, namely the 'degenerin site' activate all members of the ENaC/degenerin family. Chemical modification of a cysteine introduced in the degenerin site of rat ENaC (betaS518C) by the sulfhydryl reagents MTSET or MTSEA, results in a approximately 3-fold increase in the open probability. This effect is due to an 8-fold shortening of channel closed times and an increase in the number of long openings. In contrast to the intracellular gating domain in the N-terminus which is critical for channel opening, the intact extracellular degenerin site is necessary for normal channel closing, as illustrated by our observation that modification of betaS518C destabilises the channel closed state. The modification by the sulfhydryl reagents is state- and size-dependent consistent with a conformational change of the degenerin site during channel opening and closing. We propose that the intracellular and extracellular modulatory sites act on a common channel gate and control the activity of ENaC at the cell surface.

Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and credit supply: Evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning experiments

We analyze the impact of countercyclical capital buffers held by banks on the supplyof credit to firms and their subsequent performance. Spain introduced dynamicprovisioning unrelated to specific bank loan losses in 2000 and modified its formulaparameters in 2005 and 2008. In each case, individual banks were impacteddifferently. The resultant bank-specific shocks to capital buffers, coupled withcomprehensive bank-, firm-, loan-, and loan application-level data, allow us toidentify its impact on the supply of credit and on real activity. Our estimates showthat countercyclical dynamic provisioning smooths cycles in the supply of credit andin bad times upholds firm financing and performance.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Bank Credit Card Information, Fall 2003

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Bank Credit Card Information

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Guard Your Bank Accounts!, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Guard Your Bank Accounts!

With a bang, not a whimper: Pricking Germany's "stock market bubble" in 1927 and the slide into depression

In May 1927, the German central bank intervenedindirectly to reduce lending to equity investors.The crash that followed ended the only stockmarket boom during Germany s relative stabilization 1924-28. This paper examines thefactors that lead to the intervention as well asits consequences. We argue that genuine concernabout the exuberant level of the stock market,in addition to worries about an inflow offoreign funds, tipped the scales in favour ofintervention. The evidence strongly suggeststhat the German central bank under HjalmarSchacht was wrong to be concerned aboutstockprices-there was no bubble. Also, theReichsbank was mistaken in its belief thata fall in the market would reduce theimportance of short-term foreign borrowing,and help to ease conditions in the money market.The misguided intervention had important realeffects. Investment suffered, helping to tipGermany into depression.

Financial liberalization, bank crises and growth: Assessing the links

This paper studies the effects of financial liberalization and banking crises on growth. It shows that financial liberalization spurs on average economic growth. Banking crises are harmful for growth, but to a lesser extent in countries with open financial systems and good institutions. The positive effect of financial liberalization is robust to different definitions. While the removal of capital account restrictions is effective by increasing financial depth, equity market liberalization affects growth directly. The empirical analysis is performed through GMM dynamic panel data estimations on a panel of 90 countries observed in the period 1975-1999.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.

Effects of mineralocorticoid and K+ concentration on K+ secretion and ROMK channel expression in a mouse cortical collecting duct cell line.

The cortical collecting duct (CCD) plays a key role in regulated K(+) secretion, which is mediated mainly through renal outer medullary K(+) (ROMK) channels located in the apical membrane. However, the mechanisms of the regulation of urinary K(+) excretion with regard to K(+) balance are not well known. We took advantage of a recently established mouse CCD cell line (mCCD(cl1)) to investigate the regulation of K(+) secretion by mineralocorticoid and K(+) concentration. We show that this cell line expresses ROMK mRNA and a barium-sensitive K(+) conductance in its apical membrane. As this conductance is sensitive to tertiapin-Q, with an apparent affinity of 6 nM, and to intracellular acidification, it is probably mediated by ROMK. Overnight exposure to 100 nM aldosterone did not significantly change the K(+) conductance, while it increased the amiloride-sensitive Na(+) transport. Overnight exposure to a high K(+) (7 mM) concentration produced a small but significant increase in the apical membrane barium-sensitive K(+) conductance. The mRNA levels of all ROMK isoforms measured by qRT-PCR were not changed by altering the basolateral K(+) concentration but were decreased by 15-45% upon treatment with aldosterone (0.3 or 300 nM for 1 and 3 h). The paradoxical response of ROMK expression to aldosterone could possibly work as a preventative mechanism to avoid excessive K(+) loss which would otherwise result from the increased electrogenic Na(+) transport and associated depolarization of the apical membrane in the CCD. In conclusion, mCCD(cl1) cells demonstrate a significant K(+) secretion, probably mediated by ROMK, which is not stimulated by aldosterone but increased by overnight exposure to a high K(+) concentration.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.