776 resultados para American foreign policy
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
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The 1970s are in the limelight of a growing historiographic attention, partly due to the recent opening of new archival resources. 1973, in particular, has a special interest in the historian’s eyes, as many are the events that happened that year: to name but a few, the Chilean coup, the October War, the ensuing oil crisis, the Vietnamese peace treaty. So it is may be not entirely surprising that not much attention has been paid to the Year of Europe, a nebulous American initiative destined to sum up to nothing practical - as Kissinger himself put it, it was destined to be the Year that never Was.1 It is my opinion, however, that its failure should not conceal its historical interest. Even though transatlantic relations have sometimes been seen as an uninterrupted history of crisis,2 in 1973 they reached what could then be considered as their unprecedented nadir. I believe that a thorough analysis of the events that during that year found the US increasingly at odds with the countries of Western Europe is worth carrying out not only to cast a new light on the dynamics of transatlantic relations but also to deepen our comprehension of the internal dynamics of the actors involved, mainly the Nixon administration and a unifying Europe. The Nixon administration had not carefully planned what the initiative actually should have amounted to, and its official announcement appears to have been one of Kissinger’s coups de theatre. Yet the Year of Europe responded to the vital priority of revitalising the relations with Western Europe, crucial ally, for too long neglected. But 1973 did not end with the solemn renewal of the Atlantic Declaration that Kissinger had sought. On the contrary, it saw, for the first time, the countries of the newly enlarged EC engaged in a real, if short-lived, solidarity on foreign policy, which highlighted the Nixon administration’s contradictions regarding European integration. Those, in addition to the numerous tensions that already strained transatlantic relations, gave birth to a downward spiral of incomprehensions and misperceptions, which the unexpected deflagration of the October war seriously worsened. However, even though the tensions did not disappear, the European front soon started to disintegrate, mainly under the strains imposed by the oil crisis. Significant changes in the leadership of the main European countries helped to get the tones back to normal. During the course of 1974-5, the substantial failure of the Euro-Arab dialogue, the Gymlich compromise, frequent and serene bilateral meetings bear witness that the worst was over.
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La tesi analizza una parte della politica estera dell’amministrazione Johnson, e più specificamente l’avvio del dialogo con l’Urss in materia di non proliferazione e controllo degli armamenti e la revisione della China policy, inquadrando entrambe nell’adattamento della cold war strategy all’evoluzione sistema internazionale, argomentando che la distensione intesa come rilassamento delle tensioni e ricerca di terreno comune per il dialogo, fosse perlomeno uno degli strumenti politici che l’amministrazione scelse di usare. Il primo capitolo analizza i cambiamenti che interessarono il Blocco sovietico e il movimento comunista internazionale tra la fine degli anni Cinquanta e l’inizio degli anni Sessanta, soprattutto la rottura dell’alleanza sino-sovietica, e l’impatto che essi ebbero sul sistema bipolare su cui si basava la Guerra Fredda. Il capitolo secondo affronta più specificamente l’evoluzione delle relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica, il perseguimento di una politica di distensione, dopo la crisi dei missili cubani, e in che relazione si trovasse ciò con lo status della leadership sovietica a seguito dei cambiamenti che avevano avuto luogo. Soffermandosi sulla questione del controllo degli armamenti e sul percorso che portò alla firma del Trattato di Non-proliferazione, si analizza come la nuova rotta intrapresa col dialogo sulle questioni strategiche sia stato anche un cambiamento di rotta in generale nella concezione della Guerra Fredda e l’introduzione della distensione come strumento politico. Il terzo capitolo affronta la questione della modifica della politica verso Pechino e il processo tortuoso e contorto attraverso cui l’amministrazione Johnson giunse a distaccarsi dalla China policy seguita sino ad allora.
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Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.
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Maintaining the readiness U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is a fundamental pillar of American defense policy. The biggest issue facing the national laboratories that are charged with this mission is replenishing the highly skilled and specialized manpower that is necessary for this task. This lecture presents both physics and science policy questions that must be answered. It also presents employment opportunities for young scientists and engineers.
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1 Brief von Max Horkheimer an Rosel Favez, 03.12.1935; 5 Briefe zwischen Sidney B. Fay von der Bureau of International Search Cambridge, Massachusetts und Max Horkheimer, 1939-1941; 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer an James Feibleman, 02.03.1942; 5 Briefe von Hans Feibelmann an Max Horkheimer, 1936-1937; 2 Briefe zwischen Babette Feigenbaum und Max Horkheimer, 29.04.1941, 05.05.1941; 1 Brief von Arthur Feiler an Max Horkheimer, 15.10.1939; 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer an Adolf Feitler, 03.01.1935; 3 Briefe zwischen Frederick V. Filed von dem American Council Institute of Pacific Relations und Max Horkheimer, 1937, 05.04.1937; 9 Briefe zwischen Thea Field, Lowell Field und Max Horkheimer, 1935-1941; 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer an Finkelstein, 18.09.1941; 7 Briefe zwischen Harry Finkelstein und Max Horkheimer, 1936-1940; 1 Brief von Louis Finkelstein an Robert MacIver, 29.05.1940; 2 Briefe zwischen Louis Finkelstein und Max Horkheimer, 06.06.1940, 04.06.1940; 15 Briefe zwischen Hugo Fischer und Max Horkheimer, 1937-1938; 1 Brief von Hugo Fischer an P. Tillich; 1 Brief von Hugo Fischer an Karl A. Wittfogel, 17.06.1940; 2 Briefe von Max Horkheimer an Ernest Manheim, April 1942; 1 Brief von Alexander Farquharson an Max Horkheimer, 20.01.1940; 3 Briefe zwischen dem Institute of International Education, New York Edgar J. Fisher und Max Horkheimer, Oktober 1938, 18.10.1938; 10 Briefe zwischen Paul Fischer und Max Horkheimer, 1938-1940; 2 Briefe zwischen der Hessian Hills School New York und Max Horkheimer, 21.02.1938, 28.02.1938; 2 Briefe zwischen Dorothy Canfield Fisher und Max Horkheimer, 24.01.1939, 19.01.1939; 1 Brief von Ossip K. Flechtheim an Max Horkheimer, 04.01.1941; 2 Briefe zwischen der University of Minnesota, Minneapolis und Max Horkheimer, 02.08.1945, 15.09.1945; 3 Briefe zwischen Leo Löwenthal und Max Horkheimer, 1943-1945, 17.08.1945; 2 Briefe zwischen der University of Denver, Colorado und Max Horkheimer, 11.05.1943, 28.05.1943; 1 Brief von dem Institute Universitaire De Hautes Etudes Internationales Genf an Max Horkheimer, 25.01.1939; 1 Brief von Hans Kelsen an Max Horkheimer, 30.01.1939; Lebenslauf und 2 Empfehlungsschreiben von Max Fleischmann für Prof. Edwin Borchard; 1 Brief von der Columbia University in the City of New York an Franz Neumann, 17.04.1940; 3 Briefe zwischen Philipp Flesch und Max Horkheimer, 26.03.1940, 1939-1940; 17 Briefe zwischen Babette Fletcher, Theo Fletcher und Max Horkheimer, 1941-1950; 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer an Abraham Flexner, 07.06.1939; 1 Brief von Robert Fließ an Max Horkheimer, 24.10.1938; 1 Brief von der Foreign Policy Association New York an Max Horkheimer, 03.11.1934; 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer an Rudolf Forster, 10.01.1940; 2 Briefe von der Fortune Time & Life Building New York und Max Horkheimer, 1938-1940; 4 Briefe zwischen Siegmund H. Foulkes (Fuchs) und Max Horkheimer, 1936-1937, 31.12.1936; 5 Briefe zwischen Elsie M. Foulstone und Max Horkheimer, 1941; 1 Brief von Mary Fox an Max Horkheimer, 09.12.1938; 5 Briefe zwischen Ernst Fraenkel und Max Horkheimer, 1936-1938; 1 Heiratsanzeige Liesl Frank; 7 Briefe zwischen Philipp Frank und Max Horkheimer, 1937-1939; 6 Briefe zwischen Lothar G. Frank und Max Horkheimer, 1941; 7 Briefe zwischen Felix Frankfurter und Max Horkheimer, 1937-1941; 2 Briefe zwischen Joseph Freeman und Max Horkheimer, 22.11.1944; 1 Brief von der Free Synagogue New York an Max Horkheimer, 14.11.1938; 2 Briefe zwsichen Benjamin Freilichmann und Max Horkheimer, 07.01.1939, 23.01.1939; 2 Briefe zwischen dem Frenkel Travel Service New York und Max Horkheimer, 21.02.1936, 23.02.1936; 2 Briefe zwischen Hugo Freund und Max Horkheimer, 14.11.1938, 18.11.1938; 2 Briefe zwischen Julius A. Jr. Freynick und Max Horkheimer, 11.09.1939, 18.09.1939;
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In understanding that the efforts made in improving global health affects the health of U.S. citizens, a policy analysis of President Barak Obama's Global Health Initiative was conducted. Using materials gathered from experts in the field of health and their findings and recommendations, paired with the current policies of other G8 countries that pledged to support the efforts of improving global health, the analysis was conducted using four specifically defined criteria. The set criteria determine the appropriateness, responsiveness, effectiveness and equity of Obama's GHI in comparison to other G8 country health policies and overall global health priorities. G8 countries without a specific global health policy, or with a policy that was not in English were excluded from this study and Switzerland, headquarters of the World Health Organization, was added due to its membership in the OECD, and the fact that it has a specific foreign health policy. In evaluating the U.S. Global Health Initiative it is clear that in terms of implementing foreign policy specific to health, the United States is on the forefront alongside the United Kingdom and Switzerland. Other G8 Countries have pledged monies and in order to Millennium Development Health Goals by 2015. The U.S. Global Health Policy does not address issues necessary to meet Millennium Development Goals in Health. Instead the Global Health Initiative is focused narrowly on Fighting and rolling back the HIV/Aids Epidemic based on President Bush's PEPFAR policy. Policy recommendations for a more effective and efficient Global Health Initiative include building upon the PEPFAR policy foundation in order to strengthen health systems worldwide, allowing individuals and communities to combat unnecessary death and disease through research, education, and other preventative methods.^
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On September 3, 1954, Chinese artillery began shelling Quemoy (Jinmen), one of the Kuomintang-held offshore islands, setting off the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. This paper focuses on the crisis and analyzes the following three questions: (1) What was the policy the U.S. took towards the Republic of China (R.O.C), especially towards the offshore islands, to try to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? (2) What were the intentions of the U.S. government in trying to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? And (3) how should U.S. policy towards the R.O.C. which led to solving the Taiwan Strait Crisis be positioned in the history of Sino-American relations? Through analysis of these questions, this study concludes that the position the U.S. took to bring an end to crisis, one which prevented China from “liberating Taiwan” and the Kuomintang from “attacking the mainland,” brought about the existence of a de facto “two-China” situation.
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The thesis investigates if with the free news production, people who post information on collaborative content sites, known as interacting, tend to reproduce information that was scheduled for Tv news. This study is a comparison of the collaborative content vehicles Vc reporter, Vc no G1 and Eu reporter with TV news SBT Brasil, Jornal Nacional, Jornal da Record and Jornal da Band. We sought to determine whether those newscasts guide the collaborative platforms. The hypothesis assumes that Brazilian TV news have been building over time a credible relationship with the viewer, so it is possible to think that the interacting use the same criteria for selecting the broadcasts and reproduce similar information in collaborative content sites. The method used was content analysis, based on the study of Laurence Bardin and the type of research used was quantitative. This research concluded that, within a small portion of the universe surveyed, there are schedules of television news across the collaborative content.
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En 2011, con sólo 26 años y un único libro publicado -El desengaño de Internet: los mitos de la libertad en la red-, Evgeny Morozov (Bielorrusia, 1984) se convirtió en una figura de referencia a la hora de hablar del papel que desempeñan las nuevas tecnologías de la comunicación en nuestro mundo político, económico y cultural. Miembro de New American Foundation, editor de la revista Foreign Policy y profesor visitante en la Universidad de Standford, colabora habitualmente con cabeceras como The Economist, The New York Times, The Guardian, The Wall Street Journal o El País. Su enfoque afiliado y escéptico ha quedado de nuevo de manifiesto en su segundo libro- To Save Everything, Click Here (2013)-, en el que aborda la tendencia contemporánea a buscar soluciones tecnológicas a lo que en el fondo son problemas políticos, morales o incluso antropológicos.
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Since the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of Latin American states have attempted to incorporate in some way or another human rights concern into their respective foreign policies, highlighting a history of human rights abuses and the return of democratic political rule as a trigger for galvanizing a commitment to assist in preventing such violations in other countries. Yet, while human rights have come to play a non-trivial role in the contemporary foreign policy of many Latin American states, there is great diversity in the ways and the extent to which they go about incorporating human rights concerns into their foreign policies. Explaining the diversity of human rights foreign policies of new Latin American democracies is at the heat of this project. The main research questions are the following: Why do new democracies incorporate human rights into their foreign policies? And what explains the different international human rights policies of new democracies? To answer these questions, this research compares the human rights foreign policies of Chile and Brazil for over two decades starting from their respective transitions to democracy. The study argues that states commitment to international human rights is the result of the intersection of domestic and international influences. At the international level, the search for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition and credibility affected the adoption of international human rights in both cases but with different degrees of impact. International values and pressures by themselves, while necessary, are an insufficient condition for human rights initiatives perceived to have not insubstantial political, economic or strategic costs. New democracies will be more or less likely to actively include human rights in their international policies depending on the following four domestic conditions: political leadership legitimizing the inclusion of human rights into a state's policies, civil society groups connected to international human rights advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign policy decisions of their government, and the Foreign Ministry's attitudes towards international human rights and the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of the foreign policy process.
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This dissertation aims at integrating two scholarships: state-society relation studies and Chinese foreign policy analysis. I created Two-level Perception Gap Model to analyze different intellectual groups' relations with party-state by confirming Chinese intellectuals play a role in CFP making in general, China's Japan policy in particular. This model is an alternative approach, instead of conventional wisdom patron-client approach, to explain and analyze the pluralized intellectual-state relations in China. This model first analyzed the role of two intellectual groups, namely think tank scholars and popular nationalist, in China's Japan policy making, and then based on these analyses it explains the interactional patterns between these two intellectual groups and party-state. I used three case studies, which represented different types of issue, Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, to examine this model. First, I examined think tank scholar groups and the extent they influenced "core interest issue and sensitive issue (Issue 1)," Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, and their international patterns with party-state. Chapter 3 compares the responses of Chinese officials to the changes in the defense policy of Japan to the analyses from the think tank scholars. As the model assumes, results show that think tank scholars' analyses are consistent with China's policy position; nevertheless, it is difficult to confirm their analyses have influence on Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. Based on the analysis of journal articles, most articles do not provide policy suggestions or simply provide suggestions that do not deviate from the policy. As Gu's theory of pluralist institutionalism and my hypothesis points out, most think tank scholars are establishment intellectuals so they tend to be self-disciplined. Second, this model provide a new concept "patriotic dilemma" for analyzing the challenge and constraints brought by popular nationalist discourses and public mobilization to Chinese foreign policy decision makers. Chapter 4 investigated the cases study of the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, defined as "major/minor interest issue/ sensitive issue (Issue 3)," and the discourses from the popular nationalist, mainly focusing on anti-Japanese activists. The chapter also observes their influence on nationalist public opinions and analyzes how the nationalist public opinions constrain the policy choices among decision makers. Results strongly supported the hypothesis of patriotic dilemma that, although the popular nationalist group and public opinions constrained the policy choices of Chinese decision makers in the short term, they were unable to change the fundamental policy direction. Third, chapter 5 also focuses on anti-Japanese activists and examines the model with the case of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The result supported that hypothesis that China's policy change was not because of the influence from popular nationalist's discourses or public opinions but because of the change of priority of this issue, from major/minor interest issue to core interest issue. These two chapters also indicate that the patron-client model is unable to describe the popular nationalist. An alternative approach, such as the concept "patriotic dilemma" is needed to describe the relations between the popular nationalist and the government.
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Brazil has a dual identity as a Latin American country and one of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The regional and global dimensions of Brasilia’s foreign policy have been closely intertwined. Inspired by the idea of development and autonomy in the last ten years, Brazil has assumed a stronger regional leadership role. The result has been the emergence of a South American space, with Mercosur and Unasur as the main integration schemes. For Brazil, regionalism is not only a goal in itself but also an instrument for exerting global influence and for ‘soft-balancing’ the United States. Washington’s lower profile in the region has facilitated Brazil’s rise as a regional and even continental player, with a strong influence on the Latin American puzzle composed of many different pieces or concentric circles.
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The premise of this study is simple: before discussing what defence strategy the EU should adopt at Brussels-level, member states should clarify what they expect individually from the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Inspired by the confusion about EU defence policy in most European capitals, this authoritative study inverts the usual analytical approach applied to the debate on European strategy. Rather than initiating the enquiry from the perspective of common interests guiding CSDP, it analyses how seven prominent member states see CSDP as a tool to pursue their strictly national interests. Five researchers immersed themselves in the foreign policy worlds of Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Stockholm and Madrid, looking at CSDP through national lenses and away from the potentially distorting influence of ‘Brussels’ rhetoric.
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The spectacular offensive by Islamic radicals in Iraq this June has led the country to the verge of collapse, and is another scene of the deep crisis in the Middle East, in which Turkey is entangled. The immediate consequence of this is a severe crisis of prestige after the kidnapping by terrorists of Turkish diplomats and Ankara’s inability to resolve the situation; in the long term consequences include escalation of the Kurdish problem, and a further increase in threats to the security of Turkey itself as well as the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. Both Ankara’s options and its political will to actively respond to the crisis are extremely limited. Yet again in recent years, the current crisis, the broader situation in the Middle East, and finally the position of Turkey in the region elude unambiguous assessments and forecasts – these are prevented by the scale and growth of the reappraisals and tensions in the region. The only undoubted fact is that Turkey is strategically and irreversibly entangled in the Middle East’s problems, which are an important factor affecting the transformation of the state which the ruling AKP is implementing; and in the near future, this state of affairs will only deepen.