The impact of ownership structure on corporate debt policy : two stage least square simultaneous model approach for post crisis period : evidence from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

Ownership concentration as a governance mechanism has received considerable attention among academician, practitioners as well as policy makers because large-block shareholders are increasingly active in their demands that corporations adopt effective governance mechanisms to control managerial decisions, which include corporate debt policy. Earlier study on the agency model of the firm widely recognizes that the managerial ownership and external debt play an important role in mitigating agency conflicts and enhancing firm value. They also found that increase in the external monitors, for example the institutional investors, can actually play a useful role in limiting agency problems in the firm. This paper, using 100 Composite Index companies from Brusa Malaysia between 1998 to 2002 explores the impact of institutional holdings on managerial ownership and debt policy in an integrated framework by using a simultaneous equations estimation procedure (2SLS). The findings show that there is a significant impact of institutional ownership which serves effective control mechanism on managerial ownership and corporate debt policy as hypothesized. Findings of such evidence suggest that institutional holding thus have played an important role in managers' strategic management decision and reduce agency conflict. In addition, corporate debt policy too is governed by managerial ownership and exhibited a negative relation.

Managerial ownership concentration and agency conflict using logistic regression approach : evidence from Bursa Malaysia

This paper adopted logistic regression model to examine the relationship between level of managerial ownership concentration and agency conflict which are proxied by level of risk, firms leverage and firms dividend policy. The study covers a period of 5 years from 1997 through 2001. The study is based on the 100 blue-chip stocks, majority of which are derived from CI components. The findings suggest a positive and significant association between level of level of risk at lower level and managerial ownership while a negative and significant association is also evidenced between risk at higher level and managerial ownership concentration. While debt policy which serves as positive monitoring substitute for agency conflict is found to be positive and significant explaining the level of ownership concentration. Furthermore, dividend policies, which also serve as monitoring, substitute to reduce agency conflict between manager and external shareholders do not appear to have any significant impact on managerial ownership. On the other hand, the level of institutional ownership, which serves as external monitoring force, is found to have inverse impact on level of managerial ownership concentration. This is marginally significant at 10 level (p=.12). The findings, in part explain the argument that the managerial ownership help reduce agency conflict between outside equity holders and managers.

Sources of liquidity commonality, asymmetric information and ownership structure in emerging markets : evidence from the Chinese stock market

Xinwei Zheng examines if common factors of liquidity can be determined by ownership structure measured by asymmetric information in an emerging market that has adopted an order-driven trading system. Using China as a case for the study, I select a broad sample of stocks from two separate Chinese stock exchanges to measure and
analyse the relationship. My empirical evidence seems significant and pervasive. These findings about the Chinese stock market provide useful pointers for understanding commonality in emerging economies and shed critical light
on a new dimension of the working of emerging markets.

Impact of board composition and ownership on internationalisation strategy amongst small New Zealand firms

Internationalisation strategies are important for company expansion because New Zealand, with its four million people, has such a small market. Nonetheless, there mayor may not exist ;"agency costs" in the use of Outside Directors. Ownership patterns may also influence Internationalization Strategy. Using Binary Correlation, N-Way Cross-Tabulation, and Principal Component Analysis, we find evidence that Outside Directors have less influence on Internationalisation Strategy than Inside Directors. Family ownership also seems to have a greater association than non-family owned companies. Despite substantial limitations, the methods and models proposed seem to have some utility in examining the association of Internationalisation Strategy with Board Composition and Ownership Patterns.

Dog ownership, dog walking and children's and parents' physical activity

This study aimed to determine cross-sectional associations of dog ownership, dog walking, and physical activity (PA) among children and their parents. Objective measures of PA were obtained for children ages 5-6 and 10-12 years from 19 primary schools across Melbourne, Australia. Parents self-reported their PA, dog ownership, and frequency of dog walking: 53% of families owned a dog, 41% of children who owned a dog did not walk their dog at all, and 32% reported never or rarely walking their dog as a family. Dog ownership was associated with an additional 29 min/day in PA among younger girls, and 70 and 59 min/week more in PA among mothers of younger boys and older girls, respectively. Among mothers of older girls, dog owners were 1.6 times as likely to meet PA guidelines. Mothers with older boys and girls, and fathers with younger boys, who reported walking the dog regularly as a family, spent more time in PA (105, 90, and 158 more min/week, respectively). Promoting dog ownership and dog walking among children and as a family are potential strategies for increasing PA participation in some families.

Market based performance : do ownership structures, or firm policy choice matter?

This study examines whether the structure of share ownership or firm's dividend and debt policies provide explanation for firm performances in Malaysia. Firm performance, measured as Tobin's Q is modelled in a dynamic panel framework to estimate effects of director ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership, and firm's dividend and debt policy. The generalised methods of moments (GMM) method is used to estimated the models for 80 CI components companies listed on Main Board of Malaysia observed from 1999 to 2002. The findings reveal strong evidence of positive impact of firm's dividend and debt policy on firm performance. However, ownership structure seems to be less important for market based performance of Malaysian firms: These results are expected to provide guidelines to the investors regarding the significance of firm dividend policy, leverage policy and market to book value ratio as some of the key sources of value creation for Malaysian listed firms.

Ownership and strategic choice of HRM methods by Chinese SMEs

Using a sample of seventy-four Chinese small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), this paper explores the influence of ownership on human resource management (HRM) practices by SMEs. It concludes that enterprise ownership determines both strategic choice and the level of complexity in the application of HRM practices, which are more likely to be adopted by foreign-related and domestic, private-owned companies than by collective and state-owned enterprises.